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Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping of Material Non-Public Information

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ABSTRACT. Insider trading law is meant to be a shield, protecting the market and investors from unscrupulous traders, but it can also be a sword. Insofar as we penalize trading on the basis of material, non-public information, it becomes possible to share information strategically in order to disable or constrain innocent investors. A hostile takeover can be averted, or a bidding war curtailed, because recipients of such information must then refrain from trading. This Article offers the first general account of “insider tainting,” an increasingly pervasive phenomenon of weaponizing insider trading law.

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ARTICLE CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

I. CONTROLLING ANOTHER'S TRADES 5
   A. Takeover Defenses 6
   B. Bidding Wars 9
   C. Wolf Packs 10

II. THE LAW PREVENTING INSIDER TRADING 14
   A. Fraud Theories 16
   B. Ad Hoc Theories 20
   C. Enforcement Limitations 23
      Error! Bookmark not defined.

III. THE LAW PERMITTING INSIDER Tainting 23
   A. Tainting is Viable 23
      1. Some Preliminary Remarks 23
      2. 14e-3 25
      3. Fraud-Based Theories 27
   B. Tainting is Credible 31
      1. Obscured Tips 32
      2. Faithful Tipping 33
      3. Successful Tainting 34
   C. Tainting In Context 36
      1. Tainting by Managers 36
      2. Tainting by Bidders 39
      3. Tainting By Wolves 41

IV. CONSIDERING INSIDER Tainting 45
   A. Enforcement 45
      1. Punishing Perpetrators 45
      2. Protecting Victims 47
   B. Learning from Tainting 51
      1. Competing Impulses in American Insider Trading Law 51
      2. The Nature of Information 54

CONCLUSION 56
INTRODUCTION

The CEO prefaced the call by informing Cuban that he had confidential information to convey. . . . Cuban became very upset and angry during the conversation. . . . At the end of the call, Cuban told the CEO “Well, now I’m screwed. I can’t sell.”

A joke in the private fund space: The holders will know who each other are, who owns 2%. They’ll say “Wise guys! Let’s send this [information] over to them!”

Across legal domains—from commodities to securities, contracts to property—we assume that everyone wants information. Yet, as Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban discovered, knowledge can be a curse. American securities law prohibits trading on the basis of “inside” information, such as an early tip about corporate strategy sure to presage a swing in the stock price. Cuban became the subject of a nine-year long SEC insider trading enforcement action because of one such tip. He sold his stake in Mamma.com soon after the CEO told him about a confidential plan to dilute the existing shareholders by issuing new shares. The sale may have saved Cuban $750,000. But Cuban claimed that he had preexisting plans to sell his shares, and that he did not need or want additional reasons to do so. The CEO’s tip put Cuban in a difficult position: either cancel the planned sale or endure almost a decade of costly and risky litigation.

From the CEO’s perspective, discouraging Cuban’s sale may not have sounded like a bad thing. After all, Cuban was the company’s largest shareholder, with 6.3% of the stock. A sale by such a major investor would have sent shockwaves through the shares of the small company, frustrating the planned securities offering. Relatedly, Cuban’s large stake might have been a sufficient toehold for an activist investor to agitate for change at Mamma.com. Cuban’s sale of shares endangered the managers’ plans and their jobs.

Thus, the management of Mamma.com might have had several reasons to try to keep Cuban from selling shares, and the discussion of confidential stock offerings could have helped bind him in place. By tainting

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2 Phone interview with Private Funds Attorney, on file with author (Oct. 13, 2015).
3 See infra Part I describing just what sorts of information are, and are not, subject to restrictions, as well as what is meant by “on the basis of.”
4 Complaint, Cuban, 3:08-cv-02050-D at ¶24.
5 Regardless of whether we believe Cuban’s version of the story, we should believe in traders like Cuban. See Donald C. Langevoort, "Fine Distinctions" in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 446 (2013) (discussing a hypothetical based on the Mark Cuban case).
6 Complaint, Cuban at ¶10.
Cuban with inside information, the managers heaped risk into Cuban’s exit path; more prudent investors would have relented and retained their shares.

The Mark Cuban case offers a glimpse into the secretive world of “Insider Tainting.” Whereas most informational tips open doors, insider tainting closes doors. Rather than empowering and enriching the recipient, the tipper conveys information precisely in order to constrain the tippee. Tainted with inside information, the tippee faces legal risks to her preexisting or potential trading plans. By leveraging high-stakes public law to serve as a threat, insider tainting confers power over the trades of others.

It may seem surprising that tainting is possible. Criminal law is supposed to punish only the culpable, and even civil offenses in the securities world are supposed to require scienter, or knowledge of wrongdoing.7 Moreover, familiar features of insider trading law would seem to protect innocent traders. It is usually lawful to trade on a hot tip unless you assumed a duty of trust and confidence, or unless your source breaches such a duty by sharing the secret with you in order to secure a personal (often pecuniary) benefit.8 Yet the victims of insider tainting do not intend any wrongdoing, they do not promise confidentiality, and their antagonists act out of spite rather than to some kind of quid pro quo.

Nevertheless, insider tainting is viable. Some forms of insider trading are illegal even if the trader assumed no duty, conferred no benefit, and genuinely tried to avoid the tip.9 More importantly, insider trading cases are characterized by expansive law and ambiguous facts, and so there are numerous circumstances where a trader may rationally fear that trading could lead to trouble even when the law is on their side. Cuban escaped liability by proving that he never swore confidentiality, but it took nine years for him to establish his version of the facts, and he may only have succeeded because the accusing CEO was unavailable to testify against him.10 Even where a clear-sighted court would acquit, tainting forces a trader to worry that an aggressive plaintiff or prosecutor could pursue the case anyway.

Despite the secrecy associated with insider tainting, there is evidence that tainting occurs. Tainting was deemed a serious enough problem that in 2014, Japan amended its securities laws to specifically account for tainting.11 Securities attorneys report increasingly frequent questions from clients about the proper handling of a juicy text message, call, or email—sometimes anonymous and sometimes attributed to a competitor or issuer. In a world

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7 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept, [is] generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand. . . ”).
8 See infra Part II.
9 Those privy to hostile takeover plans are generally forbidden from trading until the takeover begins—even if they didn’t ask for such knowledge or restrictions. 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2016). See also Part II. B. Providing certain traders with advance notice of a tender offer can place the targeted traders on the sidelines.
11 Infra Part II.
in which law is increasingly part of investment strategy, it should come as no surprise that tainting is part of the arsenal of sophisticated players.

This Article names, presents, and analyzes insider tainting for the first time. It considers the contexts in which it can be deployed, techniques by which it can be achieved, and the responses the law can use to limit it. It shows that tainting is problematic: sometimes it operates as an anti-takeover defense, robbing shareholders of valuable payments and protecting ineffective managers from the risk of replacement. In other cases, it helps with takeovers by giving an unfair advantage to unscrupulous takeover artists, and by facilitating circumvention of shareholder-protective disclosure requirements. The article identifies features of the law that help make tainting possible, such as the fact that traders can be convicted for possessing certain information even if they do not set out to use it, and it notes the many challenges to eliminating insider tainting.

This Article also uses insider tainting as an opportunity to reflect on the law of securities in our society and the economics and regulation of information generally. Insider tainting serves as a useful lens to reflect on the vagueness and expansiveness that we have come to accept in insider trading law, and the chilling effect our law’s “fine distinctions” may have on risk averse traders. Apart from securities trading, insider tainting also informs our understanding of private information in transactions generally, and the unintended effects of its regulation.

The structure of this Article is as follows: Part I discusses three contexts in which individuals might wish to disable the trades of another person—in which insider tainting could come in handy, if it were available. Part II reviews insider trading law. Readers familiar with this body of law may skip or skim this Part without losing any important information. Part III begins the main analytic contribution of the Article: it shows that individuals can indeed use insider trading law to disable trades unamicable to their interests. Part IV presents and evaluates potential responses to insider tainting, and then reflects on what insider tainting teaches us about securities, corporate law, and information generally.

I. CONTROLLING ANOTHER’S TRADES

Sometimes it would be nice to be able to veto another person’s trades. This Part describes three contexts in which that is true, in order to

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12 See, e.g., Minor Myers & Charles Korsmo, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&As, 92 WASH. L. REV. 2015 (documenting the “renaissance” of hedge funds investing to make use of the stockholder’s appraisal remedy).
13 Despite the depth of scholarship on insider trading, the literature has not yet taken stock of insider tainting.
14 Infra Part III.C.1.
15 Infra Part III.C.2.
16 Infra Part III.C.3.
17 See infra Part IV.B.
set the stage for Part III, in which insider tainting is shown to be useful. All three examples in this section concern mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The three examples are takeover defenses, competitive bidding, and wolf pack activism. To summarize briefly, managers would sometimes like to stop acquirers, acquirers would sometimes like to stop other acquirers, and cooperating investors would sometimes like to stop their compatriots from trading in ways incompatible with their collective plans.

A. Takeover Defenses

Mergers and acquisitions are among the most momentous events in the life of a corporation. They can generate and transfer billions of dollars. One powerful rationale for corporate combinations is as a tool for increasing efficiency by disciplining incompetent or self-serving managers. When

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18 This focus on M&A is in part out of respect for the scale of the problem. The stakes are so high in acquisitions as to tempt all manner of wrongful behavior. Indeed, that is why the SEC has implemented a special insider trading regime just localized in the context of acquisitions. See infra Part III.A.2. The focus on M&A is also justified for reasons of analytic focus and clarity—it is sometimes better to take a deep dive into one topic rather than canvass all topics on the first look; subsequent work can examine tainting in other contexts.

The focus on M&A should not be taken as a concession that these issues are limited to M&A. Indeed, both quotations at the start of this Article refer to non-M&A cases of possible insider tainting. The Mark Cuban quotation plausibly concerned efforts to protect the share price against Cuban’s departure. The second quotation concerned competition among market-makers. Where only a few firms make a market in a security, it is a joke among financial professionals that one market-maker might taint another in order to secure a temporary monopoly on the security. Disabling another trader could thus create an anti-competitive and cartelizing influence in trading markets, even where no one has any interest in acquiring control of portfolio companies.

19 See e.g., Sydney Ember & Michael J. de la Merced, Sinclair Unveils Tribune Deal, Raising Worries It Will Be Too Powerful, N. Y. TIMES. (May 8, 2017) (Proposed $3.9 billion merger). There is widespread agreement that the target company shareholders usually gain substantially due to mergers. Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford, New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 103 (2001); Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49 (1988). The scale of these gains can be monumental: typical takeover premiums exceed 15% or 20%, instantly generating millions or billions in value. See Andrade et. al. at 110. Acquirers, for their part, sometimes do very well too, Jarrell et al. at 53. Takeover artists and serial acquirers, such as private equity firms make enough money from the periodic purchase and sale of firms to keep themselves in comfort.

20 Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 21 (1988); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). This can be true even in cases where the acquisition does not occur. The threat of a takeover disciplines managers. Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 721 (2005). Some acquisitions may constitute or aggravate agency costs, as managers seek to draw greater perquisites from a larger corporate empire. See Yakov Amihud and Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981)
acquisitions take place, the target company’s existing executives and board stand a good chance of losing their perch. Therefore, managers face an existential threat from unwelcome acquirers, and so have a powerful interest in constraining the market for corporate control.

Considerable energy has therefore been devoted to protecting incumbent managers from unwanted takeovers— but only within certain limits. For example, Delaware courts have vindicated the use of poison pills, which are a legal tool that penalizes unwelcome acquirers.\(^2\) The simplest variant of the poison pill distributes to shareholders a large number of warrants—essentially, stock options—exercisable only if some arrivate acquires a controlling block. The dilutionary effect of these warrants, enriching all existing shareholders at the expense of the acquirer, greatly discourages acquisition efforts.

