The *Insular Cases* Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories

**ABSTRACT.** The *Insular Cases* have been enjoying an improbable—and unfortunate—renaissance. Decided at the height of what has been called the “imperialist” period in U.S. history, this series of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the early twentieth century infamously held that the former Spanish colonies annexed by the United States in 1898—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam—“belong[ed] to, but [were] not a part of, the United States.” What exactly this meant has been the subject of considerable debate even as those decisions have received unanimous condemnation. According to the standard account, the *Insular Cases* held that the “entire” Constitution applies within the United States (defined as the states, the District of Columbia, and the so-called “incorporated” territories) while only its “fundamental” limitations apply in what came to be known as the “unincorporated” territories (today, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa). Scholars unanimously agree that the *Insular Cases* gave the Court’s sanction to U.S. colonial rule over the unincorporated territories—and that the reason for it was racism. Yet courts and scholars have recently sought to hoist the *Insular Cases* on their own racist petard—by “repurposing” them to defuse constitutional objections to certain distinctive cultural practices in the unincorporated territories. Adopting the standard account of the *Insular Cases*, according to which they created a nearly extraconstitutional zone, proponents of repurposing argue that the relative freedom from constitutional constraints that government action enjoys in the unincorporated territories can and should be exploited now to vindicate their peoples’ right to cultural self-preservation. This Article disagrees. Although I share the view that the Constitution should not ride roughshod over the cultural practices of the people of the unincorporated territories, I do not agree that the Constitution necessarily must bend to any such practices it finds there or that the *Insular Cases* present a legitimate—let alone desirable—doctrinal vehicle for preserving such practices. Instead, constitutional doctrines available outside of the *Insular Cases* present the most promising—and the only legitimate—doctrinal means for making the constitutional case in favor of cultural accommodation. Against the repurposing project, I argue that the *Insular Cases* gave rise to nothing less than a crisis of political legitimacy in the unincorporated territories, and that no amount of repurposing, no matter how well-intentioned—or even successful—can change that fact. On the contrary: repurposing the *Insular Cases* will prolong the crisis. They should be overruled.
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**INTRODUCTION**

The *Insular Cases* have been enjoying an improbable—and unfortunate—renaissance. Decided at the height of what has been called the “imperialist” period in U.S. history, this series of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the early twentieth century infamously held that the former Spanish colonies annexed by the United States in 1898—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam—“belong[ed] to . . . but [were] not a part of the United States.”

Although previous U.S. territories were “incorporated” into the United States upon annexation, these new ones had been annexed but not incorporated.

What exactly this meant has been the subject of considerable debate even as those decisions have received widespread condemnation. According to the standard account, the *Insular Cases* held that the entire Constitution applies within the United States—defined as the states, the District of Columbia, and the incorporated territories—while only its fundamental limitations apply in what came to be known as the “unincorporated” territories. According to an alternative account (to which I subscribe), the *Insular Cases* did not carve out a

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3. *See Sparrow, supra* note 1, at 99-110 (describing a range of views on the significance of the *Insular Cases*, and concluding that “[a] majority of the Court did agree to a decision that avoided a confrontation with Congress and happened to be consistent with the United States’s new imperial policy”); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665 (2020) (describing the *Insular Cases* as “much-criticized”).

4. “Limitations” here refers to rights, such as the Bill of Rights and constitutionally protected unenumerated rights, and limitations on government power expressed in absolute terms, such as the prohibitions on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and titles of nobility in Article I, Section 9. *See* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
largely extraconstitutional zone of territory subject to formal, internationally recognized U.S. sovereignty where none of the Constitution applies except for certain fundamental limitations. Instead, when it comes to which constitutional provisions apply where, the Insular Cases stand for a more modest twofold proposition. First, provisions defining their geographic scope with the phrase “United States” may or may not include unincorporated territories. Second, either way, fundamental limitations certainly apply within unincorporated territories, though what counts as “fundamental” may vary from one unincorporated territory to the next.5

Although what it means to be “unincorporated” remains contested to this day, every account of the Insular Cases agrees that they also stand for a considerably less modest proposition: that the federal government has the power to keep and govern territories indefinitely, without ever admitting them into statehood (or deannexing them, for that matter).6 Before 1898, territories annexed by the United States were presumed to be on a path to statehood.7 However, the

5. As I have noted in earlier scholarship challenging the standard account, that account is so ubiquitous that a comprehensive list of examples would take too much space. See Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], United States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 808 n.40 (2005) (listing selected examples); see id. at 870–77 (describing and challenging the standard account). This Article challenges the standard account with a particular focus on current efforts to rehabilitate the Insular Cases. For other challenges to it, see, for example, Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101 (2011); and GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 72–94 (1996). For a welcome effort to explore new approaches to the Insular Cases, see RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (Tomiko Brown-Nagin & Gerald L. Neuman, eds. 2015). For work that transcends this debate and takes the scholarship on the Insular Cases and the U.S. territories in exciting and generative new directions, see the other Articles in this Special Issue: Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Navassa: Property, Sovereignty, and the Law of the Territories, 131 YALE L.J. 2390 (2022); James T. Campbell, Aurelius’s Article III Revisionism: Reimagining Judicial Engagement with the Insular Cases and the “Law of the Territories,” 131 YALE L.J. 2542 (2022); and Addie C. Rolnick, Indigenous Subjects, 131 YALE L.J. 2652 (2022).

6. I have argued that the Insular Cases also introduced into U.S. constitutional law a doctrine of territorial deannexation. See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5 (explaining that the annexation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam gave rise to a debate among lawyers and legal scholars over whether it was constitutionally permissible to deannex U.S. territory [i.e., grant it independence] and arguing that the Insular Cases answered that question in the affirmative). I do not discuss the deannexationist aspect of the Insular Cases in this Article because it is relevant here only insofar as it occupies the same position as statehood—that is, as a status that can be postponed indefinitely.

7. See generally PETER ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (Univ. Notre Dame Press, 2d ed. 2019) (1987) (describing the debates over statehood in several territories subject to the Northwest Ordinance and the widely shared assumption that territorial status led to statehood and citizenship was incomplete without statehood);
annexation in 1898 of three territories populated largely by nonwhite people gave rise to a public debate over whether the United States, for the first time in its history, could continue to hold a territory indefinitely without eventually admitting it as a state.\textsuperscript{8} The Court found a way. It simply invented, out of whole cloth, the distinction between incorporated territories, which were on their way to statehood, and unincorporated territories, which might never become states, and placed these newly annexed territories in the latter category.\textsuperscript{9} The distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories thus served as the cornerstone of a racially motivated imperialist legal doctrine\textsuperscript{10}: the idea of the unincorporated territory gave sanction to indefinite colonial rule over majority-nonwhite populations at the margins of the American empire.\textsuperscript{11}

Since the Founding, territories had been subject to U.S. sovereignty but denied federal representation. The political illegitimacy of unrepresentative federal rule over their inhabitants had been justified by the shared understanding, confirmed by consistent practice, that territorial status was a temporary necessity that would end when a territory became a state.\textsuperscript{12} But by giving constitutional

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\textsuperscript{8} Earlier territories had nonwhite inhabitants as well, but on these contiguous lands, the United States pursued a combined policy of white settlement and forceful removal. See \textit{Paul Frymer, Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion} (2017); \textit{Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom} (2010).

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Balzac v. Porto Rico}, 258 U.S. 298, 311 (1922) (explaining the relationship between incorporation and statehood, which \textit{Downes} had implied, two decades after \textit{Downes}). Legal historian Sam Erman has located the origins of \textit{Downes}'s doctrine in the legislative and administrative context. See Sam Erman, \textit{Accomplices of Abbott Lawrence Lowell}, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 105, 113 (2018). As scholars of the \textit{Insular Cases} have long observed, Abbott Lawrence Lowell published an article in the \textit{Harvard Law Review} shortly before the Court decided \textit{Downes} in which he made the case for distinguishing between two classes of territories, those incorporated and those not, see Abbott Lawrence Lowell, \textit{The Status of Our Territories: A Third View}, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 176 (1899). See, e.g., \textit{Torruella}, supra note 1, at 25-32 (describing the debate among several leading legal scholars over the constitutional status of the territories annexed in 1898).


\textsuperscript{11} On the \textit{Insular Cases}' departure from the original meaning of the Territory Clause, according to which territorial status was understood as temporary, see Cesar A. Lopez-Morales, \textit{Making the Constitutional Case for Decolonization: Reclaiming the Original Meaning of the Territory Clause}, 53 Colum. Hum. RTS. L. Rev. 772 (2022).

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Balzac}, 258 U.S. at 311. See generally sources cited supra note 7, all of which support the proposition that, before 1898, territories annexed by the United States were widely presumed to be on a path to statehood.
sanction to the new and subordinate category of unincorporated territories, which might never become states, the Insular Cases raised the possibility that the United States could, if it so desired, govern unincorporated territories indefinitely despite the fact that their residents had neither representation in the federal government nor the assurance that such representation would be forthcoming upon their territory’s eventual admission as a state. After the Insular Cases, that possibility became a reality that has persisted for nearly 125 years.

The unincorporated territory was a judicial innovation designed for the purpose of squaring the Constitution’s commitment to representative democracy with the Court’s implicit conviction that nonwhite people from unfamiliar cultures were ill-suited to participate in a majority-white, Anglo-Saxon polity. With the creation of the unincorporated territory, the Court implicitly embraced the view that the theory of political legitimacy underlying the Constitution allowed for an exception, born of practical necessity and motivated by racism, permitting a representative democracy to govern people deemed inferior indefinitely without representation. The raison d’être of the Insular Cases was, therefore, to provide the constitutional foundation for perpetual American colonies.

But recent efforts to “repurpose” the Insular Cases have breathed new life into those reviled decisions. Adopting the standard account of the Insular Cases, according to which they created a nearly extraconstitutional zone for the unincorporated territories, proponents of repurposing argue that precisely because the Insular Cases swept aside most constitutional restraints upon government action in those territories, they now—counter-intuitively—hold the key to the survival of the unique and diverse cultures of these places: today, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI), and American Samoa.

These territories, all unincorporated, remain subject to U.S sovereignty, and overwhelming majorities of their populations apparently want to keep it that way.

13. On the popularity of the idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority and its relationship to U.S. imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century, see, for example, Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism: The Role of Ethno-Juridical Discourse in the Spanish-American War, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 1. On how scholars, legislators, and bureaucrats lay the groundwork for the doctrine, see sources cited supra note 9.

14. See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.

15. For a general introduction to the law of the unincorporated territories, see ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989).
way. At the same time, several of them have certain traditional cultural practices that could be in tension or outright conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The practices at issue include, for example, racial restrictions on the alienation of land in the Pacific U.S. territories, which are meant to protect native land ownership where land is scarce and central to cultural identity. Ordinarily—in what most people think of as the United States—racial restrictions on the alienation of land would clearly violate the Equal Protection Clause. But here the repurposed *Insular Cases* come into play. If, as the standard account has it, these decisions relegated the unincorporated territories to a nearly extraconstitutional zone, then the Constitution does not stand in the way of territorial cultural practices deserving of protection. Or so the argument goes.

A recent *Harvard Law Review* Special Issue features several contributions explaining the repurposing view and arguing that it might offer the best way to protect the distinctive cultures of the unincorporated territories. As one of


17. I say “several” because Puerto Rican cultural practices do not conflict with the Constitution and I am not aware of any cultural practices in the U.S. Virgin Islands that conflict with the Constitution. In Puerto Rico, resistance to statehood does reflect a concern that statehood could threaten Puerto Rico’s culture and, in particular, its language, but any such threat would not come from the Constitution. On the cultural practices at stake in the other territories, see the sources cited infra notes 20–23, and the discussion of the relevant litigation, infra Parts III, IV.

18. See sources cited infra notes 20–23; see also discussion infra Part III (describing cases concerning whether the application of certain constitutional provisions in the unincorporated territories would threaten cultural practices there).


them explains, “[w]here the doctrine [of the Insular Cases] once served colonial interests in an era of mainland domination of the territories, a revisionist argument would see it repurposed today to protect indigenous cultures from a procrustean application of the federal Constitution.” 21 Another advocate of the repurposing project argues that judicial adoption of the repurposing view is “defensible and perhaps even necessary” in order to protect culture and promote self-government in the U.S. territories. 22 An early defender of repurposing, Stanley Laughlin, sums up the argument like this:

The genius of the [doctrine of the Insular Cases] is that it allows the insular areas to be full-fledged parts of the United States but, at the same time, recognizes that their cultures are substantially different from those of the mainland United States and allows some latitude in constitutional interpretation for the purpose of accommodating those cultures. 23

As these quotations make clear, the repurposing project aims to achieve not one but two interrelated goals: cultural accommodation and continued U.S. sovereignty. That is, if the sole goal were the protection of culture, then separation from the United States through independence would render irrelevant any tension with the U.S. Constitution and no repurposing would be necessary. But since support for independence in the territories is minimal at best, it becomes necessary to reconcile the cultural practices at issue with the U.S. Constitution. Enter the standard account of the Insular Cases, providing support for the idea that constitutional obstacles can be swept aside in the unincorporated territories.

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21. See Territorial Federalism, supra note 20, at 1686. I use the term “repurposing” rather than “revisionist” because my argument is that this account does not revise the standard account, but rather accepts it and builds upon it.


This Article makes the case against the repurposing project. My argument is that the Insular Cases gave rise to nothing less than a crisis of political legitimacy in the unincorporated territories and that no amount of repurposing, no matter how well-intentioned—or even successful—can change that fact. On the contrary: repurposing the Insular Cases will prolong the crisis.

The felt imperative to derail the recently annexed territories from the statehood track, while still permitting the United States to retain them, drove the Court to abandon a settled understanding that otherwise would have constrained it: that annexed territories would eventually become states. The famously unclear and erroneous reasoning of the Insular Cases is famously unclear and erroneous precisely because it simply could not be reconciled with that settled understanding. To accomplish the end of giving constitutional sanction to permanent colonies, the Court had to carve out an exception to settled constitutional law. The doctrine of territorial incorporation it produced has long been the source of serious judicial confusion and even incoherence. The cases and scholarship seeking to repurpose the Insular Cases now pursue a defensible end, but in the process they not only inherit but dramatically exacerbate a legacy of resorting to shoddy legal reasoning in pursuit of an end that otherwise appears out of reach.

My case against the repurposing project begins with a refutation of the standard account, but it does not end there. Refuting the standard account is

24. For other work criticizing the repurposing project (not always described with that phrase), see, for example, Cepeda & Weare, supra note 10; and Juan R. Torruella, Commentary, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with Its Future: A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66 (2018), which describes the Insular Cases as the first of four “experiments” with Puerto Rico’s status, criticizes all of them, and argues against a proposal for yet another experiment as set forth in Territorial Federalism, supra note 20. In an earlier article, I argued against the repurposing view in the context of Puerto Rico. See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 871-77. When it comes to Puerto Rico, the advocates of repurposing do not look to the Insular Cases for support for cultural accommodation, since, as noted above, see supra note 17, Puerto Rican cultural practices do not conflict with the Constitution. Instead, they look to the Insular Cases for support for the proposition that Congress has the power to enter into a binding “compact” with Puerto Rico short of statehood. My argument in United States, see Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, was that Congress does not have such power. See also Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus, Political Wine in a Judicial Bottle: Justice Sotomayor’s Surprising Concurrence in Aurelius, 130 YALE L.J.F. 101 (2020) (criticizing the “compact theory”); Torruella, supra (same).


26. I should note that I do not take a position or intend to imply one with respect to Federal Indian law, though analogous issues arise in that context. For a thorough exploration of the parallels between the law of the territories, Federal Indian law, and civil-rights law, see Rolnick, supra note 5.
necessary because its error with respect to the applicability of constitutional provisions forms the basis for the repurposing project, which relies on the idea of a nearly extraconstitutional zone to pursue the goal of cultural accommodation. This keeps the Insular Cases alive—and as long as the Insular Cases remain alive, the Court’s imprimatur will remain on permanent colonialism. But refuting the standard account is not sufficient because even on the alternative account, the Insular Cases constitutionalized permanent colonialism by introducing the unincorporated territory into American constitutional law. What defines unincorporated territories is that they can remain territories, subject to U.S. sovereignty and federal laws but denied representation in the federal government, forever. So while I argue that the Insular Cases did not create a nearly extraconstitutional zone, and I explain and clarify what they did hold, I do not argue that the solution to the problem of the Insular Cases lies in a correct interpretation of them. Instead, it lies in overruling them and erasing the doctrine of territorial incorporation from American constitutional law.27

Ironically, it may be possible to achieve the objective of cultural accommodation in the territories by employing ordinary constitutional doctrines, such as standard equal-protection doctrine or the plenary power jurisprudence under the Territory Clause.28 I argue below that many, perhaps all, of the claims advanced under the rubric of the repurposing project could and should be decoupled from the Insular Cases jurisprudence and reframed and adjudicated under precisely these doctrines.29 However, even if one believes, as the advocates of repurposing do, that it would be tragic not to find a way to accommodate cultural practices in the U.S. territories, those ends cannot justify their doctrinal means, because the cost of resorting to such means is the perpetuation of a system of permanent colonies. In my view, even if certain diverse cultural practices in the territories cannot be reconciled with the Constitution, this fact would not justify the repurposing of the Insular Cases.

To put it bluntly: arguing that we need to repurpose the Insular Cases to accommodate culture is like arguing that we need to repurpose Plessy v. Ferguson to


28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ”).

29. See infra Part III.
accommodate benign racial classifications. We do not. We must not. Just as we cannot turn a blind eye to the racist premise driving Plessy, even if doing so appeared necessary to constitutionalize benign racial classifications, neither can we tolerate, let alone expiate, the racist premise of the Insular Cases, and the flagrant political illegitimacy it licenses, in order to pursue the independently laudable goal of preserving important cultural practices in U.S. territories. Like Plessy, the Insular Cases are bad law. They cannot be redeemed, even by conscripting them into service for the noble goal of protecting their victims from a certain harm. Democratic representation is an inviolable commitment of the Constitution’s own bedrock conception of political legitimacy. Perpetual territorial status violates it.

Part I explains the Insular Cases, criticizing the standard account and clarifying what those decisions held. My goal here, in short, is to refute the claim that forms the basis of the repurposing project: that the Insular Cases relegated the unincorporated territories to a nearly extraconstitutional zone. While those decisions did introduce the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories into the Court’s constitutional law on the territories, the standard account misunderstands it. The doctrine of territorial incorporation does not mean, as the standard account holds, that the “entire” Constitution applies in the incorporated territories while “only” its fundamental limitations apply in the unincorporated territories.

Part II describes several Supreme Court decisions relying on the Insular Cases since the original series came down between 1901 and 1922. Each of them concerns a constitutional challenge originating in formally foreign territory where the United States exerts some form of control. One involves trials of civilians on U.S. military bases abroad; another, a search by U.S. agents of a Mexican national’s home in Mexico; still another, the detention of persons labeled enemy combatants in Guantánamo, a place the Court concluded is subject to de facto U.S. sovereignty though located in de jure foreign (Cuban) territory. Together, these cases kept alive the standard account of the Insular Cases by endorsing an
understanding of those cases according to which constitutional provisions do not apply abroad if it would be “impracticable and anomalous” to apply them. Developed in the context of foreign territory, the impracticable-and-anomalous test soon made its way into the jurisprudence on the Constitution in the domestic yet unincorporated territories.

Part III describes, examines, and criticizes the evolution of the Supreme Court’s latter-day spin on the Insular Cases in a series of lower-court decisions involving constitutional challenges in the unincorporated territories. These courts have expressly taken up the repurposing project, relying on the Insular Cases and engaging in avowedly teleological reasoning with a view toward finding ways to accommodate cultural practices that might otherwise violate constitutional requirements. A close reading of these cases illustrates the pitfalls of the repurposing project, which proceeds as if, whenever a constitutional challenge arises in an unincorporated territory, the laws of constitutional physics are suspended. Endorsing the standard account of the Insular Cases, these decisions expand upon a poorly reasoned approach to the question of which constitutional provisions apply where, while leaving untouched the politically illegitimate status of the territories. Creating the illusion of solicitude toward territorial self-determination, they inadvertently and perversely entrench federal power while prolonging the subordination of territorial inhabitants.

Part III also argues that the repurposing project is not only misguided, but gratuitous. Even if one believes the United States must find ways to accommodate territorial cultural practices in tension with the Constitution, the fact is that even without the Insular Cases, constitutional law contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate most, if not all, of the cultural practices at issue. In most, if not all, of the cases discussed here, either the courts could have reached the same results without reliance on the Insular Cases or the opposite result would have posed no threat to territorial cultural practices.

Part IV turns to a recent development in the repurposing project, examining current litigation over whether the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies in the unincorporated territory of American Samoa. Two federal courts of appeals have now relied on an updated version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test to hold that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in American Samoa. These courts reasoned that extending the Citizenship Clause to American Samoa would be anomalous because, according to the territory’s elected representatives, most American

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34. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir.), relèvè en banc denied, 20 F.4th 1325 (10th Cir. 2021).
Samoans do not want it to apply. Neither of these courts conducted a factual inquiry into or a legal analysis of the territorial cultural practices at issue in order to determine whether the application of the Citizenship Clause would actually threaten them. Instead, they took the word of the territory’s elected representatives with respect to the purported wishes of a territorial majority and, on that basis, held that a constitutional provision did not apply in an unincorporated territory—in effect holding a constitutional provision inapplicable by popular demand. This, I argue, is the Insular Cases run amok.

Part V illustrates how the Insular Cases sow doubts about the applicability of constitutional provisions in the unincorporated territories even when there is no plausible argument that they are relevant. Here I describe two examples. First, I examine recent litigation in Puerto Rico involving the Appointments Clause, in which the Insular Cases repeatedly came up despite a consensus among the parties and courts involved that the question presented did not turn on their validity. The case, Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment LLC, involved a challenge to the selection mechanism for the members of the Board, which Congress created in 2016 to handle Puerto Rico’s economic crisis. The selection mechanism does not require Senate confirmation, and the plaintiffs challenged it as a violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which requires Senate confirmation of all Officers of the United States. The question was not whether the Appointments Clause applies in Puerto Rico; it was whether the officers of the Board are Officers of the United States. But because the challenge arose in an unincorporated territory, doubts over whether the Appointments Clause “applies” there inevitably came up at various stages in the litigation. The First Circuit opinion in Aurelius described the Insular Cases as a “dark cloud” over the case. The Supreme Court allotted ten minutes of oral argument for a discussion of the Insular Cases, during which a Puerto Rican lawyer implored the Court to overrule them, while several Justices

35. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 310; Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 880. In Fitisemanu, Judge Lucero’s opinion for the Court gave this reason. The concurring judge explained that “although I agree with much of Judge Lucero’s reasoning endorsing consideration of the wishes of the American Samoan people, I would leave that consideration to the political branches and not to our court.” Id. at 883 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring). The dissent disagreed that the wishes of the American Samoan people should determine whether the Citizenship Clause applies. See id. at 902-06 (Bacharach, J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion of Tuaua and Fitisemanu, see infra Part IV.

36. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 310; Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 880.

37. 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).

expressed puzzlement over why they had even come up.\textsuperscript{39} The opinion upholding the selection mechanism confirmed their irrelevance to the issue in Aurelius, questioning their validity and refusing to extend them beyond their facts, but understandably did not overrule them.\textsuperscript{40} The second example is the case of United States v. Vaello Madero, an equal-protection challenge to Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which provides aid to persons who are needy and disabled or elderly.\textsuperscript{41} Once again, the applicability of the relevant constitutional guarantee of equal protection was not in question. Once again, the Insular Cases came up anyway, this time in the Respondent’s argument that they constitute evidence of a history of racism against Puerto Ricans that should lead to strict scrutiny of the challenged classification. Once again, the oral argument featured a confused and confusing exchange about the Insular Cases, with one Justice wondering what they had to do with Vaello Madero and another demanding to know why the Court should not overrule them altogether.\textsuperscript{42} The Deputy Solicitor General expressed puzzlement over the idea that the Court would overrule cases on which the government did not even rely.\textsuperscript{43} Meanwhile, the Respondent decried the racism of the Insular Cases, but stopped short of asking the Court to overrule them.\textsuperscript{44} As their perplexing appearance in Vaello Madero suggests, the Insular Cases deserve to be overruled, and soon. But when the Court finally overrules them, it must do so clearly and unequivocally, in a case that squarely presents the doctrine of territorial incorporation and requires the Court to weigh in on its validity. That case, I argue at the end of Part V, is Fitisemanu v. United States.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{39}. Transcript of Oral Argument at 82, 86-87, Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334); see also Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 10 (describing the exchange at oral argument); Ponsa-Kraus, supra note 24, at 127-28 (same).

\textsuperscript{40}. Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665.

\textsuperscript{41}. United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (2022). Justice Gorsuch concurred in Vaello Madero specifically to criticize the Insular Cases and call on the Court to overrule them at some point. See Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. at 1554-57 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor dissented but specifically noted her agreement with that call. See id. at 1560 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). I discuss the role of the Insular Cases in Vaello Madero below, see infra Part V.B.

\textsuperscript{42}. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-11, United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (2022) (No. 20-303).

\textsuperscript{43}. Id. at 8, 11.

\textsuperscript{44}. Brief for Respondent at 2-3, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (2022) (No. 20-303) (attributing the Insular Cases to ‘concern that [inhabitants of the territories] belonged to ‘uncivilized’ and ‘alien races’ who were ‘unfit’ to handle the full rights and duties of citizenship’). For a detailed discussion of Vaello Madero, see infra Part V.B.

\textsuperscript{45}. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc denied, 2021 WL 6111908 (Dec. 27, 2021), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 27, 2022) (No. 21-1394).
The haunting of Aurelius and Vaello Madero by the Insular Cases was yet another instance of the unending constitutional uncertainty to which the people of the unincorporated territories have been subjected for nearly a century and a quarter. To them, the Insular Cases are an oppressive omnipresence constantly sowing doubt about the applicability of constitutional guarantees. Yet to the Justices—the only people in a position to do something about it—they have so far registered as a mere oddity, albeit a distasteful one.\textsuperscript{46} These wrongly decided racist, imperialist decisions have run amok long enough. The Court should overrule them once and for all.

\section*{I. The Insular Cases Revisited}

The status of the Constitution in the territories of the United States was ambiguous and contested even before the Insular Cases, though the territories’ status as states-in-waiting was not.\textsuperscript{47} Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress governed the territories through organic acts, which either required territorial legislatures to pass laws consistent with the applicable provisions of the Constitution or expressly “extended” the Constitution, again insofar as applicable, to a

\textsuperscript{46} As noted above, see supra note 41, Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor recently went further in Vaello Madero, arguing that the Court should overrule the Insular Cases.

\textsuperscript{47} See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 824–34. Alaska may have been an exception, though the question of its future status was not definitively answered until the Insular Cases distinguished between incorporated and unincorporated territories and placed Alaska on the incorporated side of the line. See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). The treaty for the annexation of Alaska did differ from earlier treaties in that the earlier ones promised to “incorporate” the inhabitants of annexed territories “into the Union” and “admit” them to the enjoyment of the rights and privileges of citizenship, whereas the Alaska treaty omitted the reference to incorporation into the Union. \textit{Compare} Treaty with France for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr. 30, 1803, 18 Stat. 232, 233 (“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”) (other treaties used the same language), \textit{with} Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possession in North America by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians to the United States of America, U.S.-Rus., Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542 (“The inhabitants of the ceded territory . . . , with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). The language excepting “uncivilized native tribes” from the grant of citizenship in Alaska had some precedent in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexing Mexican territory in 1848 after the war with Mexico, which required Mexicans living in the territory to make an election between Mexican and U.S. citizenship within one year but discussed “savage tribes” in a separate provision. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 929–32.
given territory. Because Congress “extended” the Constitution, or parts of it, to the territories, it was unclear whether these provisions would have applied ex proprio vigore (i.e., of their own force). Cases considering constitutional challenges in the territories produced conflicting decisions, at times holding that a given provision applied of its own force, at other times stating that a statute had applied the relevant constitutional guarantee to the territory, and occasionally leaving the question open.

The debate over slavery in the territories underscores the uncertain status of the Constitution there. Famously, John C. Calhoun and Daniel Webster debated the issue in terms of whether the Constitution “followed the flag” to the territories. Calhoun argued that it did, and therefore protected slavery there, as a form of property. Webster argued that it did not, and that it therefore did not prevent Congress from regulating or even abolishing slavery in the territories. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the Dred Scott case agreed with the view expressed by Calhoun in what has come to be known, ironically, as the most anti-imperialist passage the Supreme Court has ever uttered:

There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States.

While the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments rejected the Dred Scott decision insofar as it held that no Black person, whether slave or free, had ever been or could ever be a U.S. citizen, the status of the Constitution in the

48. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 90, § 6, 10 Stat. 172, 175 (“[T]he legislative power of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 453, 458 (“[T]he Constitution and laws of the United States are hereby extended over and declared to be in force in said Territory of Utah.”); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755-56 (2008) (“When Congress exercised its power to create new territories, it guaranteed constitutional protections to the inhabitants by statute.”); see Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 824-34, 825 n.127 (discussing and providing a full list of relevant statutes).

49. See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 824-34.


51. Id. at 145.

52. See id. at 156.

53. See id. at 155-56.

territories remained uncertain. Subsequent cases on the applicability of the Constitution in the territories picked up where they had left off, sometimes holding that constitutional rights applied \textit{ex proprio vigore} and other times holding that they applied by virtue of statutory extension.\textsuperscript{55}

This is where doctrine stood when the United States intervened in Cuba’s War of Independence against Spain in 1898, entering the conflict just in time to seal Cuba’s victory.\textsuperscript{56} The political and popular debate surrounding the United States’s intervention in this conflict pitted imperialists against anti-imperialists on the question of whether the United States could annex territory without committing to admitting it into statehood.\textsuperscript{57} That debate took constitutional form as a disagreement over whether the United States could govern territory unrestrained by the Constitution, or, in a revival of the catchy but overly simplistic turn of phrase associated with the earlier debate over slavery in the territories, whether the Constitution “followed the flag” to the new territories.\textsuperscript{58}

That contentious question came to the Supreme Court in the form of \textit{Downes v. Bidwell}, a case involving a dispute over the imposition of duties by the customs collector of New York on a shipment of oranges from Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{59} The question before the Court was whether the phrase “United States” as used in the Uniformity Clause included Puerto Rico (and, by implication, the other new territories).\textsuperscript{60} If so, the duties would have arguably violated the uniformity requirement.\textsuperscript{61} The Court’s answer was that the phrase did not encompass Puerto Rico.\textsuperscript{62} Although subject to U.S. sovereignty, the new territories were not part of the United States for purposes of uniformity.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 824-34.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} See Joint Resolution of Apr. 20, 1898, ch. 24, 30 Stat. 738. \textit{See generally} Hugh Thomas, Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom 356-414 (2d ed. 1998) (1971) (recounting the history of the war from the United States’s intervention to its end in the U.S. occupation of Cuba).
  \item \textsuperscript{57} \textit{See}, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 1, at 40-56 (describing the constitutional debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists in the wake of the war with Spain).
  \item \textsuperscript{58} See id. at 2-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Id. at 249; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts, and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Downes}, 182 U.S. at 249. For a discussion of the debate among lawyers and legal scholars concerning the meaning of the phrase “United States,” see Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], The Constitution and Deconstitution of the United States, in The Louisiana Purchase and American Expansion, 1803-98, at 181, 183-89 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005).
  \item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{Downes}, 182 U.S. at 250-51; id. at 342 (White, J., concurring).
\end{itemize}
Justice Brown, who had authored the *Plessy* decision several years earlier, wrote the opinion for the Court. Despite the opinion's official designation, however, no other Justice joined it; the opinion “for the Court” was really an opinion for Brown alone. Brown explained that the phrase “United States” included only the states of the Union and the District of Columbia, and that, with few exceptions, the Constitution was reserved to them.\(^63\) It did not apply in the territories unless “extended” there by Congress.\(^64\) Brown’s reasoning came to be known as the “extension theory.”

In a concurrence that would eventually gain the assent of a unanimous Court, Justice White rejected the proposition that the Constitution as such did not apply in the territories: “In the case of the territories,” he wrote, “as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.”\(^65\) White then drew a different line around the phrase “United States” in the Uniformity Clause, reasoning that it included states, the District of Columbia, \textit{and} any territory that had been “incorporated” into the United States following its annexation.\(^66\) Since neither the treaty of peace with Spain nor subsequent congressional legislation had formally “incorporated” Puerto Rico, the Philippines, or Guam into the United States, those territories were not part of the United States—at least for purposes of uniformity.\(^67\) They were, instead, “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,” as he put it in an infamously incomprehensible turn of phrase.\(^68\) White’s reasoning came to be known as the doctrine of territorial incorporation, and the affected territories acquired the label of “unincorporated territories.”\(^69\) Two other
Justices joined White’s concurrence and a third, concurring separately, agreed with it in substance.\footnote{70}

Both Justices Brown and White observed in dicta that fundamental constitutional limitations restrained Congress anywhere—even in unincorporated territories.\footnote{71} Courts and scholars adhering to the standard account have since interpreted these statements restrictively, as if they stood for the proposition that only fundamental constitutional limitations, and nothing else in the Constitution (except for the Territory Clause, of course), apply in the unincorporated territories.\footnote{72}

But this interpretation misreads these passages. Read carefully and contextually, the passages have a very different implication: namely, they assure the reader that the holding in \textit{Downes} would \textit{not} affect fundamental constitutional limitations. When Justice White referred specifically to fundamental limitations, his meaning was expansive, not restrictive. As he put it, “[E]ven in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitution which applies, there may nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed” anywhere.\footnote{73} Neither Brown nor White provided an exhaustive list of applicable provisions, though Brown’s examples included the prohibitions on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and titles of nobility, along with:

the rights to one’s own religious opinion and to a public expression of them . . . ; the right to personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to courts of justice, to due process of law and to an equal protection of the laws; to immunities from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishments; and to such other immunities as are indispensable to a free government.\footnote{74}

\footnote{70. Justices Shiras and McKenna joined. \textit{See id.} at 287. Justice Gray concurred separately. \textit{See id.} at 344-45 (Gray, J., concurring).}

\footnote{71. \textit{Id.} at 282-83 (plurality opinion); \textit{id.} at 291 (White, J., concurring).}

\footnote{72. \textit{See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 808 n.40 (2005) (listing selected examples of scholarship adopting the standard account); \textit{see id.} at 870-77 (describing and challenging the standard account).}

\footnote{73. \textit{Id.} at 291 (White, J., concurring).}

\footnote{74. \textit{Id.} at 277, 282-83 (plurality opinion). Brown “suggest[ed], without intending to decide, that” these were “natural rights, enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them.” \textit{Id.} at 282. Note that he included equal protection on the list well before it had been “reverse” incorporated into the Due Process Clause under \textit{Bolling v. Sharpe}, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Soon after \textit{Downes}, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court interpreted the equal-protection guarantee as applicable in Puerto Rico. \textit{See Ex parte Bird}, 5 P.R. 241, 261 (1904); \textit{see also...}}
To be sure, these statements assume that some provisions apply and some do not. But as Justice White insisted, this is true anywhere—not just in unincorporated territories. To cite just one example, at the time *Downes* was decided, most of the Bill of Rights did not apply against the states, either. In other words, to interpret these opinions as creating a nearly extraconstitutional zone substantially oversimplifies and overstates what they held.

Still, the *Downes* majority held that the Uniformity Clause did not apply in the newly annexed territories on the unprecedented ground that either some of these territories (White) or all of them (Brown) were not part of the United States, giving rise to strongly worded dissents by Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan. Both principally disagreed with the opinion for the Court, but each separately criticized White’s concurrence and its novel doctrine of territorial incorporation. They decried it as not only wrong, but entirely unprecedented and utterly confusing. Expressing consternation at the idea that there were two categories of U.S. territory with two different relationships to the Constitution, they insisted that the new territories, like all previous ones, had become part of the United States upon their annexation and that the same constitutional requirements applied to them as had always applied to all territories.

Despite the vigorous disagreement among the Justices, the holding in *Downes* and the other *Insular Cases* soon put an end to the popular and political debate. The imperialists had won the day—that much was clear. A majority of the Court had taken their side by allowing the United States to annex and govern territory subject to at least one fewer constitutional requirement than might otherwise apply. The Constitution, it seemed, did not “follow the flag” to these new territories—or at any rate, that famous turn of phrase was a memorable way of summing up a headline what the Court had done. Courts and scholars later struggling to make sense of the decisions settled on a more legalistic way of saying essentially the same thing, repeatedly describing the cases as having drawn a line between places where the “entire” Constitution applies (i.e., states, the
District of Columbia, and incorporated territories) and places where only its “fundamental” limitations apply (i.e., the unincorporated territories).

Over the two decades following Downes, lower courts and the Supreme Court decided a series of additional cases concerning the applicability of constitutional rights in the unincorporated territories. These cases consistently held that constitutional rights applied in the territories, with the exception of federal grand-jury and jury-trial rights. As to those specific provisions, the Court held that they did not apply in the unincorporated territories of their own force (i.e., unless Congress extended them by statute), whereas they did apply in incorporated territories (such as Alaska and Hawaii).

The case of Balzac v. Porto Rico, decided five years after Congress extended U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans by statute, culminated the series. Balzac concerned a challenge to the denial of the jury-trial right in a local Puerto Rican court. If the grant of citizenship had incorporated Puerto Rico, the federal jury-trial right would apply there. But the Balzac Court held that even the collective naturalization of the people of Puerto Rico had not incorporated the territory of Puerto Rico. It thus clarified one aspect of the doctrine of territorial incorporation. Whereas Justice White’s concurrence in Downes had not explained what the act of incorporation looked like, but had assumed that it would be a consequence of citizenship, Balzac made clear that Congress must expressly state its

80. See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 821.

81. Andrew Kent has compiled a comprehensive list that identifies whether each right applied via military or executive order, local legislation, Congressional statute, or court decision. See Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 375, 454-65 (2018).

82. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (holding that the right to trial by jury did not apply to Hawaii between its annexation in 1898 and its incorporation in 1900 but applied thereafter); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that the right to trial by jury applied to Alaska because it was an incorporated territory). As I have argued elsewhere, see Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, 824-52, the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, and the uncertainty as to which provisions would be held applicable in the latter, creates the impression of a dramatic difference between the two categories of territory for purposes of which federal rights apply. But in fact, until the Insular Cases, it had not been entirely clear that every provision of the Bill of Rights applied ex proprio vigore in any territory. Instead, the Court had flipped back and forth on the question—as Downes itself acknowledged. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 253-54. This point is relevant here because it helps explain the origin of the idea that the unincorporated territories are in a nearly extra-constitutional zone—that is, it comes from the alleged contrast between them and the incorporated territories, where the “entire” Constitution supposedly applies, though the reality is more complicated.

83. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).

84. Id. at 300.

85. Id. at 305.
intent to incorporate a territory, and that citizenship alone did not accomplish it.\textsuperscript{86} At the same time, \textit{Balzac} confirmed that the applicability of fundamental limitations on government power in the unincorporated territories depended on a case-by-case analysis.\textsuperscript{87}

The standard account interprets \textit{Balzac} as further evidence that the \textit{Insular Cases} relegated the unincorporated territories to a nearly extraconstitutional zone. Yet despite the stubborn persistence of the standard account, the proposition that most of the Constitution does not apply in the unincorporated territories does not accurately describe those controversial decisions.

On the one hand, the doctrine of territorial incorporation broke with the past in several respects. The Court—never mind the Constitution—had never distinguished between two classes of territories, one a part of the United States and the other merely belonging to it. On the contrary, the Court had stated on more than one occasion that the United States included the states, the District, \textit{and} the territories, without offering any hint that there might be more than one category of territory—let alone a category of territories fully subject to U.S. sovereignty but somehow outside the United States.\textsuperscript{88} Before \textit{Downes} was decided in 1901, territories annexed by the United States had also been on their way to statehood, an assumption that had been confirmed by consistent practice.\textsuperscript{89} After 1901, this was no longer the case. By delinking annexation from eventual statehood, the Court gave its imprimatur to indefinite—potentially permanent—territorial status. Moreover, \textit{Downes} dispelled doubts about whether annexed territories could be deannexed: they could, and a close reading of Justice White’s concurrence reveals that he was at pains to make it clear.\textsuperscript{90} Still, the doctrine of territorial incorporation made it possible to postpone deannexation, too, indefinitely.

On the other hand, significant as the \textit{Insular Cases’} break with the past was, it did not translate into the proposition that the entire Constitution applies

\textsuperscript{86} Downes, 182 U.S. at 306; Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305.

\textsuperscript{87} Balzac, 258 U.S. at 306.


\textsuperscript{89} As noted earlier, in 1883, a court described the territories as “inchoate state[s].” \textit{Ex parte Morgan}, 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883). In 1909, the Supreme Court omitted that phrase from its quotation of the Arkansas court in a case involving one of the new unincorporated territories. New York \textit{ex rel. Kopel} v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 475 (1909). I thank Neil Weare for pointing this out to me. As for the possible exception of Alaska, as noted earlier, see supra note 47, the question of its future status remained unanswered until the \textit{Insular Cases} put it on the statehood track.

\textsuperscript{90} See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 853–60 (offering a close reading of Justice White’s concurrence in \textit{Downes} and a deannexationist interpretation of the doctrine of territorial incorporation).
within the United States narrowly defined, while only its fundamental provisions apply in territories belonging to, but not a part of, the United States.

For one thing, with very few exceptions, fundamental constitutional limitations constrain government action in the unincorporated territories as they do elsewhere in the United States. What counts as fundamental depends on the specific territory at issue, but the Insular Cases and their progeny repeatedly arrived at the same answer: nearly every right they considered turned out to be fundamental in every unincorporated territory, with the exception of the federal rights to an indictment by a grand jury and a jury trial.91 Once one accounts for the fact that federal grand-jury and jury-trial rights did not apply against states at that time either, the proposition that the “entire” Constitution applies in the United States while “only” its fundamental provisions apply in the unincorporated territories begins to look pretty shaky.92

For another, even Downes’s holding concerning the Uniformity Clause93 had dubious significance in light of a decision handed down just a few years after Downes: Binns v. United States.94 In Binns, the Court relied on Congress’s plenary power over all territories, without distinguishing between incorporated or unincorporated territories, to uphold an excise tax on licenses in the incorporated territory of Alaska that would otherwise have violated uniformity.95 Rejecting

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91. See Balzac, 258 U.S. 298, 304-05, 309, 311 (1922) (holding that the federal right to a jury trial does not apply in a local court in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that the right to an indictment by grand jury does not apply to the Philippines); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 332 (1911) (same); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (concluding that Congress is not required to guarantee the right to trial by jury in unincorporated territories like the Philippines). For a comprehensive list showing which rights were held applicable in the unincorporated territories and how, see Kent, supra note 81, at 454-65. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico later held that the Nineteenth Amendment did not apply on the island either, but the U.S. Supreme Court never weighed in on that question. See Morales v. Bd. of Registration, 33 P.R. 76 (1924).

92. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the right to a trial by jury into the Fourteenth Amendment). The right to an indictment by a grand jury still does not apply against the states. To be sure, the Court’s reasoning with respect to why grand-jury and jury-trial rights did not apply in the unincorporated territories was undeniably different from its reasoning with respect to why those rights did not apply against the states (i.e., racist and imperialist). Even so, there were parallels as well, as explored in Andrew Kent’s illuminating article. See generally Kent, supra note 81, at 394-412 (describing criticisms of and opposition to juries in the early twentieth-century United States).

93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”).

94. 194 U.S. 486 (1904).

95. Id. at 486; Mygatt-Tauber, supra note 27; SPARROW, supra note 1, at 148; Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5, at 836-37.
THE INSULAR CASES RUN AMOK

the relevance of the doctrine of territorial incorporation to the question in *Binns*, the Court explained that Congress had the power to legislate for Alaska as if it were the local legislature because Alaska was a territory and that the deviation from uniformity was permissible because the taxes raised revenue for Alaska’s benefit.96 As for other constitutional provisions defining their geographic scope with the phrase “United States,” we do not have a definitive answer because, until recently, no case other than *Downes* had raised the question of whether a constitutional provision defining its geographic scope with the phrase “United States” included the unincorporated territories.97

In short, the proposition that the *Insular Cases* created a nearly extraconstitutional zone for the unincorporated territories is neither warranted by what those decisions actually say nor desirable as a matter of policy today. It misdescribes and overstates their holdings with respect to the applicability of the Constitution in the unincorporated territories, exacerbating their profoundly flawed reasoning. Worse, it diverts attention from the real problem with these decisions—namely, that they sanction the practice of maintaining perpetual colonies that are subject to congressional plenary power over their autonomy and self-government but denied representation in the federal government.

By embracing the view that the *Insular Cases* created a nearly extraconstitutional zone under U.S. sovereignty, the standard account has given rise to an unwarranted expansion of their holdings with respect to the applicability of the Constitution in the territories. It is as if the *Insular Cases* had swept aside all but a few constitutional obstacles to government action in these places. The result has been unclear and poorly reasoned case law. Over the past several decades, courts confronting constitutional challenges in the unincorporated territories have taken advantage of the apparent constitutional void supposedly left by the *Insular Cases*. Citing an unabashedly results-oriented justification, they have rationalized their overly creative constitutional interpretation as essential to the pursuit of cultural accommodation. This is the *Insular Cases* “repurposed.” But

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96. *Binns*, 194 U.S. at 491–92. The same was true of the duties in *Downes*. See Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56–191, § 4, 31 Stat. 77, 78 (1900); see also Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (explaining *Binns* as follows: “[T]he court declared it to be settled that Alaska had been undoubtedly incorporated into the United States, and hence conceded that the license complained of was invalid if levied by Congress under the general grant in the Constitution of the power of taxation. The legislation in question was, however, sustained on the exceptional ground that Congress had therein merely exerted its authority as a local legislature for Alaska.”).