Delaware courts have blessed poison pills on the theory that managers may need some leverage in order to negotiate with acquirers, to secure a better deal for shareholders than they would have gotten from a

unilateral ultimatum. But judicial acceptance of defensive techniques is not unequivocal.

Any defensive technique must respond to an objectively reasonable belief about a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. Defenses must be reasonable in relation to the threat. Therefore, a poison pill cannot itself be preclusive or coercive. The board must meet similar standards whenever a shareholder requests a waiver of part of an existing poison pill. Whatever defensive technique is adopted, boards must disclose the defensive device and the motives for its adoption. Above all, the poison pill may never be used primarily to entrench existing managers and prevent shareholders from having electoral control over the corporation—even if they might use that control to elect new and potentially inferior directors.

These constraints are meaningful. Plaintiffs routinely challenge board actions as unreasonable or disproportionate, and courts entertain these challenges. For example, the pharmaceutical company Allergan adopted a “pretty customary” poison pill in response to takeover efforts by rival Valeant and its ally, activist hedge fund Pershing Square. Although

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24 Id. at 955; Revlon at 189.


26 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (plaintiffs did not establish likely success on the merits that board breached its fiduciary by failing to waive 10% poison pill threshold, which would have let shareholder buy up to 20% of firm).

27 See Red Oak Fund, L.P. v. Digirad Corp., 2013 WL 5740103 (Del.Ch. 2013) (recognizing a duty to disclose relevant information in proxy contest context, but finding no breach in the instant case because there were no conclusive poison pill plans to disclose at the time of the challenged vote). But see Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 651 (3d Cir. 1991) (failure to disclose that poison pill might be used to maintain manager control was not an actionable omission, because investors are charged with knowledge of “the universal interest of corporate officers and directors in maintaining corporate control.”).


the plaintiffs conceded that the pill was “very customary,” the court nevertheless determined that it gave rise to a colorable claim and the possibility of irreparable injury. That is because even a customary pill could illegally frustrate the shareholder’s franchise rights in conjunction with other facts.

Therefore, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for expedition. The case settled before the court could give its final word on the poison pill, but the litigation constituted an important reminder that the law imposes meaningful constraints on takeover defenses.

And legal constraints are not the only constraints. Institutional investors and proxy advisors are wary of supporting firms with robust poison pills.

In summary, managers often wish to halt would-be acquirers, yet defensive tactics are constrained by both law and investor expectations. In light of this unmet demand for defensive capacity, it will later prove unsurprising if managers find other springs at which to slake their thirst.

B. Bidding Wars

It is not only managers who sometimes want to stop an unwanted bidder. Because competitive auctions channel value to the seller, it would be far better for a would-be acquirer to be the only would-be acquirer.

Consider the raucous bidding war depicted in the book and film Barbarians at the Gates. RJR Nabisco market capitalization stood at about $12.5 billion before one of Wall Street’s biggest firms offered to buy it out. Other bidders soon followed. This tug-of-war drove the purchase price to $25 billion and saddled the “victor” with a crushing debt obligation—the ultimate winner’s curse. How much nicer it would have been if the first bidder had been able to disable the second bidder at the start. Perhaps the

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30 Id. at *55.
31 Id. at *55–56.
32 Id. at *56. In this case, the additional facts included a pre-existing bylaw that permitted shareholders to call a special meeting only if requested by 25% of the investor polity. The court was unwilling to preemptively bless a customary pill when combined with a peculiar bylaw.
34 ISS and Glass Lewis both recommend voting against firms with poison pills of longer than a 1-year duration. They both urge case-by-case consideration of firms with shorter term poison pills.
36 Bryan Burroughs and John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco (1989); Barbarians at the Gate, HBO (1993).
deal could have been consummated quietly and quickly, before egos were enflamed and wallets opened.

Bidders already expend considerable energy to reduce competition in a potential acquisition, but they are subject to a number of legal constraints. The Williams Act imposes myriad protections for target company shareholders, which make it easier for competitor bidders to come into the fold. For example, acquirers must disclose their presence and intentions within ten days of acquiring 5% of the target company. Tender offerors must disclose their conflicts of interest. They must hold offers open for at least twenty business days, accept tendered shares on a pro-rata basis, and otherwise abjure discriminatory tender offers. State law antitakeover laws impose similar requirements and restrictions.

These legal restrictions impair bidders’ abilities to bid without competition. Given the potential costs entailed by bidding wars, bidders are likely to think of every possible way to avoid serious competition. We shall see later that insider trading law can play a role in thwarting competing bidders.

C. Wolf Packs

It is not just long-time antagonists, such as intransigent managers and competitor bidders who may wish to block the trading of another. Some would-be cooperators may find familiar bodies of law, such as contract law, inadequate to buttress their coordination efforts. Where their collective endeavor requires credible promises not to trade in certain ways, the power to affirmatively ban someone else from trading could prove valuable. One context where this dynamic is true is among coordinated activist investors, often called “wolf packs,” in which cooperation is valued but unstable.

Activist investors take a stake in a target company in order to exert influence on management, with an eye to increasing share prices. A wolf

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38 They keep their acquisition plan secret, and they may condition their bids upon promises by the target not to seek other bids, not to cooperate with other bidders, or simply to decide quickly enough that other bids are unlikely. These deal protection efforts have spurred considerable academic debate. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).

39 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(d).


41 Rule 14(e)(1).

42 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8. Non-pro-rata acceptance might be deemed coercive, insofar as early tenderers might receive better treatment than later tenderers.


pack is “a loose network of activist investors that act in a parallel fashion but deliberately tries to avoid” triggering certain filing obligations.45

Activists work together to disperse the risks and challenges which would concentrate on a single activist acting alone. If a dozen like-minded hedge funds each take a 4% stake in a company, their collective influence will be irresistible, but no individual fund needs to accept all the economic and legal risks of a controlling stake. Let us now consider those economic and legal risks that wolf packs reduce before then explaining how wolf packs can be sustained through insider tainting.

A large economic stake is required to make activism credible and worthwhile. Yet the solitary owner of the large stake would assume great risk and opportunity costs: exogenous market shocks could impair returns if all eggs are in one basket, and a protracted battle at one company might leave the activist without cash for other opportunities. Worse yet, capital outflows from the activist’s fund could require liquidation of the position prior to completion of the campaign.46

Economics aside, a solitary activist taking a large stake would face a series of legal obstacles. First, activist campaigns can be slowed or blocked by use of a poison pill or rights offering, and such defensive tactics typically activate or become available against owners of 10% of a company’s stock.47

Second, a stake of 10% of a target company’s stock will designate the investor an “insider” for the purposes of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.48 Section 16 insiders must disgorge any “short-swing” profits, which include gains made from selling stock purchased within the last six months.49 This is a potentially ruinous penalty. Accordingly, investors are reluctant to become individually large owners, lest they be forced to remain as such for half a year or more.

Third, the Williams Act requires large shareholders to report their position.50 The public filing of one’s position has a number of negative consequences. It alerts all other investors to your plans, so it may be hard to acquire any more shares at a reasonable price. It notifies management, which may initiate defensive tactics, such as implementing a poison pill if they have not already.

For these reasons, individual activist investors wish to retain small stakes. Yet they also wish to exert influence over management. The recent solution has been the formation of wolf packs, which Coffee and Palia

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45 Wolf at the Door at 562. The filing obligations are those owed by “groups” under 13(d)(3) of the Exchange Act of 1934. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
46 Hedge funds typically accord their customers a moderately strong right to redeem their shares for cash. A large series of withdrawals would force the hedge fund to shrink its portfolio.
47 See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029 (blessing a pill with 10% threshold for active acquirers).
48 § 16(a).
49 § 16(b).
50 § 13D.
identify as “a leading cause of increased hedge fund activism” in recent
days.51

Though wolf packs solve economic and legal problems for activists,
such arrangements present their own challenges. If the hedge funds
coordinate too closely, they can be deemed a “group” for the purposes of
federal securities laws, which would undermine many of the benefits that
led to the use of a wolf pack. Avoiding this problem requires funds to
maintain a large degree of independence. This independence leads to
instability: members of the wolf pack will work together as long as it is in
their individual best interests, but they may not support the group goal if it
becomes more advantageous to defect from it.

The instability derives from three forms of defection risk. One form
is to simply steal the idea. A well-known activist’s indication that a company
is ripe for influence can serve as an important signal to other hedge funds.54
They may sometimes be able to preempt the planned campaign by
recruiting their own wolf pack and acting sooner.55

Even if an activist participates in the campaign, the activist may
opportunistically abandon it. Although the disclosure of activist involvement
usually raises stock prices, the success of a campaign is never assured, and
failed campaigns may result in a lower stock price. The result can be a sort
of prisoner’s dilemma, with some funds tempted to sell soon after
announcement so as to lock in their gains so far. The more funds that take
this approach, the less likely the activist campaign is to succeed, as once-
allied voters run for the door. This can become a self-fulfilling cycle as funds
fear being the last one out the door. A viable and collectively rational
campaign can collapse under the weight of individual defection.57

51 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 550 (2016).
52 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2012) (“When two or more persons act as a . . . group
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate
or group shall be deemed a ‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection.”)
53 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562 (2016) (explaining the tactical
benefits that turn on not being a “group.”).
54 Those most critical of activists tend to suggest that activists have a knack for
picking underperforming companies, for whom reversion to the mean may be eminent. See
55 For a twist on this, consider the facts of the RJR Nabisco bidding war, infra.
There, the management group met with KKR to discuss a tender offer and then withdrew
to work with American Express. We can style KKR as a competing group, or we could
conceive of the managers themselves as a competing group, withdrawing from and
competing with the group they themselves founded with KKR. Regardless, the saga left
numerous feelings hurt because its participants felt that they had been victims of defection at
various stages.
57 Arguably, the Murakami’s betrayal of Horie, described in just a moment, could
qualify as an early abandonment.
Defection can occur even before the campaign is actually begun. A fund may feign interest in the activist campaign in order to encourage its formation, but spend the accumulation period selling shares rather than buying them. Consider an example of such a betrayal, perpetrated by one of Japan’s first activist investors, Yoshiaki Murakami.58

A former Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry official, Murakami made his name by launching Japan’s first postwar tender offer.59 Then in 2003, he set his sights on Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS), buying up 18% of the company’s shares and applying increasing public pressure for a change in management. As the months went on, Murakami sought an ally in his campaign. He found one in Takafuli Horie, another larger than life figure.60

Although Horie would later be jailed for securities fraud, in 2004 he was a big-spending internet tycoon and a serial acquirer of stodgy but hitherto respectable companies. In fact, at the time the key meeting with Murakami, Horie was individually pursuing a hostile takeover of NBS.

Murakami and Horie met to discuss a coordinated assault on NBS’s defenses. If Horie could acquire 33% of the NBS stock, they would jointly control the company – provided that Murakami retained his block. Would he do so? “I can’t promise anything, but trust me.”61 This hedged response foreshadowed Murakami’s later faithlessness, but was enough for Horie to indicate that he was “definitely interested” and would seek appropriate financing for his buying spree.62

Horie spent the next three months buying NBS shares – 35%, in total – before he announced his triumphant achievement.63 However Murakami had not followed through on his end. Instead of holding his shares and assuring the coalition a controlling stake, Murakami had betrayed his partner by discretely selling his shares. In fact, Horie had basically bought up Murakami’s shares. The activist campaign would

62 Id.
63 Id. at 1578.
therefore fail, and Horie would be left holding the bag, enabling Murakami to exit a vast position without crushing the stock price.

In light of these events, the future Hories of the world may be more skeptical about putatively coordinated efforts, just as the future Murakamis must work hard to build trust. Each would be pleased to discover some credible commitment device for blocking unauthorized trades, outright promises to work together would trigger group disclosure obligations under the Williams Act and its equivalent. We shall see that insider trading law can serve to make tacit cooperation credible.

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The examples above give ample evidence that the power to veto the trades of another would carry substantial value. But can it be accomplished? Most traders would not voluntarily submit themselves to the veto of a competitor or antagonist. Those who might accept such a yoke will not necessarily find the law supportive of the arrangement. Yet there is a body of law that constrains trading: the securities laws concerning insider trading. It is to that body of law that we now turn.

II. THE LAW PREVENTING INSIDER TRADING

Dozens of traders each year are investigated for trading on the basis of proscribed information, resulting in dozens of civil enforcement actions. Since 2009, more than 80 traders have been criminally convicted by federal prosecutors in Manhattan alone.

While America certainly regulates informed trading, you might not know it just by reading primary legal texts such as codified criminal law. No statute or rule defines “insider trading.” Until thirty years ago, the words “insider trading” appeared in no statute and was not a government

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64 The campaign’s failure had other causes. It is also the first one in which a poison pill was permitted by Japanese courts—two months before publication of the government’s official report urging their permissibility.

65 Nate Raymond, FBI says conducting 30 undisclosed insider trading probes, REUTERS, Jul. 5, 2016, Reuters, [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-insidertrading-idUSKCN0ZL2G4] (Stating that the FBI has more than 50 current investigations in New York City alone).


67 Id.

68 Several efforts to define the act were introduced since Newman but none received substantial support. S.702 - Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act; H.R. 1173 - Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015; and H.R. 1625 - Insider Trading Prohibition Act.

enforcement priority. It has been said that there simply was no legal or moral proscription of informed trading until the SEC conjured one in the early 1960s.

Regardless, a federal common law of insider trading has rapidly developed in recent decades, interpreting and extending Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it this federal common law that most discussions of insider trading concern. Sprouting

70 Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 330, 349 (2013) (“From the SEC's founding in 1934 to Chairman Cary's groundbreaking 1961 decision in Cady, Roberts—a span of twenty-seven years—the SEC brought no insider trading cases at all. Over the subsequent twenty years, insider trading continued to be a relatively low prosecution priority in terms of the number of cases at the agency . . . .”).


73 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (as amended) provides (in pertinent part):

   It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.


   Rule 10b-5 provides:

   It shall be unlawful . . . (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).

74 Some theory or another is necessary because the operative rule for prosecuting most insider trading is 10b-5, an anti-fraud rule. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”). At common law, it is no fraud to remain silent about one’s knowledge unless under a duty to speak. Id. at 227–28. The typical securities trader is silent when executing a trade through a broker or anonymous stock exchange, so there can be no fraud unless the trader is under a duty to speak.

The two insider trading “theories” (classical and misappropriation) are accounts of why a duty to speak might arise in connection with a given securities transaction. These theories are independently sufficient grounds for liability, covering slightly different facts.
for the most part from a fraud statute, sometimes enriched by state fiduciary law, American insider trading law is deeply a product of its terroir.

**A. Fraud Theories**

Two types of informed trading are prohibited on the theory that they amount to fraud.75

The *Classical Theory* bars insider trading as an abuse of some special relationship that may exist between two traders, which would entitle one to full disclosure by the other before consummating a trade.76 Most crucially, the Supreme Court has held that “a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.”77 Hence, certain officers and directors commit a fraud by engaging in insider trading because they remain silent while transacting with individuals (existing and would-be shareholders), to whom they owe candor.

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See Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that the fiduciary-like duty against insider trading under section 10(b) is imposed and defined by federal common law . . .”). See also Adam C. Pritchard, *Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Law*, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930 (2003) (“Powell saw Rule 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of ‘federal common law.’”).

While most litigation and enforcement, and most of this Article, are focused on 10b-5, insider trading can also be pursued under federal mail and wire fraud statutes. See William Wang, *Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping*, 7 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220 (2015).

75 Cf. *A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law* at * notes 7–8, 24, 87 (explaining that courts may not inquire into one theory if the other theory better fits the facts). This suggests that these are not completely independent bases for liability. One theory may succeed or fail in part because of the success or failure of another theory.78


77 *Chiarella*, 445 U.S. at 228. For discussion of the classical theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, *INSIDER TRADING*, §§ 5.2, 5.3 (3d ed. 2010).
as a result of the principal-agent relationship that gave rise to the information in the first place.\textsuperscript{78}

The Misappropriation Theory “holds that a person commits fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”\textsuperscript{79} The Supreme Court recognized the misappropriation theory in \textit{O’Hagan}, in which a lawyer bought shares in a company because he knew that the company would soon be acquired (by one of the law firm’s clients).\textsuperscript{80} Under the classical theory, \textit{O’Hagan} would not have been barred from trading; he was no fiduciary of the shareholders of the target company. However, he must have misrepresented his intentions, feigning loyalty, in order to gain his firm’s trust in order to get this information. In Justice Ginsburg’s words, “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase and sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”\textsuperscript{81}

Both fraud-based theories of insider trading cast a pall over trading by certain insiders as well as those whom they tip. A trader cannot escape liability simply because she \textit{herself} is not an executive at the issuer company (though her information source is) and she did not \textit{personally} misappropriate the information (if her source misappropriated it). Rather, the law allows for tippee liability on a derivative basis. If the tippee knows or should know that the tip was acquired or shared in violation of a duty, then the tippee can be

\textsuperscript{78} Another status giving rise to duties is certain categories of government official. It appears that members of congress and their staff have done extremely well in the stock market. Alan J Ziobrowski, James W Boyd, Cheng Ping and Brigite J. Ziobrowski, Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representative, 13 Bus. & Pol. 1 (2013) (documenting significant abnormal returns for stock market trades of Members of Congress). An outcry followed news reports that their trading was not barred by insider trading laws. The result was the 2012 STOCK Act, which prohibited many kinds of insider trading by Congressmen and their staffs. Other governmental (and pseudo-governmental) actors have been subject to explicit restrictions for a longer time. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 13(c) (2012) (barring insider trading by members of the CFTC and their staff). But see Dona Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2011) (arguing that governmental insider trading was always illegal, at least to whatever degree non-governmental insider trading is illegal.).


\textsuperscript{80} 521 US at 650.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{O’Hagan}, 521 U.S. at 652. The SEC has further promulgated a list of relationships that can establish a duty of trust and confidence. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2014). Importantly, a duty is present if “the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–2(b)(1)–(2). For example, one trader was sanctioned for trading on a secret he learned at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. \textit{SEC v. McGee}, 895 F. Supp. 2d 669, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2012) aff’d United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2014).
liable for insider trading.\textsuperscript{82} This is most evident when the source of information gets a personal benefit, often pecuniary, from informing the tippee.\textsuperscript{83} It is not essential that the tippee have anything to do with the misappropriation so long as she is on notice of it.\textsuperscript{84}

It is a fraud to trade “on the basis” of proscribed information, but what is “on the basis?”\textsuperscript{85} Is trading barred only if the trader used the information, somehow changing her conduct in light of the information? Or is a trader culpable even if she would have made the same trade regardless, her only offense being that she traded while knowing a secret? In other words, need there be a causal connection between the trade and the trader’s knowledge of proscribed information?

This question has come to be known as the “causation” standard and it has occasioned substantial debate. Several circuits embraced a pro-defendant “use” standard, in which traders could lawfully go about their business, even if they happened to obtain proscribed information, so long as it didn’t actually cause them to trade any differently.\textsuperscript{86} Other circuits

\textsuperscript{82}When the source breaches a duty in acquiring or sharing the information, the tippee can be a “Participant After the Fact.” WANG & STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, § 5.3.1 (2010). When the tipper does not violate the law in acquiring the information or in tipping it, the tippee may be a primary violator by breaching her duty of trust and confidence to the source. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660, (1983) (“a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”)

\textsuperscript{83} Dirks, v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 at 664. The recent Salman decisions affirmed Dirks in almost all respects. In particular, it did not require a pecuniary benefit to the tipper. Instead, a chain of tippees can be implicated if the tipper simply sought to confer a gift on a “trading relative or friend.” Dirks at 664; Salman at 427-28. The decision seems to have done little to change insider trading law, other than to undo part of what Newman had done. Still, by cleaving to Dirks, critics may worry about the boundaries of the gift-based prohibition. They may appear vague—how close a friend is a “friend?”—or expansive. Cf. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (“the personal benefit standard “does not suggest that the Government may prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature. If that were true, and the Government was allowed to meet its burden by proving that two individuals were alumni of the same school or attended the same church, the personal benefit requirement would be a nullity.”)

\textsuperscript{84} S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012) (“tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while in knowing possession of that information.”)

\textsuperscript{85} See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997). For discussion of this issue, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 4.4.5. Note that 14e-3 is actually written to cover those “in possession” of proscribed information, 17 CFR § 240.14e-3(a), which accords with the possession standard discussed infra.

\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998). (“we believe that the weight of authority supports a ‘use’ requirement.”). But see Johnson v. Aljian, 394 F.Supp. 2d 1184, 1198-99 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (adopting possession standard in a civil case, distinguishing Smith as a precedent for criminal matters).
adopted a mere “knowledge” standard.87 On this standard, it does not matter whether a trader had prior, independent, and lawful reasons to execute a trade; once they obtain proscribed information bearing on the trade, they must disclose the information or abstain from trading. The SEC’s answer, acquiesced to by both courts and Congress,89 is that traders break the law if they trade while they are “aware” of proscribed information.90 This standard is much closer to non-causal

Adler actually adopted an intermediate position, in which use is required but presumed based on knowing possession – and the burden is on the defendant to rebut a presumption of use “by adding evidence ... that the information was not used.” Adler at 1337.

87 Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur embraced a true possession standard – untethered to breaches of duty or confidence. In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6,668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). The modern knowledge or possession standard has its genesis in In re Starling Drug, Inc. 1978 WL 198166 (Apr. 18, 1978). There, two directors sold shares after learning that news of the company’s recent of improvements in sales and income should be taken with a grain of salt. The directors’ claimed that they had ample reason to sell shares apart from what they learned in that meeting, and so they did not trade because of the information. 1978 WL 198166 at *5. The Commission deemed their motives irrelevant, however:

Rule 10b-5 does not require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage of material non-public information. Purchases of securities in the public market should be able to rely upon information available to the public at the time of the transaction. If an insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the detriment of the public. In re Sterling Drug, Inc., 1978 WL 198166, *5 (Apr. 18, 1978).

The next major step came fifteen years later in the Second Circuit’s Teicher decision, which seemingly endorsed a possession approach, albeit in dicta. United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1993). The defendants had argued that “the district court’s jury charge erroneously instructed the jury that the defendants could be found guilty of securities fraud based upon the mere possession of fraudulently obtained material non-public information without regard to whether this information was the actual cause of the sale or purchase of securities.” Id. at 119. The court was skeptical of this argument, but avoided ruling on the issue.

88 U.S. v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, (2d Cir. 2013). But see Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2002) (“if Lipson would have sold the shares in the same amounts and on the same dates that he did sell them even if he had not possessed any inside information, then he would be home free, because then the existence of a causal connection between his inside information and the challenged sales would be negated.”). See also U.S. v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–121 (2d Cir. 1993) (originating the knowing possession standard).


90 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (“a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale.”)
“knowledge” standard than the “use” standard. And even those courts which had endorsed a “use” standard in theory tended to apply it as though it were a knowledge standard. 91 Thus, American insider trading law generally operates to bar certain species of informed trading, regardless of whether that information caused the trade.