97. See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the Citizenship Clause, which guarantees citizenship to persons born or naturalized “in the United States,” does not apply in the unincorporated territory of American Samoa); Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir.) (same), reh’g en banc denied, 20 F.4th 1325 (10th Cir. 2021) (en banc). I discuss these cases in detail below. See infra Part IV.
all of this repurposing has left untouched, if not ever more deeply entrenched, the permanent colonial system the Insular Cases created.

II. THE INSULAR CASES REVIVED

After Balzac, the Supreme Court did not discuss the Insular Cases again until the 1950s. When it did, the circumstances involved not U.S. territories, but U.S. military bases abroad. The question in Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger was whether the rights to an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by jury applied to the capital murder trials of U.S. citizen civilian spouses of American servicemembers living on U.S. military bases in foreign territory—in those cases, Great Britain and Japan respectively.98 The Court held that they did not.99 But it then took the rare step of rehearing the cases.100 It reversed itself the following year in a decision consolidating the two cases under the caption Reid v. Covert.101

Six Justices rejected the validity of what was arguably the most directly relevant precedent on the question of the Constitution abroad: In re Ross.102 A decade before the Insular Cases, In re Ross held that an American sailor tried for murder on a U.S. vessel off the coast of Japan did not have the right to a trial by

98. The events in Reid v. Covert took place on a U.S. military base in Great Britain, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1957); those in Kinsella v. Krueger on a base in Japan, id. at 4.

99. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), withdrawn sub nom. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5; Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956), withdrawn, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). For both Reid and Kinsella, Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion titled “Reservation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter” in which he questioned the relevance of the cases involving domestic territory to a constitutional challenge involving foreign territory and withheld judgment in the case on the ground that the Court needed more time to consider the issues. See Reid, 351 U.S. at 492 (Frankfurter, J., reserving judgment); Kinsella, 351 U.S. at 481-85 (same). Three dissenting Justices, who together with Justice Brennan would later constitute the plurality in the 1957 Reid, agreed that the Court needed more time and announced that they would issue their dissent the following Term—an announcement rendered moot by the grant of the petition for rehearing. See Reid, 351 U.S. at 492 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).


101. 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). Justice Harlan changed his vote. Justice Frankfurter had postponed voting in both cases. See Reid, 351 U.S. at 492 (Frankfurter, J., reserving judgment); Kinsella, 351 U.S. at 481-85 (same). Between the first and second decisions, Justice Reed retired and Justice Whittaker joined the Court, but he did not participate in the decision on rehearing. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 41.

102. 140 U.S. 453 (1891); see Reid, 354 U.S. at 10-12 (plurality); Reid, 354 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Reid, 354 U.S. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
That case had espoused a theory known as “strict territoriality,” according to which constitutional rights stop at the border: they do not even protect U.S. citizens abroad. The Justices in the Reid plurality and the two concurring Justices rejected In re Ross. However, they disagreed over what to make of the more ambiguous and confusing Insular Cases.

The 1956 decisions had partially relied on the case law concerning the Constitution in the U.S. territories as far back as the early nineteenth century, including the Insular Cases, but had not clearly explained why cases involving domestic territory should govern a situation involving foreign territory. Citing the Insular Cases as part of that case law, they had drawn from the Court’s jurisprudence on the territories the proposition that constitutional provisions do not always apply everywhere. But on rehearing, five of the Justices took the position that the question of whether constitutional provisions apply abroad, even to U.S. citizens on U.S. military bases, raises distinct issues from the question of whether they apply on domestic territory.

The four Justices who signed onto Justice Black’s plurality opinion rejected the relevance of the territorial cases. As for the Insular Cases specifically, the

103. Ross, 140 U.S. at 464. The sailor was actually British, but the Court reasoned that “[w]hile he was an enlisted seaman on the American vessel, which floated the American flag, he was . . . an American, under the protection and subject to the laws of the United States equally with the seaman who was native born.” Id. at 479.

104. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 59-68; NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 82.

105. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 10-12 (plurality) (“The Ross approach . . . has long since been directly repudiated by numerous cases.”); id. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (“[In re Ross] expressed a notion that has long since evaporated.”); cf. id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (agreeing with Frankfurter, but opining that In re Ross “still [has] vitality”).

106. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 194, 199 (1901) (finding that Puerto Rico was not foreign territory and therefore not covered by the federal statute imposing tariffs on goods from foreign countries). The failure to address directly the relevance of the territorial cases was likely due to the U.S. legal system’s lack of a theory regarding the geography of the Constitution that has any real purchase, leaving these cases, and the Insular Cases in particular, as a handy citation for the vague idea that some territory has a different relationship to the Constitution than does other territory. I thank Kal Raustiala for this observation.

107. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 474 (1956); Reid, 351 U.S. at 488 (“Appellee’s principal argument on the merits is answered by our decision in Kinsella v. Krueger.” (citation omitted)).

108. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 8-9, 12-14 (rejecting the proposition that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights do not apply outside “the continental United States” and the 1956 decisions’ reliance on the Insular Cases specifically); id. at 53-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (reasoning that the territorial cases did not “control” Reid and Kinsella but allowing that they were relevant insofar as they exemplify a method of “harmonizing” seemingly inconsistent constitutional provisions). The different considerations obtaining abroad include, saliently, the presence of another sovereign, such as a host government, with its own legal system and its own interests in the enforcement of its laws on its own territory. For a thorough analysis of the issues at stake, see, for example, RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 3-8, 127-247.
plurality strongly criticized them and would have overruled them, expressing the view that “neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion.”109 Unfortunately, even as the plurality rightly criticized the Insular Cases, it contributed to the erroneous impression that unincorporated territories were somehow foreign, by distinguishing the facts in the Insular Cases from those in Reid on the ground that the latter concerned U.S. citizens without noting that, by then, the inhabitants of unincorporated territories were U.S. citizens as well.110

The two dissenting Justices would have left standing the 1956 decisions, including their reliance on territorial case law.111 Meanwhile, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred, specifically stating that the Insular Cases remained valid.112 Even then, Frankfurter agreed with the plurality that the Insular Cases were not relevant in Reid. On the one hand, he explained, the question of whether and how constitutional provisions apply abroad “involves . . . considerations not dissimilar to those involved in a determination under the Due Process Clause,”113 and the Insular Cases themselves involved an analysis “similar[ ] to analysis in terms of ‘due process,’”114 On the other hand, those cases “d[id] not control the present cases”115 because they concerned Congress’s power under the


110. Id. (“The ‘Insular Cases’ can be distinguished from the present cases in that they involved the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions[,] whereas here the basis for governmental power is American citizenship.”). Per Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1904), the inhabitants of annexed territory became at least U.S. nationals upon annexation. In 1917, Congress collectively naturalized the people of Puerto Rico. See Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). In other words, by the time Reid was decided, the people of Puerto Rico had been U.S. citizens for 40 years; the people of the U.S. Virgin Islands for 30; those of Guam for 5; and American Samoans were U.S. nationals as they are now. The people of the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) would become U.S. citizens later, when the United States and the NMI entered into the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976).

111. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 14 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice Burton and I remain convinced that the former opinions of the Court are correct and that they set forth valid constitutional doctrine under the long-recognized cases of this Court.”); id. at 86–87 (noting that “[t]erritorial courts have been used by our Government for over a century and have always received the sanction of this Court until today,” and complaining that “in light of all of the opinions of the former minority here,” the use of a system of territorial or consular courts to try civilians living on military bases “is now out of the question”).

112. Id. at 50–53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).

113. Id. at 44.

114. Id. at 53.

115. Id.
Territory Clause, whereas “[o]f course the power sought to be exercised in Great Britain and Japan does not relate to ‘Territory.’”

Justice Harlan, however, not only considered the territorial cases relevant in Reid, but he went further, breathing new life into the Insular Cases in particular by citing them in support of a test that would later gain favor among advocates of the repurposing project in the unincorporated territories: the so-called “impracticable and anomalous” test. Observing that the Insular Cases still had “vitality,” Harlan explained that “properly understood, . . . [they] stand for . . . a wise and necessary gloss on our Constitution:

The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution “does not apply” overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. In other words, it seems to me that the basic teaching of . . . the Insular Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous.

The opening sentence of the quoted passage echoes Justice White’s effort to distinguish his approach from Justice Brown’s seemingly more extreme

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116. Id.

117. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759-61 (2007), the Supreme Court cited the case Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), along with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) — one of the leading Insular Cases — in which the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of territorial incorporation, and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 74-75, in support of its use of a version of the “impracticable and anomalous” test, also known as the functional approach. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. While Eisentrager did take into account practical considerations, it did not use the terms “impracticable and anomalous” nor purport to set forth a test for determining the extraterritorial applicability of constitutional provisions. I have criticized the impracticable-and-anomalous test before. See generally Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 75 (arguing that the test misinterprets the Insular Cases and that courts should look to the case law on Fourteenth Amendment incorporation for guidance in cases concerning the applicability of rights in the unincorporated territories).

118. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Harlan claimed he agreed with Frankfurter, see id., but although his concurrence was substantially consistent with Frankfurter’s, he did not distinguish the Insular Cases but instead relied on them as the precedent from which he derived his impracticable-and-anomalous test, see id. at 74.

119. Id. at 67, 74.

120. Id. at 74. Justice Harlan used the words “impracticable” and “impractical” interchangeably, though arguably they do not mean the same thing. I use the term “impracticable” (except when quoting text that uses the term “impractical”) because it more accurately describes Harlan’s analysis.
extension theory in *Downes*. Recall, White explained that “when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.”\(^{121}\) Similarly, Harlan rejected the view that the Constitution did or did not apply in any given place, including foreign territory, insisting instead that the applicability of any particular provision depended on the circumstances.

Insofar as he rejected the standard account, Justice Harlan offered an accurate understanding of the *Insular Cases*. But insofar as he relied on the *Insular Cases* in a constitutional challenge originating in a foreign context—implying, erroneously, that the unincorporated territories themselves were foreign—he too contributed to the persistent misconception of those territories as somehow outside the ambit of the Constitution. By translating the reasoning in the *Insular Cases* into the “impracticable and anomalous” test, he effectively turned the question of whether a constitutional provision applied in a particular place into a question of policy. Even as he insisted that the constitution is always “operative,” he drew from the *Insular Cases* a test that makes sense only if constitutional provisions do not apply of their own force, and should only be “applied” by the courts if the logistical obstacles to their application are not insurmountable. Whatever its merits in the context of foreign territory, this revised interpretation of the *Insular Cases* bolstered the erroneous understanding of those decisions as having created a nearly extraconstitutional zone on domestic territory. Soon enough, Harlan’s test would make its way into the jurisprudence on the Constitution in the unincorporated territories.\(^{122}\)

Describing his test, Justice Harlan explained that, “for me, the question is which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it.”\(^{123}\) Harlan’s test is best understood as calling for an inquiry into whether the application of a constitutional provision abroad would be logistically impossible or lead to absurd results. In a footnote, he elaborated on what he meant by the statement that a court must consider “the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it.”\(^{124}\) There, he contrasted the consequences of the holding in *Reid* itself, which concerned capital crimes, with the arguably insurmountable challenges that would arise from providing jury trials for lesser crimes

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\(^{121}\) *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244, 292 (1901) (White, J., concurring).

\(^{122}\) See infra Part III.

\(^{123}\) *Reid*, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).

\(^{124}\) Id.
committed on military bases.125 Applying the test to the facts at issue in Reid, he concluded that it would not be impracticable and anomalous to provide jury trials to American civilians accused of capital crimes on U.S. military bases abroad.126

Justice Harlan’s test kept the Insular Cases alive in Supreme Court jurisprudence despite the fact that five out of the eight Justices in Reid believed they did not govern the applicability of the Constitution abroad. When the impracticable-and-anomalous test next appeared in a Supreme Court opinion, it yet again involved foreign territory and yet again appeared in a concurrence signed by only one Justice: this time, Justice Kennedy.127

In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the question was whether the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applied to the search of a Mexican national’s home in Mexico City conducted jointly by federal and Mexican agents after the suspect had been apprehended and brought to the United States by federal authorities.128 In an analysis that came to be known as the “substantial connections” test, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to searches of noncitizens’ homes abroad because the reference to “people” in the Fourth Amendment did not include a person involuntarily brought to and held in the United States.129 But Justice Kennedy wrote separately to disagree with the Court’s approach. Instead, he advocated for the adoption of Justice Harlan’s test.130

Echoing the assertion in the Reid concurrences that the Insular Cases had continuing validity, he noted that “we must interpret constitutional protections in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad.”131 Like Justice Harlan in Reid, Justice

125. As it happens, the Court soon faced this question, could not find a way to distinguish between capital and other crimes, and held that the right to a trial by jury applied on U.S. military bases abroad even for lesser crimes. See RAUSTAL, supra note 1, at 148.
126. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
127. Between Reid and Verdugo-Urquidez, courts deciding constitutional challenges involving the unincorporated territories started using versions of Justice Harlan’s test. See infra Part III.
129. Id. at 265-66, 274-75. The plurality also noted that Verdugo-Urquidez had not been in the United States for very long—only days—when the search took place, declining to decide “[t]he extent to which respondent might claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment if the duration of his stay in the United States were to be prolonged—by a prison sentence, for example.” Id. at 271-72.
130. See id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not cite the territorial cases following Reid, see supra note 127, but he did cite the Insular Cases, along with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Kennedy neglected to explain clearly why the *Insular Cases* should be relevant to the United States’s ability to exercise power abroad—or necessary to sustain that power, insofar as it is indeed undoubted. Kennedy went on to apply the impracticable-and-anomalous test, concluding that it would be impracticable and anomalous for the Warrant Clause to apply in Mexico due to a series of considerations analogous to the logistical obstacles that concerned Harlan in *Reid*: “The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials” were all reasons why the Warrant Clause would be impracticable and anomalous to apply abroad.

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Verdugo-Urquidez* kept the impracticable-and-anomalous test alive at the Supreme Court. His subsequent opinion for a majority of the Court in *Boumediene v. Bush* cemented its place in the Court’s jurisprudence, albeit with some modification. In *Boumediene*, Kennedy relied on both the *Insular Cases* and Justice Harlan’s *Reid* concurrence, and employed Harlan’s test as one factor in a three-pronged analysis of the applicability of the writ of habeas corpus in Guantánamo Bay. This time, the place in question had more in common with the unincorporated territories, though its status was by no means identical to theirs. Guantánamo is not domestic territory, but neither is it unambiguously foreign. Although Guantánamo is formally foreign under the de jure sovereignty of Cuba, the Court found (and it would be difficult to deny) that the United States has de facto sovereignty there.

Like Justices Harlan and White, the *Boumediene* Court rightly rejected the standard account: “The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.” But also like them, it went on to articulate a test that gave substantially greater weight to the logistical obstacles to applying a constitutional provision than the *Insular Cases* had done. The Court observed that Harlan’s *Reid* concurrence “read the Insular Cases to teach that whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the ‘particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it,’ and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of the

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132. Recall, Justice Harlan’s explanation of their relevance amounted to the observation that the *Insular Cases* stood for a useful “gloss” on the Constitution: “that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).

133. *Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).


135. See *id.* at 755.

136. *Id.* at 765.
provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”137 It then adopted a three-pronged analysis considering (1) “the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made,” (2) “the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place,” and (3) “the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”138 In its analysis of the third factor, the Court explained that while extending the writ of habeas corpus to Guantánamo would require some expenditure of resources and could divert the attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks, it would not compromise the military mission at the base.139 Nor would it cause friction with the host Cuban government because no Cuban court had jurisdiction over the detainees or military personnel at Guantánamo.140 With that, the Court concluded that it would not be impracticable and anomalous to extend the writ.141

*Boumediene* improved upon Justice Harlan’s test by clarifying that it constituted one factor in a multipronged test.142 While Harlan had certainly considered the citizenship status of civilians living on U.S. military bases abroad and the status of such bases as places subject to U.S. control by permission of a foreign sovereign, his concurrence had been unclear as to the weight he assigned each of these considerations; instead, he described the relevant test as the single question whether the asserted right would be “impracticable or anomalous” to apply. In contrast, *Boumediene* more clearly considered both citizenship and sovereignty status, along with the practical considerations of the impracticable-and-anomalous test, in determining whether a constitutional guarantee applied in a given circumstance.

Still, the decision gave the weight of a Supreme Court majority to the *Insular Cases* while only exacerbating the confusion those decisions had already caused with respect to the applicability of the Constitution in unincorporated territories. In a passage discussing the *Insular Cases*, Justice Kennedy observed that “[i]t may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional

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137. *Id.* at 759 (quoting *Reid*, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
138. *Id.* at 766.
139. *Id.* at 769.
140. *Id.* at 770.
141. See *id.* at 770.
142. See *id.* at 766.
significance."143 Yet the remark went without elaboration, so Boumediene ultimately left the standard account standing.144 Meanwhile, the Court’s endorsement of the impracticable-and-anomalous test in the extraterritorial context kept it alive in the unincorporated territories, where several courts adopted it as an updated version of the standard account. Now, whether a constitutional provision applied in an unincorporated territory depended on whether it was “impracticable or anomalous” to apply there—despite the undisputed fact that the test originated in a case involving foreign jurisdictions, whereas these were all domestic territories, subject to U.S. sovereignty and inhabited by U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals. As Part III describes, both before and after Boumediene, the standard account not only survived but thrived, as courts addressing constitutional challenges in the unincorporated territories took advantage of the creative license the Insular Cases afforded and deployed various versions of the impracticable-and-anomalous test in pursuit of the goal of cultural accommodation.

III. THE INSULAR CASES REVVED UP

Beginning a little over a decade after Reid and continuing to this day, a series of courts confronting constitutional challenges arising in the unincorporated territories have adopted the standard account of the Insular Cases and applied an updated version of those decisions’ constitutional exceptionalism with a new aim: that of accommodating territorial cultures.145 Scholarly advocates of

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143. Id. at 758.

144. Kennedy quoted the following sentence from Torres v. Puerto Rico: “Whatever the validity of the [Insular Cases] in the particular context in which they were decided, those cases are clearly not authority for questioning the application of the Fourth Amendment—or any other provision of the Bill of Rights—to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the 1970s.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (quoting Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Thus, Boumediene belongs on the list of Supreme Court opinions calling into question the validity of the Insular Cases but declining or lacking the votes to overrule them. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 14; Torres, 442 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., concurring); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 652-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665 (2020); United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1552 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This is probably for the best, since when the Court overrules the Insular Cases, it should do so unequivocally, in a case that squarely presents the doctrine of territorial incorporation. See infra Part V.

145. Two recent Ninth Circuit decisions did not do the same, but they did not question the standard account, either. Both of them interpreted restrictions in voting based on ancestry as racial restrictions and held that they violated the Fifteenth Amendment in unincorporated territories, but in each case, the court noted that Congress had “extended” the Fifteenth Amendment to the relevant territory, an observation consistent with the standard account. See Davis v.
repurposing the *Insular Cases* have applauded these efforts and themselves contributed to the development of an understanding of the *Insular Cases* that repurposes them in the service of the same aim.\textsuperscript{146}

Even if one accepts that the goal of cultural accommodation in the unincorporated territories is a laudable one, the entire project is ill-advised. That it is unabashedly results-oriented is bad enough. Worse, it keeps the *Insular Cases* alive and thriving on the misguided theory that they can be salvaged by well-intentioned judges. This is simply wrong. They cannot be salvaged. The *Insular Cases* are unsalvageable because regardless of which view one subscribes to — whether the standard or the alternative account — the *Insular Cases* created permanent colonies, which could remain subject to Congress’s plenary power and denied voting representation in the federal government forever. Salvaging these cases prolongs a colonial territorial status, whether most of the Constitution applies or not.

Recall that the *Insular Cases* are problematic in two ways. First, the quality of their legal reasoning is singularly — one might say disqualifyingly — low, as scholarship on them consistently recognizes.\textsuperscript{147} They were the epitome of making it up as one goes along. Second, their abysmal legal reasoning, problematic in large part because it was itself unabashedly results-oriented, served an indefensible goal. Justice White introduced into constitutional law an unprecedented,

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\textsuperscript{146} See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, The Supreme Court, FOMB v. Aurelius Investment, and the Insular Cases, ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 4, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the -originalism-blog/2020/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-insular-casesmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/6TL5-FYD9] (“The Insular Cases are an abomination . . . . The ‘territorial incorporation’ doctrine has no basis in the Constitution’s text or any context or pre- or early post-ratification history.”); Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 71-72 (2013) (describing Justice White’s reasoning in *Downes* as ‘cryptic and indecipherable’); GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 196-97 (2004) (“[T]here is nothing in the Constitution that even intimates that express constitutional limitations on national power apply differently to different territories once that territory is properly acquired . . . . The doctrine of ‘territorial incorporation’ that emerged from [the] *Insular Cases* is transparently an invention designed to facilitate the felt needs of a particular moment in American history.”).
ungrounded, and incoherent doctrine for the express purpose of enabling the indefinite subordination of territories inhabited by racial minorities, denying them the implicit promise of statehood that territories had always enjoyed, and preserving the option of deannexing them—anything to avoid equality and representation.\textsuperscript{148} That is what unincorporation was for. That is all it was for. The \textit{Insular Cases} are a quintessential example of bad law made for a bad purpose.

Courts that have relied on the \textit{Insular Cases} to decide constitutional challenges in the unincorporated territories have made matters worse. For one thing, these courts have followed the standard account, which, as I have explained, exacerbates the first problem by turning a modest holding affecting a few constitutional provisions at most into a dramatic holding affecting every constitutional challenge involving an unincorporated territory. For another, because the standard account is a badly distorted version of an already unclear and confusing doctrine, the decisions elaborating on it are themselves, predictably, unclear and confusing. Worse, none of these efforts changes the brutal reality that the residents of unincorporated territories remain trapped in a subordinate status with no clear end in sight. On the contrary, despite its good intentions, the repurposing project gives a patina of legitimacy to an illegitimate state of affairs.

These cases are problematic for an additional reason: the entire repurposing exercise is gratuitous. As I argue in this Part, most, if not all, of the cases relying on the \textit{Insular Cases} to avoid a purported threat to a territorial cultural practice could have produced the same results without relying on them. Meanwhile, as I argue in Part IV, the one constitutional challenge in which the \textit{Insular Cases} were essential to the result was gratuitous for yet another reason: a different result would not pose a greater threat to any of the cultural practices at issue.

To be clear, my goal is \textit{not} to find a way to reach the same results. While I do not take issue with the value of protecting territorial cultures, I do take issue with doing so at the cost of endorsing and sustaining a legal framework that constitutionalized permanent colonialism. For that reason, the repurposing exercise should be abandoned wholesale. But abandoning it need not entail the loss of culture.