B. Ad Hoc Theories

Apart from the two fraud-based theories of insider trading, several other types of informed trading are prohibited through ad hoc provisions meant to fill perceived gaps in the foregoing approaches. The most important of these rules regulates trading in advance of tender offers. A tender offer is a public invitation to sell or tender shares to an acquirer, 92 often in connection with an attempt to take over a company without the approval of the target company’s board. SEC Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading while in possession of material non-public information about a pending tender offer, without regard to whether there is a relationship of trust or confidence, and without the challenge of defining “on the basis of.”

91 Even where some form of use standard exists in theory, the practice ends up tracking a possession standard in many cases. Courts typically reject the defendant’s alternative explanations for the trade. S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99070 (D. Conn. 1995) (14e-3 case). A second reason that the shoreline remains near Teicher, despite decisions urging a use standard, is that the SEC has not acquiesced in those results. Instead, it promulgated rule 10b5-1, which adopts an awareness standard. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) The SEC uses the term “awareness” and “knowing possession” interchangeably. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Sec. Act Rel. 33-7787, 71 SEC Docket 7 (CCH) ¶ 7, at 746 (20 December 1999). (“[w]e recognize that an absolute standard based on knowing possession, or awareness, could be overboard in some respects.”). While there may be debate in theory about whether we have a use or possession standard, there is no debate in practice for individuals who would rather not be the subject of a ruinous government investigation (even one in which they will ultimately prevail).

92 See, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.Supp. 783, 823–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defining tender offer as including “(1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer; (2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer’s stock; (3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock. . . . [8] public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the target company’s securities.”) Note that 14e-3 does not in fact define “tender offer.”

93 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2016). The bidder themselves may, of course, buy shares while knowing about their own plans, subject to the other disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. The SEC considered and rejected a fuller prohibition that would have prohibited even the bidder from buying prior to its own tender offer. Tender Offers, 44 Fed.Reg. 9956, 9976–78, 9988 (Feb. 15, 1979) (“Proposed Rule 14e-2”); Tender Offers, 44 Fed.Reg. 70,326, 78,338 (Dec. 6, 1979) (“Proposed Rule 14e-3”). The rule is only triggered if a bidder has taken a substantial step towards commencing a tender offer, though
C. Permitted Trading

Notwithstanding fraud-based theories, ad hoc prohibitions on some trading, and an aggressive causation standard, the fact remains that American insider trading law permits most forms of informed trading. As in all of federal securities law, an advantage is only problematic if the acquired information is material,\(^\text{94}\) meaning that there is “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”\(^\text{95}\) Likewise, there is no violation in trading on the basis of public information, even if your counterparty does not know or has not fully appreciated the information.\(^\text{96}\) The specter of insider trading liability is only raised as to material, non-public information.

More importantly, American law does not even prohibit much trading on the basis of material, non-public information. We do not have a parity of information approach to insider trading.\(^\text{97}\) That sort of broad prohibition was advanced by the SEC in Cady, Roberts and accepted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulphur, but the Supreme Court in Chiarella rejected the notion that it is generally illegal to take advantage of an undisclosed informational advantage.\(^\text{98}\) Instead, trading is restricted only if it falls within the scope of one of the forgoing “theories” of

the trader need not know who the bidder is. U.S. V. O’Hagan 521 U.S. 642, 648 n.3 (1997). Nor whether that bidder has in fact taken a substantial step. Id at 650. See also Harold S. Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff, The Staff Answers Questions Relating to Rule 10b5-1 — Possession vs. Use and Rule 14e-, 3C SEC. & FED. CORP. LAW § 19:30 (2d ed. 2016). Furthermore, the defendant need not know that the information is non-public or that the source was a bidder or a bidder’s associate, so long as she has reason to know. Id. See also SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. 1292, 1304 (11th Cir.2004) (“Rule 14e-3, by its terms, does not require that the offender know or have reason to know that the information relates to a tender offer, so long as the information in fact does relate to a tender offer and the offender knows or has reason to know the information is nonpublic and was acquired by a person with the required status.”). Likewise, 14e-3 is triggered only if the informed trader knows that their information comes from the bidder, the target company, or a shareholder selling into the tender offer. 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2016)(a). See also 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2016)(b)(2) (Legal entities may defend themselves by implementing a compliance program intended to prevent agents from acquiring and trading on tender offer information.) For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, chapter 9.


\(^{96}\) United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (whether information is nonpublic “is largely a factual issue, turning on such factors as written company policies, employee training, measures the employer has taken to guard the information’s secrecy, the extent to which the information is known outside the employer’s place of business, and the ways in which other employees may access and use the information.”)

\(^{97}\) Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.

insider trading or *ad hoc* prohibitions.\textsuperscript{99} Those who neither steal information
nor abuse their trusted role to get it may usually trade with impunity.\textsuperscript{100}
Thus, “only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information.”\textsuperscript{101}

While some – most notably the SEC – seem displeased that insider
trading is often unconstrained,\textsuperscript{102} others defend a presumption in favor of
lawful trading.\textsuperscript{103} Informed trading improves price accuracy and gives traders a reason to do research in the first place.\textsuperscript{104}

Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, American insider
trading law does not impose liability for much accidental or intentional
tainting of others with inside information. Innocent traders need not fear
discovering something that would ruin their trading options, nor do they
need fear that a competitor or adversary will salt the earth with injurious
tips. All a trader need do is refrain from misappropriating information,
avoid positions of trust, and stay far from the merger team, and then she can
retain all of her flexibility. We seem to have in our power the ability to avoid
wrongdoing—and preserve our trading freedoms—by just acting decently
and carefully.\textsuperscript{105}

Or so the theory has been. The next Part shows how uneasy the safe
harbor really is. In fact, traders can and do become burdened with trading
prohibitions without any affirmative and culpable efforts to acquire
proscribed information, and the risk is far greater if an adversary seeks to
establish this state of affairs. Tainting with inside information is eminently
possible.


\textsuperscript{100} For example, a famous football coach was acquitted for trading in advance of
a merger, which he discovered while eavesdropping on company executives attending a

\textsuperscript{101} Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.


trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, chapter 2.


\textsuperscript{105} See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A fiduciary
duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential
information.”).
III. THE LAW PERMITTING INSIDER TAINTING

It is plain why managers and bidders might wish to disable the trades of another person. Yet it is still natural to doubt that insider trading law could matter to any such stratagem. We have seen that American law often allows traders to take full advantage of superior information. We do not have an “equal access” regime. It is only when certain conditions are met, such as the breach of a duty of trust or confidentiality, that the trading is restricted. It is natural to think that one can only abuse trust or confidence intentionally, and so involuntary insider trading would be impossible.

Likewise, it is natural to think that insider tainting would be self-deterring, since each instance of insider tainting would expose the tipper (i.e. the actor who seeks to taint another) to serious legal risks themselves. And if real insider tainting is self-deterring, then feigned insider tainting is not credible.

Yet insider tainting is indeed viable and credible. Section A shows that there are many ways for a tipper to impose insider trading risks onto an unwilling victim. Some methods actually make it illegal for the tippee to trade. Other methods may not quite succeed in making the trade illegal, but they still cast a pall over it. It is feasible for the tipper to deliver the tip in such a way that the victim must fear legal risks. Even brave traders must take into account the risk of prosecutor, plaintiff, or court error.

Next, Section B shows that such tipping is not self-deterring. There are a number of relatively safe ways for tippers to perpetrate their tainting plans. For example, successful tainting blocks the victim’s trade; yet securities fraud liability generally attaches only in the presence of a trade. And since a number of techniques exist for safely tainting, bluffs become credible as another safe strategy.

Part C goes on to discuss the application of tainting in the three scenarios (takeover defense, competitive bidding, and wolf packs) from Part I.

A. Tainting is Viable

Insider tainting is viable because it is possible to impose serious legal risks to an individual’s subsequent trades, even without her complicity or consent. The following sub-sections explain how this is possible under the various insider trading theories.

1. Some Preliminary Remarks

Insider tainting can deter trades even in cases where the odds of enforcement and conviction are less than 100%. That is because of the high

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106 Supra Part I.
107 Supra Part II.
costs of defending against a potential suit and the fierce penalties looming even in cases where punishment is unlikely.

An insider trading conviction can entail serious monetary penalties\(^{108}\) or jail time.\(^ {109}\) Even if a defendant is ultimately vindicated, the mere accusation of wrongdoing can ruin a career or destroy a business enterprise.

For example, federal investigators effectively destroyed the $2 billion Diamond Partners hedge fund merely by publicizing the fact that an investigation had been initiated. Investors fled the fund rapidly in the wake of the investigation.\(^ {110}\) Years later, the FBI paid $6 million to the firm and its managers, in an uncommon recognition of the degree to which the fund prevailed against the government in the subsequent insider trading trials.\(^ {111}\) While the $6 million was surely appreciated, the principals and employees of Diamondback were not remotely compensated for their losses, underscoring the importance of avoiding controversy.\(^ {112}\)

In light of the costs and risks entailed by any investigation, tainting can work even in cases where the probability of conviction is actually quite low. Indeed, even a very low-level risk of liability may be enough to disable a trader if her employer has a robust compliance program.\(^ {113}\) Compliance

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\(^{108}\) 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1) (authorizing SEC to seek civil penalties when a person violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 “by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information.”); § 78u-1(a)(2) (authorizing penalties of up to “three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase, sale or communication.”). For discussion of the civil money penalties the SEC may seek against insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.3.3.

\(^{109}\) 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Providing for not more than $5 million fines, 20 years imprisonment, or both, for any willful violation of the Exchange Act or any rule thereunder). For discussion of the criminal penalties against insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.2.

\(^{110}\) Indeed, the fund announced its pending closure less than one month after investigators first arrived at the fund to look for evidence. Chad Brady, Diamondback is Shutting Down, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2012), [http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324001104578163043667373604](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324001104578163043667373604).


\(^{112}\) If compensated under the traditional “2 and 20 rule,” the manager of a $2 billion fund would have been entitled to forty million dollars per year plus 20% of the fund’s gains above some benchmark.

\(^{113}\) Cf. United States v. Horvath, et al., 2013 WL 4497029, *8, *45 (2d Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that compliance department was privy to many allegedly tipping emails). Tippers can fortify their tainting schemes by looping compliance departments, which may be more risk averse than individual traders, in to the tip. The strategic invocation of compliance personal is characteristic of the phenomenon of “offensive compliance” identified by Miraim Baer. See Miraim Bair, Offensive Compliance, PRAWFSBLOG (Feb. 21,
officers may adopt categorical restrictions on trading when even when risks are minute.\textsuperscript{114}

In principle, involuntary tippees may regain their right to trade if they publicly disclose the tainting information.\textsuperscript{115} However, doing so carries legal risks, too. If there is any argument that the tippee had assumed a duty of confidentiality, they would expose themselves to liability for violating by disclosure. Moreover, if the information turned out to be false, or if the disclosing tippee does not publicize it with perfect accuracy, the tippee might herself be accused of making an actionable misstatement.\textsuperscript{116}

Even if the law allowed the tippee to disclose, doing so might still leave her worse off than if she had never been tainted. Disclosing the material, proscribed information is likely to cause the market price to move, making the victim’s subsequent sale or purchase occur at a less optimal price.

More interestingly, the choice to disclose rather than abstain reveals information about the disclosing tippee: to opt for disclosure, the trader must think that there is a trading opportunity with respect to this stock apart from the one disclosed. Otherwise, why would she disclose rather than abstain? If she discloses the tainting information, she also hints at her remaining undisclosed information.

For example, a would-be acquirer might be tainted with a peek at quarterly earnings. If she discloses those earnings to the world, it will signal that she wishes to buy the company, and had that wish apart from the now-disclosed earnings. Why? Does the trader know that one of the company’s drugs has been approved or a lawsuit settled? Careful observers (competitors, arbitragers) will read the tea leaves. The tainting party will have frustrated the victim’s trading efforts even if the latter opts for disclosure, because prophylactic disclosure still signals interest and implies information.

\textbf{2. 14e-3}

At least in the tender offer context, Rule 14e-3 proves a potent vector for insider tainting. Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading while in possession of

\begin{itemize}
  \item An over-protective approach may result from the compliance officers’ failure to understand the nuances of the factual and legal context, rational effort to build workable rules (that are simply not right in every case), or desire to assert their importance and protect their own reputation (which may depend on a spotless compliance record).
  \item The most expansive formulation of American insider trading law is the “disclose or abstain rule.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). The trader could disclose in a recognized public forum, such as a newspaper like the Wall Street Journal, or through some regulator filing. For example, the SEC requires anyone making a tender offer to file a Schedule TO containing numerous disclosures. One such disclosure could involve any unintended tips received.
  \item See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful . . . To make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”)
\end{itemize}
undisclosed information about a tender offer.\textsuperscript{117} Unlike the fraud-based insider trading theories, 14e-3 does not require any special relationship between the trader and either the source or the counterparty; it is enough to trade while knowing the proscribed information.\textsuperscript{118} It is for this reason that 14e-3 has been variously called a “strict liability”\textsuperscript{119} offense or vindication of “equal access” principles.\textsuperscript{120}

Rule 14e-3 does contain some protective limitations: The Rule is only violated if the information came from certain sources (e.g. the bidder) and is used after someone takes a “substantial step” toward a non-public tender offer.

Still, it is significant what limits are not imposed. The trader need not know who the bidder is\textsuperscript{121} or whether that bidder has in fact taken a substantial

\textsuperscript{117} 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (2016).
\textsuperscript{118} 45 Fed. Reg. 60413 n.37; United States v. O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the Commission didn’t exceed its authority in promulgating 14e-3 and remanding for consideration of conviction under 14e-3). \textit{See also} United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (1998) (affirming conviction under 14e-3); S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Rule 14e-3 imposes liability... without regard to whether the trader owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information”); S.E.C. v. Anticevic, 2010 WL 2077196, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Rule 14e-3 imposes an abstain or disclose obligation “regardless of whether the individual (1) owes a fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information; (2) has knowledge that the material, nonpublic information in his or her possession relates to a tender offer; and/or (3) actually used the information.”); S.E.C. v. Sekhri, 2002 WL 31100823 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). Note, \textit{Private Causes of Action Under SEC Rule 14e-3}, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 290, 295–96 (1983). The wide scope of 14e-3 is no coincidence. The SEC promulgated this rule to respond to the perceived injustice of its loss in \textit{Chinarella}. Donald Langevoort, 18 \textit{INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION} § 7:1


\textsuperscript{121} \textit{O’Hagan} 521 U.S. at 648 n.3.
Furthermore, the defendant need not know whether the information is non-public or whether the source was a bidder or their associate, so long as she has reason to know. In theory, all a tipper needs to do to taint a trader is to state that a tender offer is pending with respect to the security in question. If this statement is true, it would then be unlawful for the victim to trade. Even if it were false, prudent traders would become more cautious, given the penalties involved. For example, they might not trade even if they are not sure that a tender offer is forthcoming, or they were never told who the bidder might be, so long as they think it is possible that a court will later determine that a tender offer was brewing at the time. Therefore, the potential for Rule 14e-3 to deter trading is not limited to the tender offer context—it applies in any context where a tender offer is plausible.

3. Fraud-Based Theories

The fraud-based theories (classical and misappropriation) likewise permit insider tainting. This may be surprising, since these theories require a fraudulent breach of a duty, and innocent recipients of information do not take any such fraudulent actions. Even the risk of wrongful enforcement based on ambiguous facts would seem to be low, since traders can protect themselves by avoiding situations where they assume a confidence or appear to confer a benefit on any information source. When someone asks for a confidence or a quid-pro-quo, the trader can emphatically decline. Yet that is not quite right as a statement of the fraud-based theories. Actually, liability hinges on what the tippee knows about the information’s provenance, rather than what the tippee actually did. The tippee need not breach a duty of trust and confidence; insider trading liability follows if someone breached a duty and that the tippee is aware of this breach.

A tipper can therefore taint a victim by delivering information as well as a story explaining why it is proscribed. For example, a tipper could deliver material information and also declare “My brother bribed an executive to get that information.” If this is statement is true, then it is illegal for the

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122 Id. at 650. See also Harold S. Bloomberg and Samuel Wolff, The Staff Answers Questions Relating to Rule 10b5-1—Possession vs. Use and Rule 14e-, 3C SEC. & FED. CORP. LAW § 19:30 (2d ed. 2016).

123 See Bloomberg & Wolff. See also S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d. 1292, 1304 (11th Cir.2004) (“Rule 14e–3, by its terms, does not require that the offender know or have reason to know that the information relates to a tender offer, so long as the information in fact does relate to a tender offer and the offender knows or has reason to know the information is nonpublic and was acquired by a person with the required status.”)

124 S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2012) (“tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or recklessly traded while in knowing possession of that information.”). Accord United States v. Parigian, 824 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2016).
tippee to trade.\textsuperscript{125} If it is not true, then the law does not actually bar trading, but a reasonable trader may be unsure whether it is true or whether a plaintiff or prosecutor will believe that it was true. Either way, the information’s origin story casts a pall over the trader’s plans.

The forgoing example concerned a statement about the information having been misappropriated, but it is also possible to cloud information under the classical theory. Recall that the classical theory bars trading when the source breached a duty by disclosing the information in order to obtain a personal benefit such as improved reputation, reciprocal favors, or the simple joy of helping “a trading friend or relative.”\textsuperscript{126} To implicate this theory, a tipper could say, “By the way, I gave this information to you because I think and expect reciprocal favors, and also because I genuinely want to benefit you, my friend.”\textsuperscript{127} Such a comment establishes that the secret was given in breach of the tipper’s duty, and knowledge of that breach taints the tippee.

Notice that both of these examples involve the tainting backstory being given after the information, a technique we can call “post-scripting.” I have structured the examples this way in order to emphasize how hard it is for the trader to protect herself from tainting. Any time one learns information, the source may soon after disclose its problematic source. Only if a trader breaks off all contact with the world can she avoid hearing information along with its potentially problematic post-script.

\textsuperscript{125} When the source breaches a duty in acquiring or sharing the information, the tippee can be a “Participant After the Fact.” \textsc{wang \& steinberg}, \textit{insider trading}, § 5.3.1 (2010).
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Salman} at 427-28. The latter is akin to trading and then sharing the cash proceeds.
\textsuperscript{127} It is true that the tippee or the court may believe that this post-script is a pretext. It is certainly false that a tipper intends to benefit a tippee if her principal goal is actually to frustrate the tippee’s trading plans. Nor may a malicious tipper always expect loyalty from the tippee. \textit{See} Donald C. Langevoort., “Fine Distinctions” \textit{in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading}, 2013 \textsc{colum. bus. l. rev.} 429, 446 (2013) (“[T]rickery can hardly lead to a reasonable expectation of fidelity.”). Note, however, that cooperative tipping in the wolf pack context may conceivably involve tipping both to hinder and to help the tippee, whose tainting is what permits them to join the potentially profitable acquisition coalition. See \textit{infra} Part II.C.3.

Moreover, other classical theory post-scripts may \textit{actually succeed} in establishing liability. Directors breach their duty of loyalty when they take unreasonable steps to entrench themselves. \textit{AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson}, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986). \textit{See also supra} Part I.A. It would therefore violate the duty of loyalty for a director to share information as part of an unreasonable entrenchment effort. When a manager shares information in order to stop a takeover that endangers her job, the manager arguably defrauds her principal by using the corporation’s secrets to obtain a personal benefit. Therefore, the following post-script plausibly taints the tippee: “I told you that information in the hopes that it will disable your trading plans, and thereby save my job.” Candid anti-takeover tainting plausibly succeeds in tainting.
confidence from the tippee arguably creates obligations only going forward. There something to this objection to at least one form of post-scripting, under the misappropriation theory, would append the information “By the way, I gave you that information because we have a relationship of trust and confidence, such that I am justified in expecting confidentiality.”

Leon Cooperman, a billionaire hedge fund manager, accused of insider trading, staked his defense on precisely this objection to post-scripting liability. The SEC charged Cooperman, and his funds, with buying shares in Atlas Pipeline Partners on the basis of information disclosed to him by Atlas executives on three phone calls—information he was expected to keep confidential. 128 Cooperman argued that an expectation of confidentiality, if any existed, emerged only after the tip was given. 129

If Cooperman is right, and if the troubled provenance of the information must be delivered in advance of the information, traders might be able to protect themselves by terminating the communication or disclaiming responsibility prior to being tainted. Yet, there are three problems with this response.

First, even if post-scripting about a relationship of trust might not work, on the theory that the putative relationship must exist at the time of the tip rather than shortly afterward, it is clear that other forms of post-scripting will taint information. To think otherwise is to admit of unworkable formalism. An example of prior-fraud post-scripting is “Earnings have doubled. My brother bribed someone to get that information.” It cannot be that the listener is free to trade on that couplet, but that it is criminal to trade if the sentence order is reversed to read “My brother bribed someone to learn some information. It is that earnings have doubled.” The law is simply not so hyper technical as to parse conversations so finely.

Moreover, under the classical theory, authorities are divided as to whether one crucial element—the personal benefit requirement—must even be known by the tippee. 130 If defendants can be convicted without that

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128 Complaint, SEC v. Cooperman, Case 2:16-cv-05043-JS ¶34 (Sep. 9, 2016) (executive “believed Cooperman had an obligation not to use this information to trade APL securities. Indeed, during one of these conversations... Cooperman explicitly agreed that he could not and would not use the confidential information...”).


knowledge, then they can presumably be convicted based on subsequent knowledge.

Second, it is not clear that Cooperman is even right about the misappropriation theory. Cooperman’s objection seems to be that a statement (or omission of a vital truthful statement) about trustworthiness must preexist disclosure, since fraud is only fraud if it induces some form of reliance (like disclosure of information). While plausible, the Supreme Court recently rejected this proposition in another complex investment setting.\(^{131}\)

Third, as an evidentiary matter, defendants will not always be secure in the proof that they ended the conversation or disclaimed confidentiality prior to the time liability attached. Will the SEC or a jury believe that the trader deleted an email after the first paragraph signaled that the subsequent information is proscribed? Traders may wisely fear that their trades will be scrutinized in light of what they might have read or heard or agreed to. This risk is even greater if other witnesses have their own version of the events and timing.\(^{132}\)

Despite promising a vigorous defense, Cooperman settled the case. He paid $4.9 million, agreed to have an independent compliance monitor look after his fund until 2022, and promised not to publicly deny wrongdoing (although he was not forced to admit wrongdoing either).\(^{133}\) More importantly, Cooperman’s fund shrunk from about $9.4 billion under management to just $3.5 billion.\(^{134}\) Cooperman estimated his losses from

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\(^{131}\) Husky Int'l. Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 Sup. Ct. 1581 (2016) (holding that one can commit “actual fraud” for the purposes of the bankruptcy code even when a defendant made no statements and owed no duty of candor, and the victim in no way relied on any deception. Rather, intentional efforts to hinder creditors could be a fraud even if the debts were accumulated with perfect honesty).

\(^{132}\) Recall that in Mark Cuban’s case, the tipping CEO stated in his deposition that Cuban had agreed to confidentiality.

\(^{133}\) S.E.C. v. Cooperman, Joint Motion to Enter Final Judgment Pursuant to Consent, 2:16-cv-05043-JS. This $4.9 million was $1 million more than the alleged gains from insider trading, and Cooperman promised not to collect insurance or indemnification for his personal share of the sum.