In this Part, I develop and defend the argument that the repurposing project is both ill-advised and gratuitous by examining a series of cases that pursued it and one that eschewed it. I begin with a case in which a court adopted the impracticable-and-anomalous test but nevertheless concluded that the right to a trial by jury applied in American Samoa.\textsuperscript{149} I then look at two cases in which it

\textsuperscript{148} On the deannexationist interpretation of the \textit{Insular Cases}, see Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 5; and text accompanying supra note 6. On the consequences of overruling the \textit{Insular Cases} for this aspect of those decisions, see infra Conclusion.

\textsuperscript{149} See infra Section III.A.
adopted a version of the test. One of these upheld a deviation from the federal right to a trial by jury in the NMI; the other upheld racial restrictions on the alienation of land in the NMI. Next, I examine a case in which a court relied on the updated version of the fundamental rights test to uphold the unequal apportionment of the NMI Senate. Finally, I discuss a case in which a court declined to rely on the Insular Cases but nevertheless upheld racial restrictions on the alienation of land in American Samoa. In these two cases, admittedly, reliance on the Insular Cases was essential to the result. However, it should not have been. Moreover, the result was not essential to cultural accommodation.

Together, all of these cases illustrate the ways in which the Insular Cases have engendered an ambiguous, confusing, and unnecessary approach to constitutional challenges involving unincorporated territories, all while leaving their subordinate status intact.

A. Constitutional Exceptionalism Retooled

Justice Harlan’s test first appeared in the constitutional case law on the unincorporated territories in King v. Morton (remanded for factual development and reheard as King v. Andrus), a case concerning the right to a trial by jury in the U.S. territory of American Samoa. In King v. Morton, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed the repurposing project, expressly adopting a modified version of Harlan’s test for the specific purpose of protecting American Samoan culture from the threat that extending the right to a trial by jury might pose. Ultimately, the district court decided it posed no threat. But in the process, it breathed new life into the Insular Cases.

150. See infra Sections III.B–C.
151. See infra Section III.B.
152. See infra Section III.C.
153. See infra Section III.D.
154. See infra Section III.E.
James King, a U.S. citizen and resident of American Samoa, was charged with tax-related offenses in violation of Samoan law. As proceedings began in the Trial Division of the High Court of American Samoa, King moved for a jury trial. The court rejected the motion on the ground that American Samoan law did not provide for jury trials and that the right to a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution did not apply to unincorporated territories. King then initiated an action in federal court against the U.S. Secretary of the Interior challenging the denial of his motion. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed. Meanwhile, King was tried and convicted in the Trial Division of the High Court of American Samoa and his conviction was affirmed.

Before the D.C. Court of Appeals, King argued that although the Insular Cases had held that the right to a trial by jury did not apply in certain unincorporated territories because it was not fundamental, the Supreme Court had implicitly overruled that holding in Duncan v. Louisiana, a Fourteenth Amendment incorporation decision holding that the federal right to a trial by jury applies against the states because it is fundamental. As King’s argument recognized, at the time of the Insular Cases, the Court had not yet held that the right to a trial by jury was fundamental even in the states. But in Duncan, it did, and King argued that Duncan’s holding applied equally to American Samoa. But the Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, declining to follow Duncan and instead following the Insular Cases and Reid. The Court of Appeals was partially right and partially wrong.

156. King, 520 F.2d at 1142.
157. Id.
158. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1148.
162. Id. at 1142-44.
163. Id. at 1146-47; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also cases cited supra note 91 (listing a series of Insular Cases holding jury-related rights inapplicable in unincorporated territories).
164. King, 520 F.2d at 1146-47.
165. Id. at 1147.
To be sure, Fourteenth Amendment incorporation and territorial incorporation are not the same doctrine. But they overlap. Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine concerns the applicability of provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. Territorial incorporation doctrine concerns, in relevant part, the applicability of fundamental limitations, including provisions of the Bill of Rights, in the unincorporated territories. Both doctrines require courts to ask whether a right is fundamental in the relevant context. Under Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, the answer to the question applies to all states. Under the doctrine of territorial incorporation, the answer to the question can vary from one unincorporated territory to the next (though as explained above, the only federal constitutional rights that the Insular Cases held inapplicable in any unincorporated territory were grand-jury and jury-trial rights).

The court of appeals was right in reasoning that, as long as the Insular Cases remained good law, Duncan alone would not answer the question of whether a right is fundamental in an unincorporated territory. However, it was wrong to deny the relevance of Duncan entirely. Explaining its view, the court interpreted King’s argument as if relying on Duncan would mean simply applying to American Samoa Duncan’s conclusion that the right to a trial by jury is “fundamental,” period, without any inquiry into Samoan culture. As the King court put it:

The decision in the present case does not depend on key words such as “fundamental” or “unincorporated territory” . . . but can be reached only by applying the principles of the earlier cases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the situation as it exists in American Samoa today. As Mr. Justice Harlan wrote in Reid v. Covert, “the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a

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166. See Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra note 75, at 1020-42. As noted above, Justice Frankfurter made a similar observation in Reid. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).


168. As explained in the Introduction and Part I, it also concerns the applicability of provisions defining their geographic scope with the phrase “United States,” and it allows for indefinite territorial status.

169. The question is not relevant in incorporated territories because the Insular Cases held that provisions of the Bill of Rights applied in these territories because these territories were incorporated, not because the provisions were “fundamental.” See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (holding that the right to trial by jury, which was not fundamental, did not apply in the territory of Hawaii between its annexation in 1898 and its incorporation in 1900, but did apply there after Hawaii’s incorporation); Rasimusen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525 (1905) (holding that the right to trial by jury applied in the territory of Alaska because Alaska was incorporated).
necessary condition of the exercise of Congress’[s] power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas.”

The conclusion, the King court explained, must “rest on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American Samoa.” Such an understanding must be based on “facts,” not “opinion[s],” concerning the fa’a Samoa or Samoan way of life, including the matai system, where the term matai refers to the leaders of extended families or aiga. The Court identified the factual issues that the lower court should examine:

[It must be determined whether the Samoan mores and matai culture with its strict societal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a defendant is tried before his peers; whether a jury in Samoa could fairly determine the facts of a case in accordance with the instructions of the court without becoming unduly influenced by customs and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice; and whether the implementation of a jury system would be practicable. In short, the question is whether in American Samoa “circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous.”

The problem here is not the idea that a court must conduct a factual inquiry into the relevant context, but rather the suggestion that Duncan does not require such an inquiry. It does. An accurate reading of Duncan would have recognized that Duncan itself requires a fact-based, contextual inquiry into whether a right is fundamental in the context of an actual legal system. To be sure, such a holding with respect to one state automatically applies in all of them. Arguably, a complete rejection of constitutional exceptionalism would require that it automatically apply to the unincorporated territories as well. But one can concede the

170. King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). By “earlier cases,” the King court meant the Insular Cases, along with Reid. See id. (citing “Balzac, Dorr, Hawaii, and the Insular Tariff Cases,” along with Reid, as the relevant precedents on the applicability of jury trials in American Samoa).

171. Id.

172. For a description of the matai system, see Tapu, supra note 23, at 74-76.

173. King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)). As noted above, see supra note 120, Justice Harlan used the terms “impracticable” and “impractical” interchangeably in his Reid concurrence.

174. This would actually be consistent with what Justices Brown and White said about fundamental rights in Downes. Recall that they both stated that fundamental rights would of course apply in the unincorporated territories. The holdings in subsequent Insular Cases that federal jury-trial rights did not apply in these territories did not conflict with those earlier statements because the Court did not consider federal jury-trial rights fundamental in any context at that time. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
proposition that the states’ legal systems, as a group, differ sufficiently from territorial legal systems that the inquiry with respect to the former cannot resolve the question for the latter, and still apply Duncan in the unincorporated territories.

As the Duncan Court explained, the Court’s approach to Fourteenth Amendment incorporation had changed over time, from an abstract inquiry into the nature of a right to a concrete inquiry into the role of the right in the context of an actual legal system:

Earlier [cases] . . . asked, when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the protection. . . . The recent cases, on the other hand, have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.175

In other words, to follow Duncan would not have been to depend on “key words” like “fundamental.” Rather, it would have been to ask whether, in the context of the American Samoan legal system, the right to a trial by jury is fundamental—whether it is necessary to ensure ordered liberty in the context of American Samoa’s legal system. Instead, seeing a constitutional challenge from an unincorporated territory, the King court resorted to constitutional exceptionalism, requiring the district court to apply the impracticable-and-anomalous test. In the process, it gratuitously perpetuated the problematic idea that the unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional zone.

A further problem with the King opinion is that it purported to adopt Justice Harlan’s test, but actually revised it in a manner designed to serve the purpose of cultural accommodation—thus not only relying on but further expanding and entrenching the erroneous standard account of the Insular Cases. Recall that

175. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. When Duncan refers to “earlier” cases, it is referring to earlier Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases, whereas when King does, see supra text accompanying note 170, it is referring to the Insular Cases and Reid. Ironically, the revised approach in Duncan actually brought the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases closer to the original approach in the Insular Cases, which asked whether a right was fundamental in a particular territorial legal system rather than the more abstract question of whether “a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the protection,” while several territorial cases following King would adopt an inquiry more like the abstract one, asking whether a right was “fundamental in an international sense.” See infra Sections III.B-D.
Harlan’s impracticable-and-anomalous test had already (mis)translated the idea that fundamental rights apply in unincorporated territories into the proposition that whether a constitutional guarantee applies abroad depends on whether it would be impracticable and anomalous to apply it. When Harlan used the phrase “impracticable and anomalous,” it referred to arguably insurmountable obstacles standing in the way of the application of a right abroad. If logistical challenges rendered vindication of a right effectively impossible, the right would be inapplicable.

But in King, the impracticable-and-anomalous test became a disjunctive, and therefore two-pronged, inquiry. What became the “impracticable” prong still concerned the kinds of logistical challenges that Justice Harlan had in mind: challenges involving costs, administrability, institutional constraints—in short, challenges that would make the vindication of a right effectively impossible. But what became the “anomalous” prong brought into the analysis something else: namely, consideration of the effects that application of a given constitutional provision would have upon the culture of a territory—even if the right were otherwise “practicable” to apply.

Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr. describes the disjunctive version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test as follows: the impractical branch asks “[whether] the [territory’s] culture [would] defeat the constitutional provision” while the anomalous branch asks “whether enforcement of the constitutional provision would damage the culture.” I agree entirely with Laughlin’s description, but disagree with Laughlin on the legitimacy and desirability of this version of the test. A leading advocate of the repurposing project, Laughlin defended this approach in a relatively recent piece titled Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea—and Constitutional. It is not a coincidence that the title leads with a normative claim and tacks on a constitutional claim almost as an afterthought. The avowedly results-oriented repurposing project begins with the proposition that territorial cultural practices must be accommodated—while U.S. sovereignty is maintained—and then looks for ways around the constitutional constraints on the exercise of sovereignty that would otherwise apply but might stand in the way of cultural preservation.

176. See also Laughlin, supra note 23, at 353-54, 360 (describing the King Court’s version of Justice Harlan’s test as “disjunctive”).
177. King, 520 F.2d at 1147. See also Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Application of the Constitution in the United States Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. Hawai. L. Rev. 337, 341-42 (1980) (“[T]he doctrines properly analyzed . . . call for individualized determinations of the impact that any constitutional provision would have on the culture of a particular territory.”).
178. Laughlin, supra note 23, at 353-54, 360.
179. Id. at 331.
On remand, the district court in *King* held a trial to examine the relevant features of Samoan culture and reached the conclusion that trials by jury would be neither impracticable nor anomalous there. Discussing the anomalous prong first, it described the relevant cultural practices or “‘Fa’a Samoa’ (the Samoan way of life),” including the “‘aiga’ or extended family, the ‘matai’ or chieftal [sic] system, the land tenure system under which nearly all land is communally owned, and the custom of ‘ifoga’ whereby one family renders formal apology to another for a serious offense committed by one of its members.” Noting that the “major cultural difference between the United States and American Samoa is that land is held communally in Samoa,” the court concluded that jury trials “would have no foreseeable impact on that system.” With respect to the other aspects of Samoan culture that the Court reviewed, it noted that these by now exercised “waning influence” in American Samoa in any event, so that even if jury trials did have an impact, it would be part of a cultural transformation already underway: “The institutions of the present government of American Samoa reflect not only the democratic tradition, but also the apparent adaptability and flexibility of the Samoan society. It has accommodated and assimilated virtually in toto the American way of life.” In other words, it was Samoan culture in its then-current state of Americanization that must be protected. That culture would not be threatened by jury trials.

As for whether jury trials would be impracticable, the district court discussed the guidance American Samoa law could provide on the question. On the one hand, it noted that American Samoa has its own constitution with a bill of rights echoing the Federal Bill of Rights except for grand-jury and jury-trial-related requirements. On the other hand, it relied on the testimony of a justice.

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181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 15.
184. Cuison-Villazor, supra note 20, at 146-50, discusses the challenge of reconciling the goal of preserving culture with the reality that culture changes over time, including in ways that reflect the influence of other cultures.
186. Id. The omission of these rights echoed their omission from the organic acts of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. See Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § Stat. 691, 692-93 (providing a judiciary
of the American Samoan High Court that “there ha[d] been no difficulty in administering the system of criminal justice which is similar to our own in so many respects,” including in its use of adversary proceedings, witness testimony, and cross-examination.\footnote{Id. at 16.} Moreover, American Samoa’s substantive criminal law was a “virtual transplant of the American.”\footnote{Id. at 17.} Working jury trials into that system should not pose insurmountable difficulties, the district court reasoned. It thus concluded that the denial of the right to a criminal trial by jury in American Samoa was unconstitutional because it was neither anomalous nor impracticable to apply the right there.\footnote{Id. at 17.}

Had the \textit{King} court applied \textit{Duncan}, it could have conducted the very same trial and reached the very same conclusion without resorting to constitutional exceptionalism and thereby giving aid and comfort to the \textit{Insular Cases}. Taking into account the same factual context, the \textit{King} court could have explained that the right to a trial by jury applies in American Samoa because, given American Samoa’s current legal system, it is now fundamental there, as it is in the states.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Duncan v. Louisiana}, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (“The question thus is whether given this kind of system [i.e., the legal system at issue in a given case] a particular procedure is fundamental.”).} Instead, it insisted that a constitutional challenge from an unincorporated territory must be handled differently, thus gratuitously exacerbating the conceptual confusion that the \textit{Insular Cases} consistently engender while perpetuating their problematic legacy of constitutional exceptionalism in such territories. It is as if, when it comes to the Constitution in the unincorporated territories, all bets are off. We have now entered the nearly extraconstitutional zone. Whatever happens next, it has to be different—because these places are different and their people are different. They are them, not us. That is the exclusionary logic of the standard account of the \textit{Insular Cases}, and it took the form of the \textit{King} court’s revisionist version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test from \textit{Reid}.

The \textit{King} court made clear that its preferred approach served the purpose of cultural accommodation. But one need not be naïve about the extent to which courts can be apolitical to insist that it is simply not an appropriate exercise of the judicial role to carve out exceptions to rules of constitutional analysis with a view toward achieving policy aims that a court itself concludes cannot be reconciled with constitutional guarantees— to decide that if a policy aim cannot coexist with a constitutional guarantee, then the constitutional guarantee does not “apply” at all—even if the policy aim is the laudable one of protecting the cultures

\footnote{for the Philippines, but not imposing a grand-jury or jury-trial requirement); Act of April 12, 1900, ch. 191, 34 Stat. 77, 84-86 (same for Puerto Rico).}
of the U.S. territories. But this is precisely what the King court did, instructing the district court to look into not only whether American Samoa’s culture would render it impossible to implement the right to a trial by jury but whether implementation of the right would damage American Samoan culture, in order to determine whether the right to a jury trial applies in American Samoa.

King’s new version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test further entrenched the standard account of the Insular Cases as having created a nearly extra-constitutional zone—now defined as a zone in which constitutional guarantees do not apply if it is logistically impossible or threatening to local culture to apply them. But as we have seen, the Insular Cases did not create a nearly extra-constitutional zone. What they did was invent the idea that one category of territories was subordinate and could stay that way forever. Continuing to cite them keeps that abhorrent idea alive.

B. Constitutional Exceptionalism Reinvented

The federal right to a trial by jury was at issue again in Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, this time in the NMI. The NMI became a trust territory of the United States after World War II, along with several other Pacific territories. Several decades later, the others entered into free-association compacts with the United States. But the NMI instead entered into a “Covenant [t]o Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America” (the “Covenant”) opting to become a U.S. territory in order to secure U.S. citizenship for its people.

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191. Though as we have seen, the cultural practices at issue here turned out not to be inconsistent with a constitutional guarantee—rendering the King court’s constitutional exceptionalism gratuitous as well as misguided.

192. 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984).


195. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Text of the Covenant)); see Howard P. Willems & Deanne C. Siemer, An Honorable Accord: The Covenant Between the Northern Marianas and the United States 7-9, 21 (2002). Despite its elegant title (which implies that the agreement between the United States and the NMI has some sort of higher-law status analogous to a
At the time of the Atalig decision, juries were not foreign to the NMI. As the Atalig court explained, NMI law itself provided for jury trials in criminal cases involving offenses punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment or a fine of $2,000.196 The deviation from the federal standard was authorized by the Covenant, which in section 501(a) provides that “neither trial by jury nor indictment by grand jury shall be required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local law, except where required by local law.”197 The question in Atalig was whether section 501(a) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.198

Like King, Atalig declined to follow Duncan; but unlike King, it did not adopt Justice Harlan’s test, either.199 Instead, it offered its own gloss on what it described as the fundamental rights test from the Insular Cases. The Atalig court began by rejecting “two possible approaches”: the first, “that the entire Constitution applies by its own force — ex proprio vigore — in any place where the United States functions as a sovereign,” and the second, “that the Constitution applies in the NMI only to the extent provided for and agreed to in the Covenant.”200 Next, it explained that “[t]he Insular Cases suggest a middle way”: an approach based on a recognition of the difference in the meaning of “fundamental” in the states and the unincorporated territories.201

In order to determine whether a right is fundamental under Duncan, the Ninth Circuit explained, a court would ask whether it “is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”202 But in the unincorporated territories, a court must ask instead whether the right is among those that form “the basis of

constitutinal text) and language in it that purports to require the mutual consent of the United States and the NMI for any alterations, see Covenant, Art. I, § 105, the Covenant is a federal statute, enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 1 n.1.

196. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 684.
197. Covenant § 501(a), 90 Stat. at 267. As noted in the text, the people of the NMI chose (via a self-determination process culminating in a plebiscite) to become a “commonwealth,” with a “Covenant” establishing its relationship to the United States, in part in order to secure U.S. citizenship for themselves. Other trust territories for which the United States had been responsible chose to become free associated states, a status of formal independence with a treaty establishing certain reciprocal rights and obligations with the United States (not including U.S. citizenship). See sources cited supra notes 193-194.
198. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 684-84, 688-90.
199. The Atalig court cites Reid several times, but cites the plurality opinion for the Court and Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence, not Justice Harlan’s. See id. at 688 n.20, 689 & n.22.
200. Id. at 688.
201. Id. at 688-89.
202. Id. at 689 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968)).
all free government.”203 That question should sound familiar: it is a version of the question the Court asked in the early Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases, as Duncan itself explained when it described the question in the earlier cases as that of “[whether] a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.”204 Indeed Atalig quoted Dorr v. United States, one of the Insular Cases, making essentially the same statement with respect to the territories: that fundamental rights in the territories are those that form the basis of “all free government[ s].”205

What this reveals – though the Atalig court itself seems unaware of it – is just how substantial the overlap between the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation jurisprudence and the territorial incorporation jurisprudence was at the time of the Insular Cases. That is, at the time of the Insular Cases, the Court asked the same question in states and unincorporated territories when determining which rights were fundamental (while in incorporated territories, the entire Bill of Rights applied). The answers could be different – though they were not for jury-trial rights, which until Duncan were not fundamental in either the states or unincorporated territories. But the question was the same. The Atalig court thus struck a blow against the standard account of the Insular Cases, but did not seem to know it. Meanwhile, it gave sustenance to the Insular Cases by declining to follow Duncan and citing the Insular Cases instead.

Justifying its decision to follow the Insular Cases, the Atalig court explained that they enable it “to afford Congress flexibility in administering offshore territories and to avoid imposition of the jury system on peoples unaccustomed to common law traditions.”206 To follow Duncan’s approach, the court added, “would deprive Congress of that flexibility,” with the unwelcome consequence of “extend[ing] almost the entire Bill of Rights to such territories” and thereby “repudiat[ing] the Insular Cases” — something that the Atalig court believed itself neither prepared nor permitted to do.207 These observations further illustrate the confusion that the standard account of the Insular Cases engenders and that the repurposing project exacerbates.

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203. Id. at 690 (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904)).
204. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149–50 n.14 (quoted above in the discussion of King, see supra text accompanying note 175).
205. Atalig, 723 F.2d at 690 (quoting Dorr, 195 U.S. at 147). See also supra text accompanying notes 166–175, on the odd, ironic, and inadvertent way in which these territorial cases adopt an approach that echoes the early Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases, which Duncan rejects as too abstract, while Duncan adopts a more contextual approach that echoes that of the original Insular Cases.
206. Id.
207. Id.
To be sure, the *Insular Cases* afford Congress flexibility insofar as they allow a court to ask case-by-case whether a given constitutional limitation is fundamental in a given unincorporated territory. That much the *Atalig* court got right. However, as we have seen, applying *Duncan* would not deprive a court of that flexibility because it would not require conformity with an Anglo-American legal system. It would simply require a court to determine whether the right to a trial by jury is fundamental in the context of the NMI’s legal system. Moreover, to hold the right to a trial by jury applicable in the NMI would hardly amount to the “imposition of the jury system on peoples unaccustomed to common law traditions” since the NMI already had juries, as the court noted at the outset.

The most striking confusion in this passage, however, is in the comment about the Bill of Rights. The notion that a court should avoid a decision that would “extend almost the entire Bill of Rights to such territories” is very much in line with the repurposing project. But the comment fails to consider that most of the Bill of Rights already applies in the NMI. As the *Atalig* court observed in an earlier footnote, section 501 of the NMI’s Covenant with the United States “provides that except for the rights to jury trial and grand-jury indictment, each of the first nine Amendments and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment will apply in the NMI.”

The premise of this language on extending the Bill of Rights is the standard account of the *Insular Cases*: since those decisions created a nearly extraconstitutional zone for the unincorporated territories, the argument goes, Congress may fill the vacuum (or choose not to) by extending constitutional provisions by statute. As I have argued, the *Insular Cases* did not actually withhold any fundamental limitation from the unincorporated territories except for the rights to a grand-jury indictment and a trial by jury. But even if one accepts the standard account, the *Atalig* court’s reasoning here is deeply problematic. Under the circumstances, all it could mean by the quoted statement is that it wants to preserve the possibility that those protections would be withdrawn from the NMI in the future (presumably with the NMI’s consent, though if we are following the standard account of the *Insular Cases*, then surely Congress has the power to make the decision unilaterally).