\(^{134}\) Compare Simone Foxman & Erik Shatzker, Cooperman Says Omega’s Assets Fell to $4 Billion Amid Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2016), [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-11/cooperman-says-omegas-assets-dropped-to-4-billion-amid-case] ($9.4 billion under management at the time when Omega first disclosed SEC subpoenas) with Bob Van Voris & Matt Robinson, Cooperman Agrees to Lighter Penalty in Deal With Trump’s SEC, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2017), [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-18/cooperman-omega-agree-to-settle-sec-insider-trading-lawsuit] ($3.5 billion under management). More conservative estimates would time the drop from the beginning of the SEC’s actual lawsuit. Then the decline would only be from $5.5 billion. Id. Of course, some of this decline may have been a result of forces unrelated to the SEC. See Rob Copeland & Timothy W. Martin, Hedge Fund Star: We Are ‘Under Assault’, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2016) [https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-star-we-are-under-assault-1463071444] (noting massive outflows from entire hedge sector).
the investigation would exceed $100 million due to managing a smaller corpus, a figure that jives with typical management fees.

Cooperman’s settlement signifies that enforcement is costly even if a trader has a strong legal argument. It also denies the public a full airing of his theory. Had he pursued his claim, we might have had an answer to the question of whether post-hoc demands for confidentiality can or cannot taint a trader. As it stands, the lesson is that traders face costly risks under the fraud theories for even post-recipe tainting, and that means that the arsenal for would-be tainters is quite substantial.

B. Tainting is Credible

The law of insider trading creates risks for tippers too. They can be charged for perpetrating or abetting insider trading. Moreover, specific rules prohibit tipping even if no trading occurs. Finally, even if the law

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135 Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Leon Cooperman: Our assets under management shrank by more than half to $3.4 billion after SEC charges, CNBC (Jan 5, 2017), [http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/leon-cooperman-assets-under-management-shrank-by-more-than-half.html].

136 Fund managers customarily also charge a 2% annual fee as well as a performance fee based on fund returns. A 2% fee on $5.9 billion (the difference between the high and low) is $118 million.

137 WANG & STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, §5.3.1 (2010).

138 Regulation FD prohibits companies from selectively granting early peeks at company secrets to select shareholders and market professionals. Reg FD at 83,676. Intentional disclosures can be cured by filing an 8-K or a similarly public dissemination. Regulation FD requires that “whenever an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to [certain] persons . . ., it must make public disclosure of that information.” 17 CFR 243.100 (a) The relevant persons are securities market professionals and shareholders who are likely to trade on the information. Sec & Exch. Comm'n Release Notice, Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000).


Reg FD marked a change in American disclosure practices. In his majority opinion in Dirks, Justice Powell specifically rejected a parity of information theory on the grounds that issuers sometimes needed to seed valuable information in order to curry favor from analysts – a legitimate corporate purpose. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 658, (1983).
were no obstacle, many tippers would balk at their tainting strategy out of fear that the tippee would be emboldened by the tip; many unscrupulous traders would leap at the chance to trade on a hot tip, so a tainting plan may be abandoned for fear that it would backfire.

If these risks were sufficiently great, then the strategic tipping plans discussed infra would be irrational for most potential tippers and there would be no insider tainting to diagnose or prosecute. Moreover, threats of tainting would not be credible.

However, there are ample places where the law provides cover to tippers. Sometimes, the cover is a safe harbor – conduct that is strictly legal. Tippers must be cautious even when the law is on their side, for the very reasons discussed in Section A, concerning ambiguous facts. But they can be more confident than tippees that they will prevail because, as the perpetrator of the scheme, they can take steps to preserve evidence establishing the legality of their tip.

Other times, the cover is incomplete, either activated only by contingent facts or dependent upon evidentiary practicalities for assurance. These latter protections do far less to encourage insider tainting. However, rational tippees will not assume that all tippers are rational. They will give some credence to the possibility that a desperate or optimistic tipper may act even without full protection.

1. Obscured Tips

Tippers can protect themselves by hiding their identities or tipping information that is, in the end, not actually proscribed.

Anonymous tips do some work in protecting the tipper. A tipper can deliver tips through an anonymous email, letter, phone call or even human surrogate. These tips allow information to be sent with substantially reduced liability for the tipper, and so render credible the threat that some other tips might be true. Tippees may take anonymous information less seriously than attributed information, but prudent tippees may still change their plans in light of such tips.

See also Reg FD. at 83,677 n.7 ("[I]n light of the ‘personal benefit’ test set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), many have viewed issuer selective disclosures to analysts as protected from insider trading liability.") The legitimacy of this practice was undermined in the wake of the collapse of the Dot Com bubble. In part, it seemed unfair that analysts and their patrons got better information than everyone else. In part, there was a concern that analysts were thereby corrupted by the tips; they were unwilling to criticize companies, lest their access to timely information dry up. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590, 72597 (Dec. 28, 1999) at 72592. See also See Gretchen Morgenson, How Did So Many Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2000, at 1 (describing concern over analyst corruption). This latter concern drove home one of the many ironies of baked into information regulation—giving true information to individuals whose reputations depend on sharing it—led to inferior information, as those individuals compromised other aspects of their message.

139 There remain meaningful risks in these cases. Law enforcement officials have powerful forensic tools and may be able uncover the source of information.
Safer, and more effective, is for a tipper to share false information. If information turns out to be incorrect, there is no breach in a tipper’s disclosure. A tipper can almost risklessly send false tips to the tippee in order to complicate their trading options.

The potential for false tips does much to protect tippers, but such tips do not render insider tainting credible by themselves. False tips probably create no trading liability for the tippee. If all tainting is based on false tips masquerading as true, the entire enterprise will not be credible. However, false tips can make for credible bluffs an appreciable portion of them are real or carry serious risks of liability for the tippee. Fortunately for tainting perpetrators, the law allows many avenues for lawful, and therefore credible, tipping. We will therefore proceed to examine various channels for credible tainting.

2. Faithful Tipping
First, the law generally tolerates “faithful” tippers, or those who tip for a corporate purpose. The court in Dirks held that the law is only broken if the “the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure . . . . i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.” Tippers who do not obtain such a personal benefit can tip without violating the law.

\[\text{Dirks personal benefit limitation was intended to protect selective disclosures}\]

140 Of course, the dissemination of lies is also illegal under our securities laws. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (permitting recipient of false tip to sue tipper, despite in pari delicto defense); See also S.E.C. v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding liable the seller of false tips). Securities fraud is only actionable in private suits when relied upon to buy or sell. If the tippee believes the tip, she does not rely. If she believes the tip and relies, it will be by abstaining from trading. But non-traders have no standing under 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamp. v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). When a trader actually trades because of the tip, she will have little desire to make this confession in order to incriminate a tipper.


142 Recipients of information which they know to be false may still be deterred from trading if the recipients are unsure whether regulators will readily accept that the information was false.

143 Dirks 463 U.S. at 662–63. This personal benefit test was affirmed with little modification in the Supreme Court’s Salman decision. Salman reaffirmed that a tipper may violate the law if he “makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Salman retained the notion that absent a qualifying personal benefit of that sort, there is no violation. Salman at 1093.
made to help the issuer. The example considered in *Dirks* was disclosure to
stock analysts.\footnote{Dirks 463 U.S. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a
person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts.”). The *Dirks* Court also
pointed out that expansive insider trading restrictions “could have an inhibiting influence
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary for the
preservation of a healthy market.” Id.}

Although not rooted in Rule 10b-5’s classical theory, Rule 14e-3 liability for trading on tender offers provides tippers with a good faith exception. Tippers are not liable for disclosures to those involved in planning, financing, preparing or executing a tender offer,\footnote{Rule 14e-3(d)(1)(ii).} nor are they liable for any disclosures pursuant to law.\footnote{Rule 14e-3(d)(1)(iii) (Exempting from liability any disclosures made “pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation promulgated thereunder”).}

The law used to tolerate a great deal more faithful tipping than it now does.\footnote{Id. For discussion of Regulation FD, see Wang & Steinberg, supra note 79, \S 5.2.3[C][3].} Indeed, the very conduct at issue in *Dirks* is now proscribed by Regulation FD.\footnote{See Michael D. Gutten\-tag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Tipper Wrongdoing in the 21st Century, 69 Florida L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016).} However, Regulation FD only disallows selective disclosure to certain market professionals and to shareholders who the tipper reasonably foresees will trade.\footnote{Id. It is also worth noting that Regulation FD only covers individuals speaking for a corporate issuer.} It would seem that tips to would-be buyers of stock are not disallowed. Thus, tipping is not barred under Regulation FD to head off bidders and acquirers. Likewise, if the tipper believes the shareholder will not trade—say, because of the risk of insider trading liability—then Regulation FD would not seem to be triggered, since they do not foresee trading. Finally, Reg FD violation do not give rise to private rights of action.\footnote{See \url{https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm}. See also \S 243.102 (providing that Reg FD violation are not 10b-5 violations).} Thus, even those who actually violate it in their strategic tainting face a risk only if government enforcers take interest.

3. Successful Tainting

In most cases, tipping is illegal only if the tippee will trade. This is because Section 10(b), the statute under which most insider trading is pursued, regulates only conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”\footnote{\S 10b. Other provisions contain similar limitations. See, e.g., \S 17(a)], (prohibiting fraud “in the offer or sale”). Even more expansively, 14e-3’s good faith exception is available even if there is a trade, so long as the tipper does not have reason to think that the tippee will trade. When tainting law abiding citizens, tippers may be justifiably confident that no trade will occur. It is therefore possible that a tipper could escape liability under 14e-3 even if a trade actually occurs}
evil was in discouraging a planned transaction. Therefore, successful tainting fully avoids most tipper liability under our securities laws.

It may appear imprudent for the tipper to take actions that are only safe if they achieve their desired effect, but the strategy is less risky than it may appear. A core finding in game theory indicates that the second to last mover in a game can often make costly ultimatums to the last mover. In parallel, so long as the tippee is concerned enough to abstain, she protects her tipper.

The tippee has the last clear chance to avoid liability for both herself and the tipper. The tipper takes a risk by sharing information, but the tippee must decide unilaterally whether to expose herself to legal risks by trading. If the tippee opts not to trade, she protects both herself and the tipper. Importantly, the tippee might abstain for many reasons. She might be normatively concerned about fairness or the authoritative status of the law, or she may fear government investigation, or she may worry about how insider trading would affect her status within a company.

Of course, some tippers must fear that some tippees will trade despite the tip. Indeed, some tippees might be encouraged by a tip to trade all the more vigorously.