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208. *Id.* at 690 (citing *Dorr*, 195 U.S. at 148).

209. *Id.* at 690 n.27.

210. The Covenant purports to require mutual consent for revisions to it, *see* Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 105, 90 Stat. 263, 264 (1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2018)), but this is a statement of congressional policy, not power. If Congress has the power to withhold or extend constitutional provisions, then surely it has the power to withdraw a provision it has extended.
If that is indeed what the court means, it should say so and explain why. However, as it stands, the Atalig court not only engaged in the purely ends-based reasoning that characterizes constitutional exceptionalism in the territories, but also pursued a variety of ends that do not even fit the description of the purported end of cultural accommodation. For one thing, the court substituted its own judgment for the NMI’s judgment concerning what is or is not consistent with NMI culture—a criticism one might make about any one of the cases that engage in constitutional exceptionalism, but that has particular force in Atalig because the court’s statement about the Bill of Rights, while dictum, directly contradicted the NMI’s judgment as expressed in the Covenant. For another, it decided that cultural accommodation includes the preservation of a territory’s option to change its mind about what constitutional rights apply or do not apply going forward—a prerogative in tension with the purported imperative of protecting territorial culture. And it held a constitutional right inapplicable to ensure that other constitutional rights would not become applicable—reasoning that bears no relationship to any recognizable or legitimate method of constitutional interpretation.

Yet again, constitutional exceptionalism held sway in a case from an unincorporated territory. Yet again, it led to confusion and error. Yet again, it was gratuitous. And yet again, it contributed to the perpetuation of a legal framework with deeply problematic origins that was designed to produce a subordinate status that continues to this day.

C. Constitutional Exceptionalism Remixed

Another Ninth Circuit decision, Wabol v. Villacrusis, offers an even more striking illustration of the pitfalls of constitutional exceptionalism in the territories: confusion and error, all of it gratuitous, none of it even making a dent in the problem of indefinite territorial status.211

The Wabol case concerned an equal-protection challenge to racial restrictions on the alienation of land in the NMI. Under the Covenant and federal statutes, persons born in the NMI are U.S. citizens.212 The Covenant recognizes a

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211. 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992).
212. Persons from the NMI who became citizens of the United States by virtue of the Covenant were given the choice to become either U.S. citizens or noncitizen U.S. nationals when the NMI and the United States entered into the Covenant, see Covenant § 302, 90 Stat. at 266, though it is unclear whether anyone chose the latter status. For a study of blood quantum laws that discusses the NMI, see generally Rose Cuisin-Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 828-31 (2008). As Rose Cuisin-Villazor explains, such laws have been upheld in the Indian law context as political
subcategory consisting of persons of NMI descent, defined in the NMI Constitution as anyone “who is a citizen or national of the United States and who has at least some degree of Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood or a combination thereof.”

As noted in the discussion of Atalig, Section 501 applies most of the Bill of Rights and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the NMI. Still another, Section 805, authorizes the NMI to restrict the acquisition of long-term interests in local land to persons of NMI descent despite the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. A notwithstanding clause purports to resolve this tension.

The plaintiffs in Wabol entered into a lease granting a long-term interest in land to persons not of NMI descent as defined in the Covenant. Seven years later, they sued to have the lease voided under the Covenant. The defendant countered that Article XII of the NMI Constitution, incorporating Section 805 rather than racial classifications; sometimes upheld and other times struck down in the territorial context; and struck down in the state context. See Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1087, 1093–95 (9th Cir. 2016) (striking down racial classifications in voting qualifications); Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 840–43 (9th Cir. 2019) (same); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (striking down a law limiting non-Native Hawaiians’ right to vote for trustees of a Hawaiian state agency); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974) (upholding laws privileging persons with one-quarter American Indian blood); Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 Am. Samoa 2d 10, 14 (1980) (upholding racial restrictions on the alienation of land in American Samoa on the ground that the preservation of Samoan culture constituted a “compelling . . . interest” and the restrictions at issue were “necessary” to achieve that interest). The Davis decisions are discussed above. See supra note 145. The Craddick decision is discussed below. See infra Section III.E.


See Covenant § 501(b), 90 Stat. at 267.

Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1451–52. Specifically, the “persons” were an individual and a corporation.
of the Covenant, violates the Equal Protection Clause.217 Ruling for the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit upheld Section 805.

The Wabol court endorsed the repurposing project and purported to adopt Justice Harlan’s test, though it actually combined elements of three approaches—a version of the fundamental-rights test as interpreted in Atalig,218 the impracticable-or-anomalous test as elaborated in King,219 and one of two prongs of strict-scrutiny analysis220—which it brought up and then immediately discarded as irrelevant.

After briefly recounting the history of U.S.-NMI relations, the Wabol court repeated the erroneous standard account of the Insular Cases: “It is well established that the entire Constitution applies to a United States territory ex proprio vigore—of its own force—only if that territory is ‘incorporated.’ Elsewhere, absent congressional extension, only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights apply in the territory.”221 Then it described the question before it as follows: “Is the right of equal access to long-term interests in Commonwealth real estate, resident in the equal protection clause, a fundamental one which is beyond Congress’ power to exclude from operation in the territory under Article IV, section 3?”222

One problem with this formulation is that it misconceives the question as that of whether a constitutional guarantee applies. There should be no question that it does since the Insular Cases acknowledged the applicability of the equal-protection guarantee in the unincorporated territories, which the Supreme Court confirmed in Examining Board v. Flores de Otero.223 Even assuming Congress had the power to “exclude” certain guarantees “from operation in the territory,” Congress did not exclude the Equal Protection Clause from operation in the NMI, but rather applied it (for good measure) via the Covenant. The question in this case should have been whether the NMI’s land-alienation restrictions violate the concededly applicable constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

The Wabol court compounded the error by describing the constitutional guarantee at issue as a fundamental right, rather than as the equal-protection

217. Id. at 1451.
218. Id. at 1460–61 (citing N. Mar. I. v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984)).
219. Id. at 1461–62 (citing King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1459–60 (footnote omitted) (first citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); then citing Atalig, 723 F.2d at 688; and then citing Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599–600 n.30 (1976)).
222. Id. at 1460.
223. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 600 (first citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283–84 (1901); and then citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13)); see also Ex parte Bird, 5 P.R. 241, 261 (1904) (naming equal protection as among the personal rights that "are, by the mere fact of American possession, extended to every one residing within the jurisdiction of the United States").
guarantee. That is, the court asked whether a “right . . . resident in the equal protection clause” is “fundamental” in the NMI, instead of asking whether the land-alienation restrictions in the NMI violate equal protection.

Having framed the question as one regarding the applicability of a right, the Wabol court turned to what “fundamental” means in the unincorporated territories—which, were it asking the right question, is certainly what it should have done next. Echoing Atalig, it explained: “What is fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation is that which ‘is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.’ In contrast, ‘fundamental’ within the territory clause are ‘those . . . limitations in favor of personal rights which are the basis of all free government.’” Elaborating, it endorsed the repurposing project: “In the territorial context, the definition of a basic and integral freedom must narrow to incorporate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures.” It then offered its own revised formulation of Atalig’s fundamental rights test: “[T]he asserted constitutional guarantee against discrimination in the acquisition of long-term interests in land applies only if this guarantee is fundamental in this international sense.”

The phrase “fundamental in this international sense” gives a modern flavor to the earlier question “[whether] a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the protection.” But this update does not change the abstract nature of the inquiry. As explained above in the discussions of King and Atalig, the Duncan court abandoned this abstract inquiry in favor of a contextual inquiry with respect to an actual, existing legal system. Apparently, the Wabol court believed it too was choosing a contextual inquiry, while discarding only the part of it that refers to an Anglo-American legal system. But as in Atalig, the Wabol court’s teleological approach to the challenge misled it: it failed to see that the Duncan Court pursued a more, not less, contextual inquiry. Following Duncan would have been more, not less, conducive to the Wabol court’s own stated goal of accommodating territorial culture.

The Wabol court next agreed with Atalig’s explanation of the different purposes served by the Fourteenth Amendment and territorial incorporation, and
reiterated the importance of preserving the federal government’s flexibility to accommodate the territories’ distinctive cultures.\(^{230}\) Citing \textit{King}, it described the “approach” in that case as “similar [to], though more explicit” than, that taken in \textit{Atalig}.\(^{231}\) It then claimed to follow \textit{King}—which, recall, had adopted Justice Harlan’s test—describing \textit{King’s} approach as a “workable standard for finding a delicate balance between local diversity and constitutional command.”\(^{232}\) The reasoning here is transparently teleological. The goal is to carve out an exception from a constitutional command. At every step, the court was looking to accommodate territorial culture. Here, it explicitly selected the test that it would apply with a view toward upholding a cultural practice that might otherwise violate the Constitution.

When the \textit{Wabol} court finally turned to describe the cultural practices at issue, its description was surprisingly brief given the extended effort it had made to find a way to accommodate them:

There can be no doubt that land in the Commonwealth is a scarce and precious resource. Nor can the vital role native ownership of land plays in the preservation of NMI social and cultural stability be underestimated. Land is the only significant asset of the Commonwealth people and “is the basis of family organization in the islands. It traditionally passes from generation to generation creating family identity and contributing to the economic well-being of family members.” It appears that land is principally important in the Commonwealth not for its economic value but for its stabilizing effect on the natives’ social system. The land-alienation restrictions are properly viewed as an attempt, albeit a paternalistic one, to prevent the inhabitants from selling their cultural anchor for short-term economic gain, thereby protecting local culture and values and preventing exploitation of the inexperienced islanders at the hands of resourceful and comparatively wealthy outside investors. The legislative history of the Covenant and the Constitution indicate that the political union of the Commonwealth and the United States could not have been accomplished without the restrictions. Section 805 is a “fundamental provision[ ] of th[e] Covenant” which may be modified only with the mutual consent of the governments of the Commonwealth and the United States. And we must be mindful also that the preservation of local

\(^{230}\) \textit{Wabol}, 958 F.2d at 1460–61 (quoting \textit{Atalig}, 723 F.2d at 689).
\(^{231}\) \textit{Id.} at 1461 (citing \textit{King v. Morton}, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
\(^{232}\) \textit{Id.} at 1461.
culture and land is more than mere desideratum—it is a solemn and binding undertaking memorialized in the Trusteeship Agreement.\textsuperscript{233}

At the conclusion of this description, the court suddenly and without explanation used the means-end language of strict scrutiny: “[The defendant] does not contest the compelling justification for the restrictions. Rather, it attacks only the precision with which the restrictions operate to further those interests.”\textsuperscript{234} Upon reading these two sentences, which correctly articulate the strict-scrutiny standard, one is at a loss to understand the reasons for the detour into constitutional exceptionalism, complete with citations to the \textit{Insular Cases}, suggestions of extraconstitutionality, and an endorsement of the impracticable-and-anomalous test. Why not simply address the defendant’s argument by evaluating whether the NMI’s racial restrictions on the alienation of land were narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling end of preserving the NMI’s culture?

What came next was yet another sudden and unexplained turn, in which the court rejected strict scrutiny as irrelevant, in language once again sounding in constitutional exceptionalism:

[The defendant’s] attack [on the means] would have substantial force in an equal protection analysis, but it is only of minimal relevance to the threshold question of the validity of the Congressional waiver of equal protection restraints in [the Covenant]. A restriction need not be precisely tailored to qualify for exemption from equal protection scrutiny. It is therefore relevant, but not dispositive, that the restrictions . . . might have been drawn more narrowly to accomplish their goals.\textsuperscript{235}

The court’s bizarre reformulation of the equal-protection challenge as a rights challenge, its transparently teleological approach, and its embrace of constitutional exceptionalism all bear fruit in the quoted passage, which treats the idea that Congress could “waive” a restraint on its own power as if it were nothing out of the ordinary—as it is in the alternate universe of the unincorporated territories.

But even if one interprets what Congress did as a “waiver,” the Covenant does not necessarily rule out strict scrutiny in the context of land-alienation restrictions. Section 805 of the Covenant provides that, “in view of the importance of the ownership of land for the culture and traditions of the [NMI] people,” the NMI may “regulate the alienation of permanent and long-term interests in real property so as to restrict the acquisition of such interests to persons of Northern

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id.} (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{234} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{235} \textit{Id.} at 1461–62.
\end{itemize}
Mariana Islands descent.” Section 501(b), in turn, provides that the “application of certain provisions” of the U.S. Constitution to the NMI—including the Equal Protection Clause—will not “prejudice . . . the validity of and the power of the Congress of the United States to consent to” certain Covenant provisions, including Section 805. This language allows the NMI to regulate the alienation of land on the basis of race to ensure native NMI land ownership. But all this should mean is that the Covenant supports the conclusion that the NMI’s land-alienation restrictions are a compelling end. It does not absolve the restrictions from being narrowly tailored to achieve that end.

The Wabol court did not see it that way. Having discarded strict scrutiny as irrelevant, the court then applied the King version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test (recall that this version of this test considers both logistical obstacles to applying a right and its potential effect on territorial culture). Reiterating the importance of both cultural accommodation and compliance with the international obligations that the United States undertook when the NMI became a trust territory, the court concluded “that interposing this constitutional provision would be both impractical and anomalous in this setting.” Finally, the court echoed a favorite saying among proponents of the repurposing project: that the “Bill of Rights was not intended . . . to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.”

Of course not. But this exercise of mixing and matching doctrines to accommodate territorial culture is poorly reasoned and gratuitous. Again, the constitutional provision at issue here was the equal-protection guarantee. It applies to the NMI. The challenged classification required strict scrutiny. The Wabol court itself undoubtedly considered the goal of protecting native land ownership in the


237. Id. § 501(b), 90 Stat. at 267.


239. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462.
NMI a compelling one. To require the NMI to proceed with care in devising the means of achieving that end is not to commit “cultural genocide.”

D. Constitutional Exceptionalism Refutes Itself

To reject constitutional exceptionalism is not to say that there is no difference between territories and states. Indeed, the Constitution creates territories and confers upon Congress plenary power to govern them.240

As explained in Part I, the common understanding throughout the nineteenth century was that territorial status was a temporary stage on the way to statehood. Under the plenary power doctrine, “Congress exercises the combined powers of the general[] and of a state government” in the territories.241 Congress, in other words, had the power to create and modify territorial governments, which were not entirely republican in form until the territory’s admission into statehood.242 Beginning with the Northwest Ordinance, Congress exercised this power through organic acts establishing territorial governments that developed in stages as the (white) population of each territory increased.243 Upon the adoption of its organic act, an “unorganized” territory would become an “organized” territory.244 Under these acts, Congress would initially provide for presidentially appointed territorial governors and legislative councils, then replace the latter with elected legislatures once the territorial population reached a certain size.245 Congress’s plenary power allowed it the flexibility to decide at what pace to make these changes.246

Once one understands that Congress has always had plenary power to govern the territories, one begins to see that gratuitous reliance on the Insular Cases sometimes consists of citing them when the source of congressional power is the Territory Clause, not the doctrine of territorial incorporation per se. Rayphand v. Sablan, a decision of the NMI federal district court rejecting an equal-protection challenge to the malapportionment of the NMI Senate, illustrates the point.247

240. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
242. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
As authorized by the Covenant, the NMI Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature with a Senate and a House of Representatives. Like the U.S. Congress, representation in the House is distributed according to population, but representation in the Senate is allotted equally among three Senatorial districts despite their very different population sizes. One of those districts, consisting of the island of Saipan and several islands north of it, has approximately fifteen to twenty times the population of the other two districts, yet each district has three Senators.

The plaintiff in Rayphand challenged the malapportionment of the NMI Senate on the ground that it violates the one-person, one-vote standard announced in Reynolds v. Sims. Rejecting the challenge, the federal district court in the NMI cited the Insular Cases, Atalig, and Wabol for the proposition that the one-person, one-vote standard is “not fundamental in an international sense.” Endorsing constitutional exceptionalism and the repurposing view, the court explained that the Insular Cases and their progeny give Congress “the most flexibility in fulfilling its mandate under the Territorial Clause,” while avoiding “the imposition of unfamiliar and possibly unwanted rules on territorial cultures.”

The Rayphand court explained the question before it in terms that reflect its embrace of constitutional exceptionalism: “[D]id ... authority under the Territorial Clause by insulating [the Covenant] from the reach of the Equal Protection Clause?” The answer was simple: the “one person, one vote” standard could not be described as the basis of all free government because “[s]everal countries that are considered to have ‘free government’ have a bicameral legislatur[e] in which one house is malapportioned,” including the United States.

249. N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 2(a).
250. Rayphand, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
251. Id. at 1136.
252. Id. at 1138. The Rayphand court did not place primary reliance on the impracticable-and-anomalous test. It explained that “the vitality of that test is in doubt” because at the time it had only been endorsed at the Supreme Court level in two sole-authored concurrences. Id. at 1138 n.11. “Given this, we focus on the central test of Atalig, Wabol, and the Insular Cases, which is whether the given right is ‘the basis of all free government.’” Id. (citations omitted). As we have seen, a majority of the Court would later adopt a version of the test, albeit in the context of Guantánamo— not an unincorporated territory of the United States. See supra Part II (discussing Boumediene). But, as we have also seen, constitutional exceptionalism comes in various guises.
254. Id. at 1140.
In one sense, the Rayphand court’s reasoning is unassailable. It would be awkward, to say the least, for the United States to argue that a malapportioned Senate is inconsistent with free government. In another sense, its reasoning is inscrutable. Having explained that the purpose of constitutional exceptionalism is to avoid the “imposition of unfamiliar and possibly unwanted rules on territorial cultures,” the Rayphand court then used an exceptionalist argument to uphold a practice that mirrors that of the U.S. Senate.

The pitfalls of constitutional exceptionalism become all the more evident in the Rayphand court’s struggle over how to handle the federal analogy. Early in its opinion, the court declined to discuss the NMI government’s argument that its legislature is “exactly analogous to the United States Congress and should therefore survive constitutional scrutiny under Reynolds v. Sims.” The court stated that “resort to the federal analogy may be misleading when discussing the Commonwealth, which exists ‘under the sovereignty of the United States of America,’” and claimed to dispose of the case on other grounds. But those other grounds turn out to involve the very same federal analogy.

Constitutional exceptionalism is at work in Rayphand. Despite the court’s protestations, however, the result of that work is not to avoid the “imposition of unfamiliar and possibly unwanted rules on territorial cultures,” since a clash of cultures is obviously not what is at stake in this case. Instead, the Rayphand court assumes the laws of constitutional physics have been suspended because the plaintiff is in an unincorporated territory, where all constitutional bets are off. And because everyone knows that the Insular Cases were racially motivated, imperialist decisions that constitutionalized perpetual U.S. colonies, the court justified reliance on them with the reasoning that it must do so to protect the culture of the NMI—regardless of the patent absurdity of that argument in this case. Presumably, the court fixated on cultural accommodation because it is questionable to suspend constitutional rules to achieve a particular result—even if the result is the laudable one of accommodating distinctive cultural practices in subordinate U.S. jurisdictions. But the enterprise unravels when there is no distinctive cultural practice to accommodate.

Rather than bending over backward to endorse and apply the doctrine of territorial incorporation, the Rayphand court should have analyzed the issue as one involving an exercise of Congress’s plenary power over a territory. Arguably, plenary-power doctrine would suffice to uphold the NMI’s malapportioned Senate. As explained above, Congress has always had the power to create, modify, and dissolve territorial governments unconstrained by a requirement that they

255. Id. at 1137.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1138.
be republican in form. To be sure, Congress, in its exercise of plenary power, is subject to constitutional limitations such as the equal-protection guarantee. But does a malapportioned Senate in a territory violate equal protection? Given the history of territorial governments in the United States, it seems unlikely. At the very least, the Rayphand court should have analyzed the question as one concerning Congress’s plenary power and left the Insular Cases aside.

Whatever the answer, it should not lie in constitutional exceptionalism. Either plenary power suffices to uphold malapportionment in the NMI Senate or the NMI could become independent and organize a government outside the U.S. Constitution however it pleases. It is no solution for a federal court to shun constitutional requirements by resorting to the idea of a nearly extraconstitutional zone—which comes at the unavoidable cost of perpetuating the subordination of the people of the territories.

E. Constitutional Exceptionalism at Bay

I have argued that constitutional exceptionalism breeds poor legal reasoning, engenders confusion and uncertainty, and perpetuates a problematic legal framework that always has and always will subordinate the unincorporated territories. I have also argued that it does all of this gratuitously, suggesting how, in each of the cases discussed above, a court could have accommodated territorial cultural practices without relying on the Insular Cases and their progeny. In this Section, I develop this claim by describing a case in which a court found a way to do just that.

That case is Craddick v. Territorial Registrar of American Samoa, decided by the High Court of American Samoa several years after King introduced Justice Harlan’s test into the case law on the Constitution in the unincorporated territories. Craddick acknowledged the existence of the Insular Cases, but eschewed reliance on them in resolving a tension between a territorial cultural practice and a constitutional command.

258. Not only does the Territory Clause give Congress plenary power to govern territories, and Articles I and II of the Constitution exclude territories from federal representation, but the Guarantee Clause applies only to states. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).

259. As noted above, even Downes assumed this was the case, while Ex parte Bird, 5 P.R. 241, 261-62 (1904), held it. See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976) (first citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283-84 (1901); and then citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922)) (interpreting the Insular Cases as having held due process and equal protection applicable in Puerto Rico).

260. 1 Am. Samoa 2d 10 (1980).
American Samoa is both unincorporated and unorganized, the latter because Congress has not passed an organic act for it.\textsuperscript{261} It is administered by the Secretary of the Interior, though it is locally self-governing under its own constitution and laws.\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Craddick} involved an equal-protection challenge to racial restrictions on the alienation of land in American Samoa. The plaintiffs were a married couple: one a non-Samoan U.S. citizen, the other an American Samoan U.S. national. They challenged the constitutionality of an American Samoan statute prohibiting the alienation of “any lands except freehold lands to any person who has less than one half native blood, and if a person has any nonnative blood whatever,” then prohibiting the alienation of “any native lands to such person unless he was born in American Samoa, is a descendant of a Samoan, lived in American Samoa for more than five years[,] and has officially declared his intention of making American Samoa his home for life.”\textsuperscript{263} The plaintiffs claimed that the provision made a classification on the basis of race in violation of the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{264}

The court began its analysis by confirming that the equal-protection and due-process guarantees “are fundamental rights which do apply in the Territory of American Samoa.”\textsuperscript{265} The court thus implicitly acknowledged the \textit{Insular Cases}, which, as we have seen, stated that fundamental limitations apply in unincorporated territories. As noted, \textit{Downes} acknowledged in dicta that equal-protection and due-process guarantees apply in unincorporated territories, and the Supreme Court confirmed this reading several years before \textit{Craddick}.\textsuperscript{266} Still, because the \textit{Insular Cases} also held that what is fundamental may vary from one unincorporated territory to the next, the threshold question of whether a limitation is fundamental remains worth answering for any unincorporated territory where it has not yet been answered.