One way to avoid this problem is to tip with disconfirming information. If a bid is pending, the bidder could be told bad news about the target. This bad news will independently discourage acquisition in addition

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153 For a discussion of this issue, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra, note __ § 5.2.8[F]. An interesting related question is whether mail or wire fraud convictions could be secured, even in the absence of a trade. See Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 254 & nn.124,127–28,133 (2015)
154 THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT, 83 ([W] one player can do to avert mutual damage affects what another player will do to avert it.”). Other features of the game suggest that the tipper can control the outcomes. the risk to the tipper is often smaller than the risk to the tippee. For example, 14e-3 allows a “good faith” defense to tippers but there is no good faith defense for the tippee. Even if a court might not ultimately accept that the tipper acted in good faith, the availability of the defense gives tippers more leverage against investigators and prosecutors. Even where the law is not more favorable to tippers, the fact that it is less developed than tippee liability may deter some prosecutors. Cf. Guttentag, supra, note __ at 5 (“[T]here is no obvious common law precedent for determining when the selective disclosure of material non-public information constitutes a deceptive practice.”). These differences in elements matter because tippees can be liable even when the tipper is not. United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 323 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming criminal conviction of tippee in “the rare case where the tipper is acquitted and yet the relationship between the tipper and the tippee is such that the tippee may yet be prosecuted for acting upon the tipper’s breach”). In a game that imposes risks only if two parties both violate the law, the party with lesser potential punishment may sometimes take liberties knowing that the other party faces even higher incentives to prevent a bad outcome.
to any legal obstacle it creates. And, perhaps surprisingly, it still creates a legal obstacle to bidding.\footnote{This is a hypothetical possibility. I do not know of an example of liability under these circumstances. However, as a product of Japanese law, Murakami’s conviction for insider trading parallels this outcome. Murakami sold while in possession of good news (the tender offer). Stephen Givens, Looking through the Wrong End of the Telescope: The Japanese Judicial Response to Steel Partners, Murakami, and Horie, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1571 (2011).}

It is surprising that disconfirming information should create insider trading liability. Someone who buys while knowing worse news than the average person is hardly at an advantage; they would seem to be at an advantage only when they sell on the basis of this bad news. Still, the law regards such a buyer as potentially liable. First, we have a knowing possession standard for inside information.\footnote{Supra part II.A.} That means that inside information can trigger liability even if it didn’t actually cause the trade. A buyer who buys despite disconfirming news certainly did not use the information, but she still knowingly possessed it.

Second, a buying trader who has reasons to sell might buy less than they otherwise would have. The mere fact of buying does not show that the information had no causal impact.\footnote{There is an anomaly that a shareholder can be liable for buying less, but not liable for buying zero, but that foible of our law does not save this case.} As a legal and evidentiary matter, purchases in the context of bad news might still seem to have been made on the basis of that news.

Third, the fiduciary basis of the classical theory is still implicated by the non-disclosure of material information. If it is wrong for a corporate executive to trade with a shareholder while withholding really important facts about the company, that includes facts that confirm the shareholder’s decision to sell (and that disconfirm the executive’s decision to buy).\footnote{Apart from the abstract duty to disclose, there are practical reasons for this prophylactic. Knowing what the executive knows, the shareholder might seek to sell even more shares. She might adjust her level of trust in the executive. Perhaps she would even take a contrary view about the information, deeming good what others take to be bad news—as the beneficiary of the corporate enterprise, it is for her and not the executive to evaluate the significance of the disclosed information. All of this is quite separate from the question of whether it would be lawful or appropriate for the insider to selectively share the information with the shareholder. This is why “disclose or abstain” often means “abstain.”}

\section*{C. Tainting In Context}

To show how insider trading law may be deployed as a sword, this section returns to the three contexts described in Part I, in which an individual would like to disable the trades of another.

\subsection*{1. Tainting by Managers}

Managers have recently discovered the power of insider trading law to disrupt involuntary changes in ownership. In one recent example, a target company used insider trading law as part of its arsenal of anti-takeover devices in order to resist both a hostile tender offer and an activist campaign.
The colorful characters involved, the terrific sums of money, and the novel uses of legal stratagem made the affair national news. Though there has been no suggestion of strategic tainting, the facts are illustrative of the power of insider tainting to disrupt takeover attempts.

In 2014, Pershing Square and Valeant bought shares of Allergan, the pharmaceutical company that makes Botox. Pershing Square is a well-known activist investment fund, which buys shares with the goal of exerting influence over management, often in order to increase dividend payments. Valeant is a competitor to Allergan, interested in acquiring Allergan for strategic purposes, but also to fund dividend payments by slashing R&D.

Pershing Square and Valeant were mutually aware of one another’s plans. Supposedly, Valeant first approached Pershing Square in pursuit of financing for an attempted takeover of Allergan. Valeant would also stand to gain if Pershing Square acquired a large stake of shares with the intention of voting alongside Valeant in their control efforts. It would allow Valeant to exercise outsized influence without as large a capital outlay, and without immediately filing the Williams Act disclosures triggered by large investments. Pershing Square, for its part, would also appreciate an ally in its attempt to shake up Allergan—and early knowledge of Valeant’s tender offer would lock in almost assured gains for stock acquired at pretender offer prices. On the day the tender offer was announced, Allergan’s share price spiked some 30%, generating perhaps a billion dollars in profit for Pershing Square.

Allergan’s board disliked both the activist and hostile acquirer and sought to use insider trading law as a defensive weapon. Allergan sued, arguing that the acquirers’ coordinated campaign violated Rule 14e-3’s ban.

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160 To be slightly more accurate the shares were acquired by PS Fund 1, a subsidiary of Pershing Square formed as an acquisition vehicle. PS Fund 1 was 97% owned by Pershing Square and 3% owned by Valeant. Allergan, Inc. et al. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals Internationals, Inc., Case No. 8:14-CV-01214, Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶7, 10, 59 (C.D. Cal. August 1, 2014). PS Fund 1 acquired 9.7% of Allergan’s stock between February 25, 2014 and April 21, 2014.

161 The facts in this section are generally drawn from the various court opinions.

162 The Williams Act seeks to limit covert acquisitions by requiring large acquirers to disclose their presence and intentions. See e.g., Sections 13(d), (g) (requiring disclosure by owners of 5% or more of a class of stock); Section 14(d) (requiring disclosure when a tender offeror will come to own 5% or more of a class of stock).

163 Allergan’s Pyott questions Valeant, Pershing, 2015 WL 4591605 (“Pershing walked away with almost $950 million in profit after the stock price was driven up by more than 80 percent during the seven-month standoff.”).
on insider trading in the lead up to a tender offer. Specifically, they alleged that Pershing Square violated the rule by buying shares while aware of Valeant’s tender offer plans, and Valeant violated the rule by informing Pershing Square of those plans. The presiding court agreed that that the facts “raised serious questions as to whether Defendants’ conduct . . . violated Rule 14e-3” and granted a partial injunction. Allergan pursued these arguments in court and on the floor of Congress. Former shareholders followed on with their own suit.

These insider trading allegations were part of the reason that Allergan was able to undermine the Valeant/Pershing Square bid. Ultimately, the Allergan board approved a sale to another firm, Actavis, for $70.5 billion, considerably more than the $59 billion offered by Valeant. So Allergan’s use of insider trading law as a defensive tactic may have benefited the shareholders. Then again, the deal consummated more than a year later, exposing the shareholders to substantial risk. And, as with all defensive tactics, there is no assurance that the board is even trying to maximize sale price rather than protect themselves.

After Allergan’s example, the strategic use of insider trading law to disrupt activist campaigns is now presented as a standard practice. Allergan did not seed Pershing Square with secrets in order to block their efforts, and so this is not in itself a case of insider tainting. However, the drama could have unfolded in a very similar way had Allergan in fact

167 http://www.hsgrc senate.gov/download/?id=15f9e300-3c7-436e-b77ae2484044632e (former Allergan CEO testifying that his company was victim of insider trading and urging Congressional investigation). See also http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/07/sec-ackman/ (SEC Commissioner discussing Valeant matter in Congress).
171 See, e.g., Randy Rinicella, Gerard G. Pecht, Peter Stokes and Mark Oakes, Responding to an activist campaign—Litigation options, in 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 46B:33 (2016) (“Insider trading rules may provide another litigation avenue.”). See also Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Alexander R. Sussman and Gail Weinstein § 1.02 The Need for Preparedness, in TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, §1.02, 1-34.9 n. 34.60 (discussing Allergan matter).
been the source of the tainting information. Allergan could have communicated to Pershing Square that a tender offer would soon be launched by Actavis. That communication would have triggered 14e-3, rendering subsequent purchases by Pershing Square illegal.

The scope of 14e-3 is potent. It does not require that the disclosure be in breach of a duty or misappropriated, so Pershing Square cannot avoid this risk simply by disclaiming any confidentiality.172 If the issuer (or bidder) tells you about a pending offer, you cannot trade, period. The consequences of tender offer information are thus much harder to escape (which makes it a much more potent tool for manager insider tainting) than run of the mill material, non-public information.173

The only way that Pershing Square could avoid this risk is to cease communications with Allergan, but that is a highly unrealistic means of self-preservation. Activist investors like Pershing Square make their living by engaging in dialogue with management, applying pressure and seeking to introduce changes to corporate policy.

2. Tainting by Bidders

Apart from the takeover context, insider tainting is also viable in the competitive bidding context. That strategic application was central to a recent decision by the Japanese regulators overseeing the world’s second largest pool of securities trading.174 The Financial Services Agency of Japan appointed a Working Group on Insider Trading Regulations to reflect on several problems with the law that had become evident in the first decade of the 21st century. One of those problems was insider tainting.

The minutes from the Working Group include several different Working Group members expressing concern about intentional tainting.175 The FSA official in charge reported that that “law firms often inform FSA that these problems of intentional tainting actually happen,” and that this problem of intentional tainting “has practically been pointed out for a long time.”176 Yasuhisa Abe, a director of the Japan Business Federation, stated

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172 Supra Part III.A.

173 Recall again Mark Cubin’s run-in with the SEC. Conceivably, the CEO of mamma.com sought to taint Mark Cubin with inside information so that he could not sell his shares. The SEC’s case depended on testimony that Cuban had agreed to keep the conversation confidential. The case failed in part because Cuban denied the promise of confidentiality and the jury believed him. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-15/mark-cuban-defense-rests-insider-trading-lawsuit. A similar case in the UK held together because disclaiming confidentiality is ineffective even outside of the tender offer context. Peter J. Henning, Einhorn Case Highlights Britain’s Broader Definition of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES Dealbook [Jan. 31, 2012], http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/einhorn-case-highlights-britains-broader-definition-of-insider-trading/.

174 [http://www.world-stock-exchanges.net/top10.html] (After US-based exchanges, Japan is home to the largest trading venue).


176 Id.
that “this matter has long been pointed out, and [the Federation] has demanded the improvement.”  

The December 24, 2012 final report acknowledged this problem in the tender offer context:

Under insider trading regulation pertaining to TOB [Tender offer Bid] Insiders, a recipient of unpublished Tender Offer Facts, in principle, cannot purchase shares of the offeree company until the offeror publishes the Tender Offer Facts. It has been pointed out that therefore, for instance, if a person, who has decided to buy out a listed company, discloses unpublished Tender Offer Facts to other potential acquirers, this would prevent them from increasing their stake.  

As a result of this widely perceived problem, the Working Group urged a change in the law, at least in regards to tender offers, to allow trading after an appropriate period of time passes:

From the perspective of promoting fair competition with respect to mergers and acquisitions and facilitating an orderly securities trading, it would be appropriate for the recipients of unpublished Tender Offer Facts be allowed to purchase shares of the offeree company where investor confidence in the securities markets would not be harmed.

Those recommendations subsequently became law. Legal commentators concurred that the main focus of this law was to address intentional tainting of bidding competitors.

Although written without specific reference to “tainting” the focus of the new safe harbor has not eluded its audience. One major international law firm summarized the provision with explicit reference to tainting.

In consideration of the fact that a Tender Offeror could intentionally ‘taint’ competitors through the disclosure of its intention to engage in a tender offer bid, the Working Group recommended that limitations be enacted on those parties that became aware of non-public information of a tender offer.