The \textit{Craddick} court answered this threshold question concisely and correctly. Better yet, it avoided citing the \textit{Insular Cases}, citing instead the trial court’s summary-judgment order, which itself confirmed that equal-protection and due-process guarantees apply in American Samoa. The trial court observed that “it is inconceivable that the Secretary of the Interior would not be bound by these provisions in governing the territories, whether ‘organized,’ ‘incorporated,’ or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{261} See supra note 244; supra note 159.
\item \textsuperscript{263} \textit{Craddick}, 1 Am. Samoa 2d at 11-12 (quoting Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 37.0204(b) (2018)).
\item \textsuperscript{264} See id. at 12.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{266} See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976).
\end{itemize}
The court then proceeded with a traditional application of equal-protection doctrine.

Because the case concerned an equal-protection challenge to a racial classification, the court applied strict scrutiny and upheld the restrictions on the ground that they served the compelling interest of protecting Native land ownership in American Samoa and were narrowly tailored to achieve that end. The court explained that “[i]t is well established that race is a suspect classification and that statutes discriminating on the basis of race are subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.” Strict scrutiny, it went on, requires that the purpose served by the statute be “both constitutionally permissible and substantial,” and that the means used be “necessary” to achieve that purpose. The court concluded that American Samoa had “demonstrated a compelling state interest in preserving the lands of American Samoa for Samoans and in preserving the Fa’a Samoa, or Samoan culture” and that “the prohibition against the alienation of land to non-Samoans [was] necessary to the safeguarding of these interests.”

The court’s explanation of why the interest was “compelling” described the importance of land in Samoan culture and the uninterrupted history of efforts to preserve Samoan land ownership dating to the beginning of U.S. sovereignty in American Samoa. As for the means used to achieve that end, the court explained that American Samoa is 76.2 square miles in size and “with so little land available,” it was “clear” that racial restrictions on the alienation of land were necessary to preserve American Samoan land ownership. The court thus upheld the challenged restrictions, concluding they were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling end. Although the court did not itself use the term, it appeared to view the racial classification at issue as benign.

A dissenting opinion by Justice Murphy criticized the court for affirming summary judgment rather than remanding the case for the development of evidence in a full trial. Murphy contrasted the Craddick court’s approach to that taken by the King court, but to be precise, Murphy cited King with approval only for holding a trial on remand; he did not take issue with the Craddick majority’s use of strict scrutiny. On the contrary, Murphy assumed that the purpose of a trial would be to establish the facts to which strict scrutiny would apply. Indeed,

267. Craddick, 1 Am. Samoa 2d at 12 (quoting the trial court).
268. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
269. Id. (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
270. Id.
271. See id. at 12-14.
272. Id. at 14.
273. See id. at 17 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
274. See id. at 16.
while contrasting the summary judgment in *Craddick* with the trial in *King*, Murphy interpreted *King* as if it too had applied strict scrutiny. As he put it, the *King* court “heard testimony and evidence presented by a cross-section of Samoan leadership and qualified experts before determining if the Government had an interest sufficiently compelling to prohibit trial by jury of American citizens in American Samoa.”

The minor inaccuracy in suggesting that *King* applied strict scrutiny has a major clarifying effect. It reveals that the impracticable-and-anomalous test is no more conducive to an extensive factual inquiry than the strict-scrutiny standard. *Craddick* thus demonstrates how a court can eschew constitutional exceptionalism and still be respectful of territorial cultural practices. It may even uphold them, as the *Craddick* court did, without perpetuating unsound precedent. Notice that *King* engaged in constitutional exceptionalism while *Craddick* did not, but *King* held the asserted constitutional right applicable despite its asserted tension with the culture while *Craddick* applied the relevant constitutional guarantee without qualification and upheld the challenged cultural practice. As *Craddick* demonstrates, a court can accommodate some cultural practices without resort to the impractical-and-anomalous test. And, as *King* suggests, that test does not necessarily guarantee cultural accommodation.

I do not intend this discussion of *Craddick* to suggest that territorial cultural practices in tension with constitutional limitations would always and necessarily survive strict scrutiny (itself a somewhat vague standard, and concededly one the current Court would apply to any racial classification). But I am not looking for a standard that will ensure cultural accommodation. I am looking for an end to constitutional exceptionalism for the territories because it has produced a jurisprudence riddled with confusion and error that ever more deeply entrenches a doctrine that gives constitutional sanction to permanent colonialism. Part of my argument consists of demonstrating that the advocates of repurposing are wrong to conclude that we must learn to live with the *Insular Cases* if we wish to protect territorial cultures. I disagree with these advocates that one should—or must—reverse engineer one’s constitutional analysis to achieve even a laudable goal.

*Craddick* illustrates the point that strict scrutiny gives voice to territorial culture as much as the impracticable-and-anomalous test does. Like the impracticable-and-anomalous test, strict scrutiny allows for a robust examination of territorial cultural practices. The arguable problem with the decision in *Craddick* was not that it applied the strict-scrutiny standard, but that it did not remand for trial, which could have better established that land-alienation restrictions were narrowly tailored to preserve the compelling end of protecting American

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275. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
Samoan culture. As for the outcome, strict scrutiny may not guarantee the desired result, but neither does the impracticable-and-anomalous test, as demonstrated by *King*. However, the strict-scrutiny standard eschews constitutional exceptionalism and thus avoids giving aid and comfort to the doctrine that has ensured the perpetual subordination of the inhabitants of the territories.

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As I have suggested, the same argument applies to the constitutional rights at issue in the post-*Reid* territorial cases discussed in this Part. The *Atalig* court could have applied *Duncan* without asking whether juries are fundamental to an Anglo-American legal system by instead asking whether they are fundamental to the NMI's legal system. This question would not require a particular result, but it would amplify the argument for cultural accommodation without endorsing the *Insular Cases*. The *Wabol* court could have followed *Craddick*, applying strict scrutiny and determining whether the challenged restrictions were narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling end of protecting Native land ownership. Here again, the result would not be foreordained, but it would be relevant that Congress considered the end compelling enough to agree to it in the Covenant with the NMI. The *Rayphand* court could have relied on Congress's plenary power to organize governments in the territories, a power which long predates the *Insular Cases*, to conclude that the one-person, one-vote standard does not foreclose a malapportioned Senate in the NMI any more than it does in the U.S. federal government. In this case, the plenary-power doctrine, pursuant to which Congress exercises the combined powers of federal and state governments, would preserve a considerable measure of the vaunted flexibility that advocates of repurposing associate with the doctrine of territorial incorporation. There may well be traditional cultural practices that would be highly unlikely to survive without the *Insular Cases*, but only the reported resistance to same-sex marriage in American Samoa comes to mind.276

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276. Admittedly, my knowledge of the territorial cultural practices purportedly threatened by the Constitution comes from the scholarship on repurposing the *Insular Cases* and the relevant litigation (none of which has defended the *Insular Cases* on the ground that they would allow American Samoa to ban same-sex marriage, as far as I am aware). On the applicability of *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (upholding the right to same-sex marriage), to American Samoa, see Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: American Samoa, JONES DAY (Aug. 31, 2015), https://perma.cc/6KA7-MGHJ; Fili Sagapolotule & Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, American Samoa Questions Gay Marriage Validity in Territory, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 10, 2015), https://apnews.com/article/c1deb598da6a482587fdd5e3c51ef94 [https://perma.cc/J5V3-QFVF]. Arguably, the *matai* system in American Samoa violates the Nobility Clause, because only *matais* may serve in the American Samoan Senate. But arguably, it does not, because *matais* are elected and can lose their titles. See Tapu, supra note 23, at 82, 84-88, 89 (acknowledging that “there may be a legitimate claim” that the *matai* system violates the Nobility Clause but arguing both that the Nobility Clause would be impracticable and anomalous to
In short, it is simply not true that judicial adoption of the repurposing project is “defensible and perhaps even necessary” to achieve self-government in the territories. Nor is it true that the *Insular Cases* “once served colonial interests in an era of mainland domination of the territories” but, now repurposed, no longer do. The *Insular Cases* doctrine serves colonial interests today. It gave the Court’s endorsement to perpetual territorial status, and it continues to do so today. It is neither defensible nor necessary to repurpose it in order to achieve self-government in the territories. On the contrary, as long as the cases that created permanent American colonies remain on the books, they will stand in the way of that goal. That is what the doctrine of territorial incorporation was all about: denying the unincorporated territories full self-government indefinitely. Only by overruling the *Insular Cases*, and thereby unequivocally rejecting the constitutionality of permanent territories, can the Court take a stand in support of genuine self-government for the people of the territories.

### IV. THE INSULAR CASES RUN AMOK

The appeal of constitutional exceptionalism lies in its apparent solicitude toward territorial cultures in a time of consensus against cultural imperialism. But as we have seen, the cases that employ constitutional exceptionalism could have reached the same results without it. Gratuitous constitutional exceptionalism promotes poor legal reasoning and perpetuates doubts about the applicability of constitutional provisions where there should be none. Such uncertainty alone is oppressive. Moreover, even where there are reasonable doubts over the

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apply in American Samoa and that, even if the Nobility Clause applies, the *matai* system does not violate it because *matais* are elected and can lose their titles); Weaver, supra note 155, at 361 n.304 (observing that a challenge to the *matai* system could conceivably be brought under the Nobility Clause but concluding that the system is “more of a cultural institution than a government system of nobility and would most likely fall outside the Nobility Clause”).

277. Rennie, supra note 22, at 1707.

278. *Territorial Federalism*, supra note 20, at 1686.

279. See *SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND EMPIRE* 53-55 (2019); Sam Erman, *Status Manipulation and Spectral Sovereigns*, 53 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS L. REV. 813 (2022); Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 10, at 286; see also infra Part V (describing the disruptive role that uncertainty about the *Insular Cases* played in two constitutional challenges involving Puerto Rico). For a provocative argument that judges can and have engaged in territorial status manipulation even when they disclaim reliance on the *Insular Cases*, see Campbell, supra note 5. For a discussion of one example of such manipulation on the ground, in the context of federal prosecutions of local activity in Puerto Rico, see Emmanuel Hiram Arnaud, *Llegaron los Federales: The Federal Government’s Prosecution of Local Criminal Activity in Puerto Rico*, 53 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 882, 920–941 (2022), which describes the role of ambiguous and misleading descriptions of Puerto Rico’s constitutional status in cases involving federal prosecutions on the island.
applicability of a given constitutional provision, constitutional exceptionalism exacerbates the confusion and uncertainty. Worse, it leaves intact a legal framework that ensures the indefinite political subordination of the residents of unincorporated territories, which, cultural accommodation or not, remain subject to U.S. sovereignty without voting representation in the federal government.

Two recent appellate decisions seriously exacerbated the problems with the repurposing project. These cases, *Tuaua v. United States* and *Fitisemanu v. United States*, held that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in the unincorporated territory of American Samoa, where under a federal statute, birth confers U.S. nationality but not U.S. citizenship. Both decisions relied on the *Insular Cases*. As usual, this reliance involved adopting the erroneous standard account along with a version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test that was conducive to the court’s desired outcome.

The courts’ choices in these cases were even more problematic than in prior cases because the question presented here should not have been whether a right applied but whether a constitutional provision defining its own geographic scope with the phrase “United States” included American Samoa. Failing to recognize the distinction between the two kinds of questions, the D.C. Circuit in *Tuaua* relied on the *Insular Cases* and its own version of the impracticable-and-anomalous test to hold that the Citizenship Clause does not apply in American Samoa. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In *Fitisemanu*, a federal district court in Utah declined to follow the *Insular Cases* and instead followed the leading precedent on Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, to hold that the Citizenship Clause does apply in American

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280. 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
281. 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2021).
282. One may want to add “and by implication, in other unincorporated territories,” but these cases wrongly treat the question before them as one that can yield a different answer in different unincorporated territories.
284. *Tuaua*, 788 F.3d at 302-03.
285. See id. at 302.
286. *Tuaua v. United States*, 579 U.S. 902 (2016). The denial came less than a week after the Court handed down its decision in *Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle*, 579 U.S. 59 (2016), a double jeopardy case confirming that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign, but instead is fully subject to U.S. sovereignty. It was a jarring juxtaposition.
287. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Samoa.288 But a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed and followed Tuaua.289 The judge who wrote the opinion for the court relied on Tuaua's revised impracticable-and-anomalous test;290 the concurring judge declined to rely on that test;291 and the dissenting judge disagreed that the Insular Cases governed the question.292

The impracticable-and-anomalous test that the Tuaua court designed not only distorted it beyond recognition, but absolved the courts from learning anything at all about the cultural practices the test supposedly protects. As in Rayphand, constitutional exceptionalism may not have been gratuitous here, but it was pointless. After all, citizenship would not threaten any of the cultural practices at issue. What we see in Tuaua and Fitisemanu is nothing short of the Insular Cases run amok.

The Supreme Court has not answered the question of whether the Citizenship Clause applies in the unincorporated territories. The Court had the opportunity to do so in the 1904 case Gonzales v. Williams, but it chose not to.293 The Gonzales case concerned a habeas corpus petition by Isabel Gonzalez, who was born in Puerto Rico before the island’s annexation and traveled to New York several years after its annexation.294 Congress would not extend U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico until 1917.295 Instead, the organic act for the island referred to them as “citizens of Porto Rico.”296 Upon Gonzalez’s arrival at Ellis Island, she was detained and excluded on the ground that she became a public charge.297 She filed a habeas petition arguing that she had become

290. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 879-81.
291. See id. at 881-83 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
292. See id. at 883-908 (Bacharach, J., dissenting). This dissenting judge and one other dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. See Fitisemanu, 20 F.4th at 1326 (Bacharach, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc consideration).
294. Gonzales, 192 U.S. at 7. The opinion and caption misspelled her first and last names. Although González today is spelled with an accent, Isabel Gonzalez apparently did not use one. See Erman, supra note 279, at 91 fig.4.1 (image of a letter she signed without the accent).
a U.S. citizen through Puerto Rico’s annexation and therefore could not be detained at the border, let alone excluded. Gonzalez’s case made it to the Supreme Court, which ruled in her favor. However, the Court limited itself to the statutory holding that under the immigration laws then in force, the term “alien” did not refer to Puerto Ricans. It expressly declined to reach the question of whether the Citizenship Clause applied to Puerto Rico. In the wake of Gonzalez, the federal government began designating the inhabitants of the unincorporated territories noncitizen U.S. nationals, first by executive action and eventually by congressional statute. American Samoans continue to hold this status today.

The two recent challenges to American Samoans’ noncitizen U.S. national status pose squarely, for the first time since Downes, a question concerning a constitutional provision that defines its geographic scope with the phrase “United States”: does “United States,” as used in the Citizenship Clause, include American Samoa? These challenges were brought by American Samoan noncitizen

298. Id. at 7, 16.
299. Id. at 13.
300. Id. at 12 (“We are not required to discuss the power of Congress in the premises; or the contention . . . that the cession of Porto Rico accomplished the naturalization of its people; or . . . that a citizen of Porto Rico . . . is necessarily a citizen of the United States.”).
U.S. nationals, some living in the territory and others living in states, who have suffered from the deprivation of rights inherent in second-class status. As noncitizen U.S. nationals, they cannot hold certain government positions; they are disadvantaged relative to U.S. citizens when it comes to sponsoring relatives for immigration; and, despite residing in a state and not having citizenship in any other country, they do not have the right to vote.\footnote{Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (2015) (No. 12-1143); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (2021) (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019).}

The reasoning in both \textit{Tuaua} and \textit{Fitisemanu} is profoundly flawed. First, the cases use the wrong test, applying the impracticable-and-anomalous inquiry to a challenge based on a provision that defines its own geographic scope with the phrase “United States.” The question should be whether that phrase includes unincorporated territories, not whether a right is impracticable or anomalous to apply. Second, they exacerbate the confusion and uncertainty that Justice Harlan’s test has already engendered by purporting to rely on it, but then doing the opposite of what it requires, thereby avoiding rather than conducting an inquiry into whether citizenship would threaten any of the cultural practices supposedly at stake.

I have argued that the standard account of the \textit{Insular Cases}—according to which they created a nearly extraconstitutional zone for the unincorporated territories—gets it wrong. I have offered a more modest account: the \textit{Insular Cases} held that provisions defining their geographic scope with the phrase “United States” may or may not include unincorporated territories, and either way, fundamental limitations always apply, though what counts as fundamental may vary among unincorporated territories.\footnote{See supra Part I.} Admirers and critics of the impracticable-and-anomalous test alike would agree that it is one version of various tests courts have employed to address the second issue in the \textit{Insular Cases}: that of what constitutional limitations count as fundamental in a given unincorporated territory. It is a distinct inquiry from the first: whether the phrase “United States” in any given constitutional provision includes certain territories. But the courts in \textit{Tuaua} and \textit{Fitisemanu} ask whether citizenship would be impracticable-and-anomalous to apply when they should be asking whether the phrase “United States,” in this case as used in the Citizenship Clause, includes an unincorporated territory, in this case American Samoa.

Despite the rhetorical appeal of the well-known aphorism that “[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights,”\footnote{Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).} citizenship is not a “right” in the same sense as other individual rights, which may or
may not be fundamental and infringements or denials of which warrant varying levels of scrutiny. It is, rather, a status one attains by fitting the description in the Citizenship Clause of being “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” 306 Whether a person is a U.S. citizen does not turn on whether citizenship is fundamental, let alone impracticable or anomalous, to apply. That is why even a person born to a foreigner briefly present in the United States at the time of birth is a U.S. citizen. 307 To hold, as the Tuaua and Fitisemanu courts did, that persons born in American Samoa are not U.S. citizens because citizenship is not a fundamental right or because it is “impracticable and anomalous” to apply the Citizenship Clause in that territory is to display a stunning lack of understanding of a basic point of constitutional law. 308

In short, Tuaua and Fitisemanu use the already problematic impracticable-and-anomalous test to answer a question that the test was never intended to, and indeed cannot, answer. For this reason alone, the courts’ analyses in these cases are utterly misguided. But it gets worse: these decisions’ woefully inadequate discussion of the threat that U.S. citizenship would supposedly pose to American Samoa’s culture fully exposes the pitfalls of constitutional exceptionalism.

Recall that when King first adopted the impractical-and-anomalous test with respect to jury-trial rights in American Samoa, it did so on the theory that the test would enable the district court to make the detailed factual findings required to answer the question of what, exactly, about American Samoan culture would be threatened by the introduction of trials by jury. Yet, in Tuaua and Fitisemanu, the test perversely served to relieve courts of their responsibility to investigate the territorial cultural practices that U.S. citizenship would allegedly threaten. Instead of conducting such an inquiry, these courts used the test to give themselves permission to hold a constitutional provision inapplicable in American Samoa on the ground that, according to the American Samoan government, a majority of its inhabitants may not want it to apply. The Tuaua court is the worst offender in this respect, though by agreeing with its holding, Fitisemanu has made Supreme Court review of Tuaua less certain. 309 In Tuaua, the court emphasized its reluctance to “impose” U.S.

308. See Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 878-879 (not fundamental); id. at 880-881 (anomalous); Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 308 (not fundamental); Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 310 (anomalous). Only one judge in Fitisemanu reached these conclusions; the concurring judge reasoned simply that the Court should uphold the settled understanding that Congress has the power to decide the citizenship status of persons born in unincorporated territories. See Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 883.
309. That said, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Vaello Madero calling on the Court to overrule the Insular Cases at some point, see Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1557 (2022) (Gorsuch, J.,
citizenship over the objection of the majority of Samoans, as asserted by their government, in an expressly and emphatically teleological approach. But it then failed to examine how U.S. citizenship would threaten Samoan culture. Moreover, it did not even attempt to explain why U.S. citizenship would threaten Samoan culture any more than U.S. nationality already does. American Samoans are noncitizen U.S. nationals, yet nowhere in the Tuaua or Fitisemanu litigation is there even a hint of an objection by the American Samoan government to that status—or, for that matter, to American Samoa’s relationship to the United States.

The argument that citizenship poses a threat to culture would have to identify the cultural practices at stake and the constitutional provisions that would threaten those practices, which supposedly do not apply now but would somehow become applicable if the Citizenship Clause applied in American Samoa. The briefs for the United States and the American Samoan government gestured in the direction of an argument along these lines, but did not actually make it—likely because it fails on its own terms. The cultural practices in question include racial restrictions on the alienation of land and the system of communal land ownership, the matai system, and curfews linked to religion. The constitutional provisions in tension with these practices would be the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Nobility Clause, and the Establishment Clause. None of those clauses applies to U.S. citizens any more or less than

310. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302.
311. See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 3, 21, Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (2021) (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019); Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants at 17-24, Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th 862 (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019); Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants at 3-8, Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th 862 (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019); Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 23-32, Tuaua, 788 F.3d 300 (No. 12-1143). These briefs describe the threatened cultural practices and claim that citizenship would threaten them because it would render certain constitutional provisions (the Equal Protection Clause and the Establishment Clause) fully applicable. What they fail to explain is why citizenship would make any difference to the applicability of these or any other of the provisions at issue. It would not. As I explain in the paragraph following this footnote, none of the clauses at issue applies specifically to citizens.
312. See supra note 311; see also Hall, supra note 23, at 71-76 (describing these practices); Tapu, supra note 23, at 74-76 (describing the matai system).
313. The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id. The Nobility Clause reads: “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by
noncitizen U.S. nationals. The Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause expressly protect persons. The Nobility Clause is not limited to the conferral of titles of nobility on U.S. citizens as opposed to noncitizen U.S. nationals. The Establishment Clause does not refer to citizenship. Were the Citizenship Clause held applicable in American Samoa, it would not change the relationship between the cultural practices at issue and these constitutional provisions.

Like the governments’ briefs, the Tuaua court failed to examine how U.S. citizenship would threaten Samoan culture. Instead, it made passing mention of the “unique kinship practices and social structures inherent [in] the Samoan way of life, including those related to the Samoan system of communal land ownership,” explaining that “[t]raditionally aiga (extended families) ‘communally own virtually all Samoan land, [and] the matai (chiefs) have authority over which family members work what family land and where the nuclear families within the extended family will live.’” Why any of this is in tension with U.S. citizenship but not U.S. nationality is anyone’s guess.

The Tuaua opinion seems on the verge of addressing the alleged tension between U.S. citizenship and American Samoan culture when it observes that “[r]epresentatives of the American Samoan people have long expressed concern that the extension of United States citizenship to the territory could potentially undermine these aspects of the Samoan way of life.” It continues: “Congressman [Eni] Faleomavaega and the American Samoan Government posit the extension of citizenship could result in greater scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, imperiling American Samoa’s traditional,

the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. The Establishment Clause reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. None of these provisions mentions citizens and none has been interpreted as applicable to citizens specifically as opposed to persons generally.

314. See supra note 313.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 309.
319. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
320. Ironically, the internal quotation here comes from the appellate decision in the King litigation, where on remand the district court found no tension between the federal right to a trial by jury and American Samoan cultural practices. Morton, 520 F.2d at 1159; King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1977).
321. Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 310.
racially-based land-alienation rules. [Plaintiff-appellants] contest the probable danger citizenship poses to American Samoa’s customs and cultural mores.”

At this point, the court posed the question: how would U.S. citizenship “undermine these aspects of the Samoan way of life?” What comes next is not an answer:

The resolution of this dispute would likely require delving into the particulars of American Samoa’s present legal and cultural structures to an extent ill-suited to the factual record before us. We need not rest on such issues or otherwise speculate on the relative merits of the American Samoan Government’s Equal Protection concerns. The imposition of citizenship on the American Samoan territory is impractical and anomalous at a more fundamental level.

We hold it anomalous to impose citizenship over the objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed through their democratically elected representatives.

This astonishing passage is riddled with problems. For one thing, resolution of the disagreement over whether U.S. citizenship would threaten Samoan culture would not “likely” require an examination of the particulars of American Samoan culture. It would definitely require it. Such an examination is precisely what proponents of the impracticable-and-anomalous test have always argued it is for. Incredibly, the Tuaua court selected the wrong test and then absolved itself of the responsibility to do what that test requires.

For another, the court declined to “otherwise speculate on the relative merits of the American Samoan Government’s Equal Protection concerns.” But it would not require “speculation” to observe that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons generally, not citizens specifically. Surely, this basic legal proposition is centrally relevant to the question of whether U.S. citizenship would affect a cultural practice in tension with the Equal Protection Clause.

Moreover, although the Tuaua court seems unaware of it, there is yet another reason U.S. citizenship would not result in greater scrutiny of American Samoa’s race-based land-alienation restrictions: strict scrutiny already applies to them. The High Court of American Samoa applied strict scrutiny to these restrictions

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322. Id. Congressman Faleomavaega was American Samoa’s nonvoting delegate in Congress at the time.
323. Id.
324. Id. (citation omitted).
325. Id.
decades ago in *Craddick*—and upheld them. Incredibly, the *Tuaua* court did not even cite *Craddick*. Add to this the fact that race-based restrictions on land alienation survived an equal-protection challenge in the NMI, where birth confers statutory U.S. citizenship, and it is impossible to pin down precisely what the supposed threat is.

The *Tuaua* court does not reckon with any of this. Instead, it pivots: “We need not rest on such issues or otherwise speculate on the relative merits of the American Samoan Government’s Equal Protection concerns” because “[t]he imposition of citizenship . . . is impractical and anomalous at a more fundamental level.” It then holds that it would be “anomalous to impose citizenship,” regardless of what effect, if any, it would have on American Samoan culture, because according to the territory’s elected representatives, a majority of American Samoans (apparently) object to it. In other words, the court uses the impracticable-and-anomalous label, but actually applies an entirely different test: one in which a court need only ask what—according to the territorial government—might a majority of the inhabitants of the territory want?

What comes next is an especially egregious example of the pitfalls of constitutional exceptionalism. Having discarded the only precedent that could provide any guidance on the question of who is a birthright citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment (*Wong Kim Ark*), choosing instead to apply an irrelevant test that provides no guidance at all (the impracticable-and-anomalous test), and then failing to do what that test requires, the court fills the void—the nearly extraconstitutional zone in which it is now operating—with a strange and unconvincing

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326. See supra Section III.E.

327. This occurred despite the fact that several briefs on appeal in *Tuaua* cited, quoted, or discussed *Craddick*. See *Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 28–30, Tuaua*, 788 F.3d 300 (No. 13-5272); *Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alt., Amici Curiae the Am. Samoa Gov’t and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 4–5, Tuaua*, 788 F.3d 300 (No. 13-5272); *Brief of Amici Curiae Certain Members of Cong. and Former Governmental Offs. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and in Support of Reversal at 17–23, Tuaua*, 788 F.3d 300 (No. 13-5272).

328. Although the *Tuaua* court cites *Wabol*, which upheld the NMI’s land-alienation restrictions, see supra Section III.C, it cites *Wabol* for a different proposition, see *Tuaua*, 788 F.3d at 308.

329. *Tuaua*, 788 F.3d at 310.

330. Id.

331. Presumably the *Tuaua* court was aware (though it gave no sign of it) of evidence supporting the proposition that American Samoan leaders believed, when they agreed to become subject to U.S. sovereignty at the end of the nineteenth century, that with U.S. sovereignty came U.S. citizenship, and that once they learned it had not, they unsuccessfully sought federal recognition of their status as U.S. citizens for decades, because the plaintiffs explained it. See *Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21–22, Tuaua* 788 F.3d 300 (No. 13-5272). The Samoan Federation of America submitted a brief in *Fitisemanu* recounting this history. See *Brief of Amicus Curiae Samoan Federation of America, Inc. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and to Affirm, Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2021).*
gesture in the direction of political theory. The next passage begins by quoting Cicero’s *De Republica*:

A republic of people “is not every group of men, associated in any manner, [it] is the coming together . . . of men who are united by common agreement . . . .” In this manner, we distinguish a republican association from the autocratic subjugation of free people. And from this, it is consequently understood that democratic “governments . . . deriv[е] their [] powers from the consent of the governed;” under any just system of governance the fount of state power rests on the participation of citizens in civil society—that is, through the free and full association of individuals with, and as a part of, society and the state.332

As a source for the second quotation in the passage above, the *Tuaua* court cites *Kennett v. Chambers*, an opinion by Chief Justice Taney (yes, that Chief Justice Taney), which in turn quotes the Declaration of Independence.333 Why not just quote the Declaration of Independence? The *Tuaua* court’s choice here does not inspire confidence.334 Nor does the rest of the passage, the point of which seems to be that American Samoa is a republic and that to impose citizenship on its unwilling people would be autocratic. But we still do not know why U.S. citizenship would threaten American Samoan cultural practices, nor do we really


333. See id. at 310 (quoting *Kennett*, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 41). *Kennett* quoted the entire second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which begins with the famous line “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . .” and includes the following sentence: “That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” *Kennett*, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 41. *Kennett* put quotations marks around the paragraph, but did not explicitly cite the Declaration of Independence, presumably because Chief Justice Taney assumed anyone who read those words would know where they came from. It is surpassingly strange that the *Tuaua* court attributed them to the *Kennett* opinion instead of the Declaration itself. The *Tuaua* court did not even include internal quotation marks or say that they were omitted.

334. *Kennett* discussed the law on the recognition of states, explaining that “according to the laws of nations,” recognition turns on whether a state has “a civil government in successful operation, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power.” *Kennett*, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 46. The decision to quote this case is thus doubly bizarre. Not only is it a Taney opinion (an awkward source of support for the project of repurposing an imperialist doctrine widely acknowledged to have been expressly motivated by racism), but the language that the *Tuaua* court quotes appears in a passage explaining that Texas had a right to become, and had in fact become, independent from Mexico as of March 17, 1836 (an awkward source of support for a decision affirming the denial of U.S. citizenship to persons born in a U.S. colony). See id.
know what a majority of American Samoans want. All we know is that the federal government and the government of American Samoa claim that a majority of American Samoans do not want the Citizenship Clause to apply. And that, it turns out, is enough to satisfy the amorphous impracticable-and-anomalous “test.”

Perhaps the most striking feature of the quoted passage is the irony of citing the principle of government by consent in support of withholding U.S. citizenship from persons who live under U.S. sovereignty and law, yet are denied any voting representation in the federal government. In fact, American Samoans have it even worse. Like other territories, they have only one nonvoting representative who serves in the U.S. House of Representatives. But unlike the inhabitants of other territories, even if they relocate to a state, they remain second class due to their lack of U.S. citizenship. Several of the plaintiff-appellants in Tuaua reside in states of the Union, but they cannot vote at any level of government—state or federal—because they are noncitizen U.S. nationals, not U.S. citizens.

That the Tuaua court upholds this state of affairs while waxing eloquent about the benefits of a republican form of government makes a bitter pill that much harder to swallow. It would take more than a quote from Cicero and another from the Declaration of Independence (via the improbable mouthpiece of the judge who authored the Dred Scott decision) to make a persuasive case that the holding in Tuaua vindicates the principle of government by consent, as opposed to giving a court’s imprimatur to its continuing flagrant violation.

Finally, there is the elephant in the room. As noted earlier, American Samoans—American Samoans—are U.S. nationals. The Tuaua court acknowledges this fact but nowhere reckons with its significance. Why doesn’t everything that the federal and American Samoan governments say about U.S. citizenship apply with equal force to U.S. nationality? The court does not even ask this question, let alone answer it.

In short, the Tuaua opinion is a monument to the shortcomings of constitutional exceptionalism. It is confused, incoherent, and wrong. It applies the impracticable-and-anomalous test to the wrong question, modifies the test in a manner entirely unsupported even by the precedents that adopt it, and combines vague allusions to hoary principles of political philosophy with the fetishization of an unfamiliar culture, which it does not even take the trouble to familiarize itself with, to deny its people, all of them Americans living under U.S.

336. See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 301, 302, 305 & n.6, 308, 309 n.9 (acknowledging that persons born in American Samoa are “noncitizen nationals” without explaining why U.S. nationality does not threaten the cultural practices at issue).
sovereignty, a constitutional guarantee they should be able to take for granted. All the while, it justifies its approach by claiming it is proceeding in the service of territorial self-determination. And while it misapplies a test it attributes to the *Insular Cases*, make no mistake: ultimately, it is cases like *Teatua* that have ensured that the *Insular Cases*, with their racially motivated imperialist doctrine of subordination by legal ambiguity, live on.

V. THE INSULAR CASES UNRELENTING

Even in cases where no one disputes the applicability of a constitutional provision in an unincorporated territory—either because the dispute involves neither a constitutional provision defining its geographic scope with the phrase “United States” nor one about which it makes sense to ask whether it is “fundamental,” or because the government simply concedes that the relevant constitutional provision applies in an unincorporated territory—the *Insular Cases* haunt constitutional challenges involving the unincorporated territories. The litigation in *Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC*,337 the Appointments Clause challenge to the selection of the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) for Puerto Rico, is a striking and recent example; the litigation in *United States v. Vaello Madero*,338 an equal-protection challenge to Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, is another.

There should have been no question in either of these cases that the challenged discrimination against Puerto Rico was based on its status as a territory—not on its status as an unincorporated territory. But the *Insular Cases* kept coming up, injecting confusion and uncertainty into the proceedings. The story of how the *Insular Cases* haunted the litigation in *Aurelius* and *Vaello Madero* makes even clearer why the Supreme Court must overrule the *Insular Cases* once and for all. At the same time, it underscores how critical it will be for the Court to do so in the right case, so that when it overrules them, it does so unambiguously.

When the Court overrules the *Insular Cases*, it should be crystal clear both that it is overruling them and what exactly about them it is overruling. Along with being racist and imperialist, the *Insular Cases* were notoriously ambiguous and confusing. The decision that overrules them must be the opposite or it will only make matters worse. Specifically, it must overrule the doctrine of territorial incorporation—not merely disclaim the racism that gave rise to it while leaving the doctrine itself untouched. That means overruling both propositions in the *Insular Cases*: that certain constitutional provisions do not apply in certain

337. 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
territories because they are “unincorporated” and that the United States has the power to subject territories to territorial status indefinitely.

The latter problem does not lend itself easily to judicial resolution, while the former, which is the only way for the Court to get at either, rarely arises. Indeed, it did not arise at all in either Aurelius or Vaello Madero because the government did not contest the applicability of a constitutional provision in either case. As a result, invocations of the Insular Cases in these two cases were a frustrating exercise in shadow-boxing.\footnote{Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Vaello Madero described the dynamic whereby the Insular Cases have evaded review as a “workaround.” See Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1555 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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In this Part, I explain the confounding role of the Insular Cases in Aurelius and Vaello Madero. I argue that these cases illustrate both the urgency of overruling the Insular Cases and the importance of doing so in a case that allows the Court to overrule them clearly and unequivocally—a case like Fitisemanu, which could provide the Court with a rare opportunity to deliver the knock-out punch.

\subsection{Aurelius: The Insular Cases as a “Dark Cloud”}

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Pursuant to PROMESA, the President of the United States appoints Board members without the advice and consent of the Senate, as long as they are selected from a list provided by Congress.

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Regardless of one’s views on its desirability as a matter of policy, it is undeniably a blatantly colonial institution installed by the federal government to run Puerto Rico’s affairs. But the challenge in Aurelius did not take on the FOMB as such. Rather, it concerned the mechanism for selecting the members of the FOMB. The plaintiffs argued that the selection mechanism violates the Appointments Clause, which requires Senate confirmation of “Officers of the United States.”\footnote{U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . .”).

The plaintiffs argued that the members of the FOMB are Officers of the United

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States who therefore require Senate confirmation. The United States and the FOMB responded that the members of the FOMB are not Officers of the United States, but rather officers of the territorial government of Puerto Rico, and that Congress therefore has plenary power under the Territory Clause to provide for their appointment without Senate confirmation.

As we have seen, Congress has plenary power to govern the U.S. territories and has had that power since the Founding: the Territory Clause was part of the original Constitution, the United States had territories from its inception, and Congress had plenary power to govern them from the beginning. But Aurelius concerned a constitutional challenge involving an unincorporated U.S. territory. As a result, the Insular Cases inevitably came up. Before the district court, the FOMB argued primarily that Congress has plenary power under the Territory Clause to create territorial governments, which includes the power to appoint the officers of those governments with or without Senate confirmation. But it also made an argument in the alternative. Citing the Insular Cases, it argued that the Appointments Clause does not “apply” in Puerto Rico because none but the “fundamental” limitations of the Constitution apply in unincorporated territories and the Appointments Clause is not “fundamental.”

This alternative argument further illustrates the troublesome legacy of the Insular Cases. Its premise is the standard account: that the unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional zone, where only “fundamental” constitutional limitations apply. What follows, supposedly, is that it is fair to ask whether every line in the Constitution “applies” in an unincorporated territory, which in turn requires determining whether it is “fundamental” in that territory. But this is nonsense. The question of whether a constitutional provision is “fundamental” is a question relevant to limitations on government power—mainly rights: is any given constitutional limitation on government power, such as those

344. Id. The First Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs but upheld the actions of the Board under the de facto officer doctrine. Id. at 862. Because the Supreme Court disagreed, there was no need to reach the de facto officer issue. See Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665.
345. See supra note 7.
346. See Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1654.
347. The Financial Oversight and Management Board’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Title III Petition, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 318 F. Supp. 3d 537 (D.P.R. 2018) (No. 17 BK 3283-LTS). For the argument based on the Territory Clause and plenary power, see id. at 8-23; for the argument that the Appointments Clause is not “fundamental,” see id. at 23-27.
348. See id. at 23-27.
349. See supra Part I.
in the Bill of Rights, “fundamental” in one or another unincorporated territory? This question is not—and never was—what one asks about any given constitutional provision, such as, say, the Uniformity Clause.

The inquiry concerning whether a limitation is fundamental is simply irrelevant to other constitutional provisions. Some provisions, such as those concerning the election of Representatives and Senators, do not apply in the territories because they concern states, not territories. Neither the doctrine of territorial incorporation nor the idea of fundamentality has anything to do with these provisions—though it would be risible to argue that the provisions are not “fundamental” to our constitutional structure. They are as fundamental as it gets. They simply do not concern the territories—any of them. Other provisions “apply” not because they are fundamental, but because they are not limited by geographic scope, whether implicitly or explicitly. The Appointments Clause is one such provision.

The Appointments Clause states that “[t]he President[,] by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .” Although this text includes the phrase “United States,” the phrase as used here does not define a geographic scope. Unlike the Uniformity Clause and the Citizenship Clause, which do define their own geographic scope with the phrase “United States,” the Appointments Clause uses the phrase to describe the kinds of officers who require Senate confirmation, regardless of their geographic location. The Clause is not a rights provision, either, so the question of whether it is fundamental should not even come up.

In short, neither of the questions the Insular Cases asked about constitutional provisions was at issue in *Aurelius*. The case did not involve a constitutional provision defining its own geographic scope with the phrase “United States.” Nor did it involve a constitutional right. But since it was a constitutional case involving an unincorporated territory, the Insular Cases made an appearance. And sure enough, a team of otherwise highly skilled and sophisticated lawyers found itself making the absurd argument that the Appointments Clause does not “apply” to Puerto Rico because it is not “fundamental.”

Not surprisingly, the FOMB had abandoned the argument by the time the case arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court. But its opponents did not forget. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the government without relying on the Insular Cases, but devoted two pages to making clear that “[n]othing about the Insular Cases cast[] doubt” on its analysis, adding that “[t]his discredited lineage of cases . . . hovers like a dark cloud over this case.”

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was still hovering at the Supreme Court: although the FOMB and the United States did not mention the *Insular Cases*, two parties and several amici discussed them in their briefs, insisting that they were irrelevant or should be overruled.\(^\text{352}\)

Perhaps because they received so much attention in the briefs, and perhaps also because the court of appeals found it necessary to address them, if only to insist on their irrelevance, the Court granted ten minutes of additional oral argument time to one of the parties, the Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego (UTIER), which had asked the Court to overrule them. They did not come up at all during the oral arguments by the lawyers for the FOMB, the United States, or Aurelius, but they were front and center in the argument by UTIER’s lawyer.

Borrowing the First Circuit’s formulation, she described the *Insular Cases* as a “dark cloud” hovering over the case and insisted that the Court must overrule them.\(^\text{353}\) Justice Breyer agreed that they were a “dark cloud,” but wondered what the Court could do about it, since “here . . . the provision of the Constitution does apply.”\(^\text{354}\) Chief Justice Roberts was puzzled, noting that “none of the other parties rely on the *Insular Cases* in any way,” which would make it “very unusual” for [the Court] to address them.\(^\text{355}\)

UTIER’s lawyer insisted that the government had tacitly relied on the *Insular Cases* throughout the litigation and that, as we have seen, the FOMB had explicitly invoked them before the district court.\(^\text{356}\) How can one properly explain, once the government had abandoned its reliance on them, that the *Insular Cases* have hovered like a dark cloud over Puerto Rico not only since the *Aurelius* litigation began, but also since the beginning of the twentieth century? That they are like an ace up the government’s sleeve, always available for it to argue that the United States can essentially ignore the Constitution in its colonies? The idea that unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional zone has had such staying power that the government even threw it in as an alternative argument before the district court, despite the self-evident absurdity of that argument in this case.\(^\text{357}\) Of course, the argument that some U.S. territories are not

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354. *Id.* at 82–83.
355. *Id.* at 85–86.
356. *Id.* at 85–86. On the FOMB citing the *Insular Cases* before the district court, see *supra* note 339 and accompanying text.
357. See *supra* note 339 and accompanying text.
part of the United States was self-evidently absurd in *Downes* itself, but it remains on the books nearly a century and a quarter later.

The Court understandably did not find occasion to overrule the *Insular Cases* in *Aurelius*: nothing in the case turned on the validity of the doctrine of territorial incorporation. While the Court reversed the First Circuit, holding that the appointment of the Board members did not violate the Appointments Clause because they are territorial officers, not Officers of the United States, it agreed with the First Circuit on the *Insular Cases*. In the closing passage of his opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer expressly rejected UTIER’s request that the Court overrule them, instead explaining that they were irrelevant. “Those cases did not reach this issue,” he wrote, “and whatever their continued validity we will not extend them in these cases.”

Critics of the *Insular Cases* were disappointed when the Court apparently limited itself to a modest refusal to extend them. But *Aurelius* would have been a less than ideal vehicle for it precisely because nothing in the case turned on them. Were the Court to overrule the *Insular Cases* in a case not squarely presenting the question of their validity, it could make matters worse by launching us all into yet another interminable debate—this one about what exactly the Court rejected and what, if anything, still stands. A case in which nothing turns on the *Insular Cases* is not likely to produce the kind of unambiguous rejection that they deserve.

That said, when it comes to the *Insular Cases*, there is more to *Aurelius* than meets the eye. Although the Court did not overrule them, its reasoning constitutes a powerful, albeit implicit, refutation of the central idea long associated with them: that unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional

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359. See, e.g., Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 10, at 286–87; Ramsey, supra note 147. Several amicus briefs had argued that the Supreme Court should either narrow the scope of, decline to extend, or outright overrule the *Insular Cases*. See Brief of Former Federal and Local Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments Clause passim, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334); Brief of Amicus Curiae Virgin Islands Bar Association Supporting the Ruling on the Appointments Clause passim, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334); Brief for Amicus Curiae Equally American Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of Neither Party at 7–17, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Puerto Rico, Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments Clause Issue passim, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334). Another amicus brief stopped short of calling on the Court to overrule the *Insular Cases*, but criticized them. See Brief of Elected Officers of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae Supporting the Appointments Clause Ruling at 12, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334). Another (which I coauthored) argued that the *Insular Cases* did not govern the issue in *Aurelius*, and, in the alternative, that they should be overruled. See Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law and Legal History Supporting the First Circuit’s Ruling on the Appointments Clause Issue passim, *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (No. 18-1334).
zone. Properly understood, the *Aurelius* opinion goes a long way towards cutting the *Insular Cases* down to size. It is clear from the first page:

> [T]he Appointments Clause governs the appointments of all officers of the United States, including those located in Puerto Rico. Yet two provisions of the Constitution empower Congress to create local offices for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico and the Territories. And the Clause’s term “Officers of the United States” has never been understood to cover those whose powers and duties are primarily local in nature and derive from those two constitutional provisions.  

Although this passage confirms the inapplicability of Appointments Clause requirements to the officers at issue in the *Aurelius* case, there is no hint here of the standard account of the *Insular Cases*—no hint of anything resembling an extraconstitutional zone. Instead, the Court posits that “the Appointments Clause governs the appointments of all officers of the United States, including those located in Puerto Rico.”  Of course it does: not because it is fundamental, nor because it matters whether Puerto Rico is part of the United States for purposes of this provision, but because it governs the appointments of all Officers of the United States.

“Yet two provisions of the Constitution empower Congress to create local offices for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico and the Territories.”  That’s right: the Territory Clause gives Congress plenary power to govern the U.S. territories (and the District Clause gives Congress analogous power over Washington, D.C.), which means Congress has the combined powers of the federal government and a state government in these places. The latter includes the power to appoint local officers, not because unincorporated territories exist in a virtual constitutional vacuum any more than states do, but because the Constitution confers this power, analogous to a power all states have, upon Congress over the territories. This is why Congress could create governments in the territories through organic acts long before the *Insular Cases* appeared in the *United States Reports*.

“And the Clause’s term ‘Officers of the United States’ has never been understood to cover those whose powers and duties are primarily local in nature and derive from these two constitutional provisions.”  Again, this is so not because “the Constitution” does not “apply” in the unincorporated territories except for its “fundamental” provisions, nor because it makes any difference whether

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360. *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. at 1654-55 (citation omitted).  
361. *Id.* at 1654.  
362. *Id.*; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
Puerto Rico is part of the United States or not, but because local territorial officers are not “Officers of the United States.”

The *Aurelius* opinion goes on to elaborate on these basic propositions with a brief historical survey of congressional legislation for the territories in both its federal and its local capacity. As these examples illustrate, when Congress appoints Officers of the United States in the territories—such as, say, the judges on the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto Rico—the Appointments Clause applies, and when it appoints local officers, it does not. Again, the question in the case does not concern the applicability of the Appointments Clause, let alone “the Constitution,” to Puerto Rico, but rather simply whether the members of the FOMB are federal or territorial officers. Concluding that they are the latter, the Court upheld PROMESA’s mechanism for appointing them.

As we have seen in its closing passages, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court takes a moment to address the *Insular Cases*. The Court questions the ongoing vitality of the *Insular Cases* and makes clear that they should not be further expanded. But because the outcome in *Aurelius* does not turn on the validity of the doctrine of territorial incorporation, it stops short of overruling them. Sure enough, they reappeared in *Fitisemanu*, where the majority on the court of appeals did not even mention *Aurelius*. And they reappeared in the oral argument.

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364. One could argue with this conclusion; indeed, the First Circuit reached the opposite one. But my point here is that the phrase “United States” as used in the Appointments Clause does not refer to the geographic scope of that constitutional provision at all but rather describes the officers covered by the Appointments Clause. To conclude that the officers of the FOMB are not Officers of the United States, whether right or wrong, does not imply that the Appointments Clause does not apply in Puerto Rico—only that it does not apply to the appointment of those officers (in contrast to, for example, federal judges serving on the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, to whose appointments the Appointments Clause applies).

365. See *Aurelius*, 140 S. Ct. at 1659–60.

366. See id. at 1658.

367. See id. at 1662–63.

368. See id. at 1665.

369. See id. (finding it unnecessary to overrule the *Insular Cases*).

370. See *Fitisemanu* v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 862–83 (10th Cir. 2021), *rehol en banc denied*, 20 F.4th 1325 (10th Cir. 2021) (mem.). *Aurelius* came down after briefing in *Fitisemanu* concluded, but the Plaintiff-Appellants submitted a letter to the Tenth Circuit before its decision came down, alerting it to the *Aurelius* decision and citing it as supplemental authority. See Letter from Matthew D. McGill, Counsel of Record, to Christopher M. Wolpert, Clerk Ct., 10th Cir. (July 22, 2020), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wethepeopleproject/pages/210/attachments/original/1595467437/Fitisemanu__38J_Letter_%28Appellee%29.pdf?1595467437 [https://perma.cc/4JFQ-2CDU]. The dissent in *Fitisemanu* did mention *Aurelius*—it quoted *Aurelius* along with the *Reid* plurality, questioning the validity of the *Insular Cases* and refusing to extend them beyond their facts. See *Fitisemanu*, 1 F.4th at 900 (Bacharach, J.,
in *Vaello Madero*.\(^{371}\) And they reappeared in a concurrence in *Vaello Madero*, which called upon the Court to overrule them, but not in that case.\(^{372}\) And they will keep reappearing until the Court finally puts an end to their imperialist reign.

**B. Vaello Madero: The Insular Cases Redux**

As noted above, *Vaello Madero* is an equal-protection challenge to Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the SSI program, which provides benefits to needy people who are disabled or elderly. The government does not argue that the equal-protection guarantee does not apply in Puerto Rico. Instead, it defends Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the program on the ground that Puerto Rico is a territory and Congress has plenary power to discriminate against territories as long as it has a rational basis to do so.\(^{373}\) Its merits brief before the Supreme Court did not even mention the *Insular Cases*.\(^{374}\) But *Vaello Madero*’s did, citing them as evidence of a history of racism against Puerto Ricans that should translate into strict scrutiny of legislation classifying on the basis of residence in Puerto Rico.\(^{375}\)

Early in the argument, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to surprise Deputy Solicitor General Curtis Gannon by asking whether the *Insular Cases* have anything to do with *Vaello Madero*.\(^{376}\) Gannon responded by explaining that the *Insular Cases* are not relevant because they “were about whether . . . different portions of the Constitution . . . apply differently to different territories,” whereas in *Vaello Madero* the government concedes that the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to Puerto Rico.\(^{377}\)

Justice Gorsuch then spoke up: “Counsel, if that’s true, why—why—why shouldn’t we just admit the Insular Cases were incorrectly decided?”\(^{378}\) Sounding taken aback, Gannon observed that it “would not be the Court’s normal course to just say that several cases were incorrect” when Gorsuch testily interrupted him: “I’m asking for the government’s position. I’m not asking for
thoughts about the Court’s normal course.” Gannon demurred again: “I don’t think we’re proceeding on a premise that’s inconsistent with the Insular Cases because—” Gorsuch interrupted again: “I think you’ve said that you’re proceeding on a premise that the Constitution applies fully and . . . without exception in—in respect to this claim, right?” To which Gannon replied: “With respect to the equal protection claim, yes. But . . . I don’t think that that’s the only thing that the . . . Insular Cases decided.” Leading Gorsuch to ask again: “What is the government’s position on the Insular Cases?” At this point, Gannon acknowledged that some of the Insular Cases’ “reasoning and rhetoric” was “obviously anathema, [and] ha[d] been for decades, if not from the outset.” But he insisted that they were irrelevant in Vaello Madero because the government agreed with Vaello Madero that the equal-protection guarantee applies to Puerto Rico.

The perplexing exchange left observers wondering whether the Court will finally overrule the Insular Cases in Vaello Madero.379 It did not, likely because despite Justice Gorsuch’s flirtation with the possibility at oral argument, and his concurrence calling for it in some future case, Vaello Madero would have been yet another less-than-ideal vehicle for the Court to take on the doctrine of territorial incorporation.

Although the Insular Cases figured prominently in Vaello Madero’s brief, and although he is strongly critical of their racism, he did not argue that they should be overruled.380 Instead, as noted above, Vaello Madero cited them as historical


380. Brief for Respondent, supra note 375, at 2–4, 46. Several amici did, however. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Virgin Islands Bar Association in Support of Respondent at 28, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (2022) (No. 20–303) (“The Court has never revisited the Insular Cases since these fundamental changes in this Court’s jurisprudence. The Court should do so now and finally overrule the ‘much-criticized “Insular Cases.”’” (quoting Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665 (2020))); Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF and Ten Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4–6, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (No. 20–303) (“Accordingly, this action is an appropriate vehicle for the Court to reconsider—and overrule—the Insular Cases.”); Brief of League of United Latin American Citizens as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (No. 20–303) (“Accordingly, the Insular Cases must be decisively overturned and soundly rejected.”); Brief of the Government of the U.S. Virgin Islands as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 21, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (No. 20–303) (“This Court should affirm the decision below by overruling the Insular Cases and applying heightened scrutiny.”); Amicus Brief for Puerto Rico Governor Pedro Pierluisi and the New Progressive Party in Support of Respondent at 12, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (No. 20–303) (“When Congress made Puerto Ricans citizens, they became vested with
evidence in support of the proposition that the Court should subject Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the SSI program to strict scrutiny. The argument was that the equal-protection guarantee should trigger strict scrutiny because the SSI exclusion classifies on the basis of residence in an unincorporated territory, and unincorporated territories were the direct product of the racism that explicitly motivated the Insular Cases. If not for this racist doctrine, the residents of Puerto Rico (virtually all of whom are members of an ethnic minority) would not be subject to U.S. sovereignty and most federal laws but denied voting representation in the federal government nearly one and a quarter centuries after the United States annexed Puerto Rico—and Congress would not have the power to exclude them from the SSI program.

For its part, although the government conceded that the equal-protection guarantee applies in Puerto Rico notwithstanding its status as an unincorporated territory, it argued that Puerto Rico’s exclusion from the SSI program triggers only rational basis review because the Territory Clause gives Congress plenary power to govern U.S. territories, whether incorporated or not, and this challenge involves a social welfare program and courts ordinarily defer to the government in allocating benefits.

At argument, Justice Sotomayor made clear her sympathy with Vaello Madero’s position, pointing to the Insular Cases as a “prime example” of racism against Puerto Ricans and using her questions to highlight their Hispanic ethnicity, the history of discrimination against them, and their political powerlessness. While no one used the phrase “discrete and insular minority” at argument, Sotomayor’s questions brought it to mind, and Vaello Madero’s brief explicitly invoked it, describing residents of Puerto Rico as a “quintessential example of a politically powerless ‘discrete and insular’ minority.”

all fundamental rights of citizenship. To the extent the Court held otherwise in Balzac (which was the only Insular Case post-dating the Jones Act), the Court should overrule Balzac.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Virgin Islands Bar Association in Opposition to Summary Reversal at 17, Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (2022) (No. 20-303) (“The Court should deny summary reversal and grant certiorari to finally overrule the ‘much-criticized “Insular Cases.”’” (quoting Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1665)).

381. See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
382. See QuickFacts Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/PR [https://perma.cc/5GYM-94K] (showing that 98.7 percent of Puerto Rico’s population identifies as “Hispanic or Latino”).
384. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
386. Brief for Respondent, supra note 375, at 22.
However, other Justices evidently had difficulty accepting the proposition that a geographical classification, whatever its sordid history, should receive strict scrutiny. Justice Thomas, for example, wanted to know what analysis Vello Madero’s lawyer, Hermann Ferré, would apply to the case of “someone who is of Italian descent [and] has lived in New York City all his life and decides” to move to Puerto Rico, thereby losing his eligibility for SSI benefits. Ferré replied that upon moving to Puerto Rico, such a person would instantly be in the same politically powerless position as any other resident of Puerto Rico, which is, of course, true: anyone who establishes residence in Puerto Rico loses voting representation in the federal government regardless of their race, ethnicity, or anything else about them. But Thomas seemed unconvinced. “So you are transferring the relationship with Puerto Rico to the individual who happens to reside in Puerto Rico?” he asked. When Ferré answered in the affirmative, Thomas pressed him: “Do you have any [cases] where we have transferred the treatment of a state to an individual?” Ferré did not because there aren’t any.

Even so, the analogy to discrete and insular minorities has intuitive appeal. Residents of unincorporated territories are politically powerless with respect to the federal government, and the vast majority of them arguably share all of the features that define discrete and insular minorities. These include a history of discrimination against them (in this case, based on race and ethnicity—again, it was because the people of these territories were perceived as nonwhite that the Court invented the unincorporated territory in the first place); the immutability of shared traits giving rise to such discrimination (where immutability, a contested concept to be sure, refers to traits that members of the minority either cannot or should not have to change and that have been assigned a subordinating social meaning—all of which can be said about residence in an unincorporated territory); and the arbitrariness of the classifications affecting them (where arbitrariness refers to the moral irrelevance of the traits targeted by such classifications, which instead serve the purpose of reinforcing status hierarchies—as the category of the unincorporated territory surely does). Indeed, well before Vello Madero, there existed scholarship powerfully arguing that classifications based on residence in an unincorporated territory should receive strict scrutiny.

387. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 371, at 44.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
Still, Justice Thomas has a point. It is difficult to explain why a category that can be joined and abandoned at will by someone who otherwise does not belong to any discrete and insular minority should constitute a classification that triggers strict scrutiny. Moreover, even acknowledging the racist roots of the doctrine of territorial incorporation, the Italian person who moves to Puerto Rico becomes politically powerless because she now lives in a territory—not because she now lives in an unincorporated territory. While it is undeniable that Puerto Ricans are Hispanic, have suffered a history of discrimination based on their ethnicity, and are politically powerless, it is also undeniable that Congress has always had the power to treat residents of territories differently. “That’s why Respondent was able to get these benefits while he was living in New York” was how Gannon put it. What he meant was that discrimination against residents of a territory is grounded in a distinction drawn by the Constitution itself, which, ipso facto, cannot be suspect.

Whatever one thinks of the arguments above, all of them reflect uncertainty as to the relevance of the Insular Cases, and none of them turns on the merits of the doctrine of territorial incorporation. A Justice who agrees with the government would have no occasion to mention the Insular Cases, let alone reconsider their doctrine. One who agrees with Vaello Madero would have no need to reach their merits, because their role in his argument is purely historical. That is, on his reasoning, if Congress “incorporated” Puerto Rico tomorrow but continued to exclude it from the SSI program, strict scrutiny should still apply by virtue of Puerto Rico’s status as a previously unincorporated territory, because the history that makes the classification suspect cannot be overruled. Overruling the Insular Cases in this context would have been bizarre and gratuitous.

In short, there were the Insular Cases again in Vaello Madero, making trouble yet evading review. The fact is that even if the doctrine of territorial incorporation were squarely presented to the Court, it would be no mean feat for the Court to overrule the Insular Cases clearly and definitively. The doctrine of territorial

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393. There is a tweaked version of Vaello Madero’s argument that would raise the merits of the Insular Cases. It goes like this: in light of the history of racism that gave rise to the unincorporated territories, classifications on the basis of residence in Puerto Rico are a proxy for racial classifications and should receive strict scrutiny—but only as long as Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated territory. Only then would the merits of the Insular Cases be at issue, because only then would the argument for strict scrutiny turn on the validity of the doctrine of territorial incorporation. On this view, if the Court were to overrule the doctrine, eliminating the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories altogether, Puerto Rico would cease to be an unincorporated territory. The good news: the Insular Cases would finally be overruled. The bad news: Vaello Madero’s argument for strict scrutiny would fail because Puerto Rico would no longer be an unincorporated territory, but rather, simply, a territory. It is no mystery why Vaello Madero did not press this version of the argument.
incorporation has confused people ever since Justice Harlan, dissenting in Downes v. Bidwell, wrote that “this idea of ‘incorporation’ has some occult meaning which my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some mystery which I am unable to unravel.” To this day, scholars and lawyers vigorously debate the meaning and implications of the doctrine. When the Court finally takes it on, the risk of unhelpful and even incoherent reasoning within and across opinions will be high. Perhaps as much as any case the Court has decided, an opinion reconsidering the Insular Cases would benefit from rigorous and focused briefing. These landmark, notorious, racist, confusing, infuriating, and profoundly influential cases deserve to be presented to the Court, front and center, for consideration on their merits.

Fortunately, there is a better path to overruling the Insular Cases at hand. The case is Fitisemanu, in which a petition for certiorari is currently pending before the Court. Fitisemanu cleanly presents the validity of the Insular Cases. While, as I have argued, they do not govern the result here, the doctrine of territorial incorporation is nevertheless squarely presented in Fitisemanu because it is the only reason the question in Fitisemanu — whether the Citizenship Clause includes unincorporated territories — is a question at all. Every Justice deciding Fitisemanu would have to take a position on the merits of the doctrine of territorial incorporation.

Occasions for overruling the Insular Cases are few and far between. The fact is that their holdings that certain constitutional provisions did not apply in the unincorporated territories turned out to be less consequential than their endorsement of permanent colonialism. But the clearest way for the Court to get at the latter is through a challenge raising the former — as Fitisemanu does. Any decision overruling the Insular Cases would be cause for celebration. But a

395. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1, 5, 20-23. This Article also makes this point.
resounding, and resoundingly unanimous, decision should not be too much to ask for. One hopes the Court will grant certiorari in \textit{Fitisemanu} and deal those abhorrent decisions a long-overdue death blow.

\textbf{CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE \textit{INSULAR CASES}}

Suppose the Supreme Court overrules the \textit{Insular Cases}. Then what?

The territories would still be territories. They would still be subject to U.S. sovereignty and Congress’s plenary power under the Territory Clause. They would still be denied voting representation in the federal government. But the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories would finally be erased from American constitutional law. Permanent colonies would no longer have the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.

On the question of which constitutional provisions apply in the unincorporated territories, little, if anything, would change. The “entire” Constitution would not apply to them then, either. To cite just the most obvious evidence in support of this proposition, the provisions governing representation in the federal government would still exclude the territories, as they always have.

The phrase “United States” in the Uniformity Clause would now include them. But as noted earlier, that provision does not foreclose the differential treatment of territories under Congress’s plenary power even with respect to uniformity, as the Court’s decision in \textit{Binns} demonstrated just a few years after \textit{Downes}.\footnote{See supra Part I.} Recall that \textit{Binns} relied on Congress’s plenary power over all territories to uphold the imposition of excise taxes that would otherwise have violated the Uniformity Clause, on the ground that the resulting revenue benefitted Alaska. The Court could employ analogous reasoning to uphold programs that benefit the territories today.

The Citizenship Clause would surely include the territories, though in my view it does already, and only a distorted version of the already erroneous standard account could lead to a different conclusion, as it did in \textit{Tuaua} and \textit{Fitisemanu}.\footnote{See supra Part IV.} As for other constitutional provisions, we have seen that the \textit{Insular Cases} themselves recognized the applicability of fundamental limitations on Congress’s power in the unincorporated territories. Whether these include jury-related provisions would depend on how the courts chose to analyze the question of whether these rights are fundamental in the territories—a question courts could answer with regard to the relevant legal context, as they already do in the states.\footnote{See supra Part III.}
Finally, the disappearance of the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories need not affect the United States’ power abroad. Recall, a majority of the Justices in Reid itself recognized this, though Justice Harlan was not among them. Rejecting the relevance of the Insular Cases to the application of the Constitution in foreign territory, they found a way to answer the question before them without reliance on those decisions. 401

So what would change? No longer would a constitutional challenge involving a territory trigger a suspension of the laws of constitutional physics. No longer would the doctrine of territorial incorporation haunt constitutional challenges involving the territories, muddling matters and engendering a confused and confusing jurisprudence. No longer would cases involving these territories bestow a patina of legitimacy upon their patently illegitimate status. No longer would perpetual colonialism have the endorsement of the federal courts.

Advocates of repurposing, “focused on the functional goal of maintaining indigenous practices, may argue that the benefit of ending legal subordination is too abstract compared to the tangible protection that repurposing the Insular Cases may bring.” 402 And it is true that overruling the Insular Cases would not concretely require Congress to do anything specific at any particular time. However, as I have shown, repurposing the Insular Cases has not actually brought the territories any tangible protection that could not be achieved without them. 403 Meanwhile, a decision overruling them would be an event of momentous symbolic significance, which would shine a light on the territories’ subordinate status and draw attention to Congress’s responsibility for it. For the people of the unincorporated territories, who have no voice in the federal government, and who are largely invisible to the rest of the United States, a strong statement by the Supreme Court rejecting the constitutionality of their indefinite subordination would be no small thing.

And what would become of the territories? My hope is that the Court’s definitive rejection of the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories would give rise to an American reckoning with the reality of U.S. imperialism that would, in turn, lead to the demise of perpetual colonialism in the United States. Or to put it in more concrete terms, my hope is that in the course of definitively rejecting the doctrine of territorial incorporation, the Court would bring attention to the plight of the territories while reviving and endorsing the understanding that, under the U.S. Constitution, territorial status must be

401. See supra Part II.
402. I took the liberty of quoting the editors of this Special Issue, in their second edit letter to me, because they put the objection clearly and concisely.
403. As noted above, perhaps one would need them in order to sustain a ban on same-sex marriage in American Samoa, were the territory to enact such a ban.
temporary because it subjects people to U.S. sovereignty and federal laws while denying them representation. I suspect it is too much to hope that the American public would finally become aware of the territories. But perhaps it is not too much to hope that such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court would go a long way toward eroding the insidious message of constitutionally sanctioned subordination that the Court’s failure to overrule the Insular Cases sends instead. And perhaps, in the wake of such a decision, U.S. officials charged with governing and administering the United States’s colonies would feel that much more pressure to bring democratic legitimacy to the United States’s relationships with the territories.

For better or worse, territorial self-determination cannot become a reality without action from the political branches of the federal government. On the better side of the ledger, a widespread consensus exists even in the federal government that it is up to the people of the territories to decide where their decolonization should lead. Their options include statehood or independence, with or without free association404—or the United States could amend the Constitution to provide for a noncolonial form of asymmetrical federalism that genuinely protects alternative forms of sovereignty without sacrificing equality and representation.

The reason to overrule the Insular Cases is not, however, to resolve the political status of the territories, which the Court cannot do. It is to end the proposition that the unincorporated territories exist in a nearly extraconstitutional zone. Again, doing so would have the salutary twofold effect of reining in the purely teleological and poorly reasoned jurisprudence engendered by that proposition, while withdrawing once and for all the Court’s implicit imprimatur from the outrageous notion that a U.S. territory can remain a territory forever—notwithstanding the flagrant political illegitimacy and shameless hypocrisy of a representative constitutional democracy that allows itself, in perpetuity, to govern a people without representation.

404. There is considerable disagreement, at least in the context of the debate over Puerto Rico’s status, over whether free association is a form of independence or a status distinct from independence. Compare, e.g., André Lecours & Valérie Vézina, The Politics of Nationalism and Status in Puerto Rico, 50 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 1083, 1095 (2017) (“Free association is really independence.”) with, e.g., Angel Israel Rivera & Aarón Gamaliel Ramos, The Quest for a New Political Arrangement in Puerto Rico: Issues and Challenges, 26 CARIBBEAN STUD. 265, 279, 282-83 (arguing that “sovereign free association” is a status distinct from independence). As the statement accompanied by this footnote indicates, my own view is that free association is a form of independence because a free association agreement can be unilaterally terminated by either party. On this disagreement, see Rafael Cox Alomar & Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus, Proposal Compromise Status Legislation for Puerto Rico and Companion Memorandum with Background & Commentary 6 (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2021-10/Compromise%20Proposal%20Puerto%20Rico%20Status%20Legislation_o.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DP9-UY3G].
The fact is that not even Justice White, who originally insinuated the doctrine of territorial incorporation into the Court’s jurisprudence, went so far as to endorse indefinite territorial status explicitly. On the contrary, in the closing passages of his concurring opinion in Downes, he did the opposite, albeit in characteristically racist-imperialist terms:

[I]t is lawful for the United States to take possession of and hold in the exercise of its sovereign power a particular territory, without incorporating it into the United States, if there be obligations of honor and good faith which, although not expressed in the treaty, nevertheless sacredly bind the United States to terminate the dominion and control, when, in its political discretion, the situation is ripe to enable it to do so. Conceding, then, for the purpose of the argument, it to be true that it would be a violation of duty under the Constitution for the legislative department, in the exercise of its discretion, to accept a cession of and permanently hold territory which is not intended to be incorporated, the presumption necessarily must be that that department, which within its lawful sphere is but the expression of the political conscience of the people of the United States, will be faithful to its duty under the Constitution, and therefore, when the unfitness of particular territory for incorporation is demonstrated the occupation will terminate.\(^{405}\)

Even Justice White understood that it would be wrong for the United States to subject a place and its people to territorial status indefinitely. Even the doctrine of territorial incorporation, as qualified in this closing passage of White’s troublesome concurrence, rests on the assumption that the political branches have a constitutional duty to ensure that territorial status will not go on forever. If there is any proposition in the Insular Cases worth preserving, it is this one.

\(^{405}\) Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 343-44 (1901) (White, J., concurring).