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177 Id. However, no specific incidents were discussed.
178 *11-12.
179 *12.
180 Article 167, Paragraph 5, Item 8 and 9 of the FIEA. The Diet passed the Amendment on June 12, 2012. The provisions became effective on April 1, 2014.
181 See, e.g., Working Group Recommendations with respect to the Insider Trading Regulations of Japan, WHITE & CASE [http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-03142013-1/#.VCxQzSldWRM].
offer bid if such transaction would not impede fairness and undermine sound operation of the securities market.” 182

The Working Group did not quantify the extent of tainting, nor did it cite specific instances, nor attempt an international comparison. So it provides only suggestive evidence that insider tainting occurs. Still, this expert body’s conviction that a new safe harbor to combat insider tainting was necessary and the regulators’ decision to adjust the law in concurrence, helps to dispel the sense that careful thought about potential insider tainting might be too speculative. Although Japanese insider trading law differs in some respects, the comparison is still instructive because both bodies of law are similar enough to suffer from similar pathologies. 183

3. Tainting By Wolves

The forgoing discussion has implicitly addressed manager and competitor tainting, but insider tainting can also be used to coordinate cooperation. 184 By constraining unilateral trading options, insider tainting can reduce defection from cooperatively rational joint bidding strategies.

Consider again Murakami, the swashbuckling Japanese investor who betrayed his activist ally, Takafumi Horie. Because Murakami sold his shares (to Horie, it would be discovered) while he was aware of Horie’s planned tender offer, Murakami violated Japan’s equivalent to 14e-3. 185 He was charged in 2006 and soon convicted of insider trading. His fund was fined ¥1.149 billion, worth about 10 million USD. 186 Murakami was personally sentenced to two years of hard labor. The lesson is clear: once you start down a road that ends in a tender offer, you must walk all the way together or else end up in trouble.

What may not be clear is why loyalty could have (presumably) protected Murakami from liability. After all, even if he bought shares as planned, Murakami would still have been buying while in position of tender offer information. 187 Absent an exemption, he would still be guilty of

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182 Working Group Recommendations with respect to the Insider Trading Regulations of Japan, WHITE & CASE, [http://www.whitecase.com/alerts-03142013-1/#.VCxQzSldWRM].
183 Japanese insider trading law is generally more restrictive of insiders and more tolerant of tippees. This suggests that some forms of tainting will be easier than others in Japan than in America, but that it will not be systematically out of line with U.S. experience.
184 Although cooperative from an ex ante perspective, cooperative tainting remains a strategic use of insider trading law, and one that may be strenuously resisted by its ex post victim whose preferred plans are curtailed.
185 Article 167 of the Securities Law.
unlawful insider trading.\textsuperscript{188} Given this expansiveness, how do rules like 14e-3 allow any coordination rather than outlaw it?

The answer emerges from 14e-3’s exemptions. Despite its reach, 14e-3 is not unlimited. Some people get to trade while they are aware of the tender offer. At a minimum, the tender offeror himself must be permitted to trade.\textsuperscript{189} Rule 14e-3 recognizes an exemption for offerors, and courts have interpreted the offeror exemption to cover both offering persons and co-offering persons.\textsuperscript{190} And the contours of this judicially created exception are almost perfectly suited to tamp down on wolf pack defections.\textsuperscript{191}

Insider trading law creates a narrow path of safety through a perilous realm, and thus channels investors to remain on the path. To see the exemption’s power as a commitment device, look to who precisely gets the co-offering person exemption. The 	extit{Valeant} court crafted a “fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry”\textsuperscript{192} by melding together an eight-factor test used by the

\textsuperscript{188} Specifically, it would seem that Murakami would be guilty of warehousing, which is tipping off allied purchasers to help stack the stockholder roles with sympathetic investors. See INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION § 7:4 (“[T]he practice of ‘warehousing’—which occurs when the bidder tips other persons about the bid and encourages them to purchase target company shares in an effort to get them into friendly hands—is unlawful under the rule.”). SEC Adopting Release at 60,412; Proposed Rule 14e–2 at 9976–77; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (noting that the SEC promulgated Rule 14e–3 to prevent warehousing). A court evaluating the Pershing Square/Valeant bid for Allergan actually granted a partial injunction against Pershing Square voting any shares, on the theory that there were “serious questions” about whether Pershing Square was entitled an offering person’s exemption, or instead was simply warehousing shares for the real offering person, Valeant. See Allergan, Inc. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., No. SACV 14-1214 DOC ANX, 2014 WL 5604539, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014), appeal dismissed (Dec. 4, 2014).

\textsuperscript{189} The SEC actually wished to ban trading by the bidder himself, but relented on this point. Tender Offers, 44 Fed.Reg. 9956, 9976–78, 9988 (Feb. 15, 1979) ("Proposed Rule 14e–2"); Tender Offers, 44 Fed.Reg. 70,326, 78,338 (Dec. 6, 1979) ("Proposed Rule 14e–3").

\textsuperscript{190} Allergan, Inc. v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., No. SACV 14-1214 DOC ANX, 2014 WL 5604539, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014) ("[T]he Court concludes from its review of the relevant statutory and regulatory text that the term ‘offering person’ can include multiple persons."). appeal dismissed (Dec. 4, 2014).

\textsuperscript{191} Coffee and Palia would actually push the law more fully in that direction. They propose “a bright-line rule: a hedge fund or other investor should not be deemed a ‘co-offering person’ (and thus exempt from insider trading rules), unless it joins fully in making the tender offer and has joint and several liability for its payment. This would preclude most hedge funds from making a modest contribution to the strategic bidder in return for advance knowledge of the bid—a tactic that is hard to distinguish from paying a bribe for a tip.” John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016). Under Coffee and Palia’s “full commitment” standard even minor defections from the wolf pack plan would expose the defector to criminal sanctions.

\textsuperscript{192} Allergan, Inc., 2014 WL 5604539 at *12.
SEC in a closely related context along with four additional factors appropriate for this particular legal context.

These ten factors are relevant to determining whether a person is a co-offering person:

1. The person’s “role in initiating, structuring, and negotiating the tender offer”
2. Whether the person is “acting together with the named bidder”
3. Whether person is “providing financing for the tender offer, or playing a primary role in obtaining financing?”
4. Whether “the person form[ed] the nominal bidder, or cause[d] it to be formed”
5. “Would the person beneficially own the securities purchased by the named bidder in the tender offer or the assets of the target company?”
6. The “extent to which [the] other party benefits from the transaction”
7. The person’s “control over the terms of the offer”
8. Their “control over the surviving entity”
9. Their “control over . . . the named bidder”
10. Their “identity with the named bidder”

Factors 1–6 were drawn from the SEC’s test for who must be disclosed as a “bidder” for 14D. Factors 7–10 were added to narrow the application of this test to fewer persons. The court accepted that the 14D bidder inquiry is meant to be cast widely to facilitate disclosure, whereas the 14e-3 exception for Co-Offering Persons ought to be narrow, to prevent too much informed trading.

Most of these factors hinge on extended cooperation with the other members of the activist group, and all of them may be proven in part through the testimony of the other members of the activist group. By tying the exemption to the cooperation and testimony of the activist group, courts have fashioned a test that encourages members of the group to hang together.

Consider the forms of defection discussed in the previous subsection. An investor who promises to buy shares with the group but instead sells them will not be invited to control the subsequent tender offer or control its

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194 Id. at *12. Several of the additional four factors echo the initial four. This suggests those four are the central factors. It also leaves us with a total of only ten factors.
195 Factors 7 and 10 also appear in the SEC’s list. Id.
196 Id. (Narrower test justified as “limiting the universe of persons permitted to trade on inside information only to the person making the tender offer”).
terms, and she can be excluded from any joint venture acquisition vehicle. Lacking shares at the time of the tender offer, she will not benefit from its effects. With these elements missing, the investor will likely not be considered a co-offering person and any bids in advance of the offer will violate 14c-3. 197

When Allergan accused Pershing Square of illegally trading with knowledge of Valeant’s tender offer, Pershing Square indeed argued that it should escape liability as a co-offering person. 198 The court found that there were “serious questions” about whether Pershing Square was indeed a co-issuing person because it lacked control over the offer price and did not retain any interest in the surviving entity. 199 If Pershing Square wanted to join in the tender offer gains, it could only do it by keeping a robust control and economic stake. Thus, even if investors see grounds for self-enrichment, the threat of insider trading liability gives them a reason to resolve their differences and pursue their common project.

In addition to these objective indicia, evidentiary factors are also important. If the difference between warehousing and co-offering seems vague, that only bolsters the power of tainting to support commitment. The testimony of the putative co-offering person or persons could prove helpful in distinguishing pernicious warehousing from virtuous co-offering. One gets less useful testimony from those who bear grudges. For both evidentiary and legal reasons, one’s co-offering partner has a partial veto over one’s trading options.

* * *

Insider tainting is viable and credible. It can be used by managers to covertly block takeovers, stilling the market for corporate control. Insider tainting lets managers circumvent antitakeover jurisprudence. The result is that corporate assets may remain under the control of ineffective managers, and shareholders lose out on potentially lucrative buyouts.

Shareholders likewise lose when acquirers face no competition. Insider tainting lets bidders knock out their competition and potentially buy a company for a song. They effectively circumvent federal laws meant to render the tender offer process fair, competitive and non-coercive.

Likewise, the use of tainting by wolf packs allows these activist groups to work in concert while circumventing the Williams Act’s regulation of concerted activism. We can be agnostic about whether the rise of wolf

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197 An investor who sets off on her own activist campaign might still benefit from the primary group’s tender offer, but no more than any other shareholder. Regardless, it is hard to imagine a “co-offeror” exemption applying to a competitor.


packs is good or bad and yet still be skeptical of this element of their arsenal. If the law would impose disclosure and other obligations on hedge funds coordinated through contract, it is a peculiar arbitrage to suspend those obligations when the coordinating law is instead insider trading law.

Whether or not insider tainting is always bad is an interesting question. For now, we proceed on the assumption that insider tainting is generally a problematic phenomenon. If that is so, it is worth asking how we can prevent it, and what it signifies about U.S. insider trading laws in general. It is to those questions that the final Part looks.

IV. CONSIDERING INSIDER TAINTING

We have seen that insider tainting is viable and credible. If we wish to control it, we must reduce its credibility, reduce its viability, or both. That is, we must either catch and punish those who engage in insider tainting, or we must protect those who are victimized by insider tainting, or both.

There are indeed some steps we might consider in both of those veins. However, both tasks are more difficult than they may appear. Part A. discusses possible modifications to the securities enforcement regime, highlighting both what might help and what is fraught with difficulty.

This discussion of solutions sets the stage for reflection on the deeper significance of insider tainting. It is a very strange thing that insider trading law can be misused in this way, and that it is not easy to right the ship. Ultimately, insider tainting is a window into the telos and praxis of information regulation. Part B undertakes these discussions.

A. Enforcement

Can insider tainting be controlled through appropriate exercise of the government’s prosecutorial and enforcement powers? Sub-section 1 describes the potential for preventing tainting through aggressive policing of its perpetrators. Sub-section 2 explores the role of lenience for tainting’s victims.

1. Punishing Perpetrators

It is difficult to prosecute tainters because much tainting is arguably legal under U.S. securities laws. For example, successful tainting cannot be prosecuted under Rule 10b-5 because that rule requires a purchase or sale, and successful tainting results in no purchase or sale. Congress could create an ad hoc offense targeting tainting, which does not require a

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200 If state and federal M&A law ever leads to inefficient results, then using insider tainting to circumvent the law could lead to more efficient results. If that occurs often, and if the circumvented law cannot be changed to accommodate these cases, then insider tainting could even be overall efficient.

201 Supra Part III.B.
purchase or sale, but it is presently difficult for prosecutors or plaintiffs to simply resolve to catch perpetrators of insider tainting.

If securities law is ill-suited to address insider tainting without modification, we might turn our attention to corporate law. Managers who disclose corporate secrets for inappropriate purposes violate the duty of loyalty, and states have long offered their own insider trading restrictions based on fiduciary theories. When tippers undermine corporate interests in order to protect their jobs, they should be liable under state corporate law.

The more interesting question concerns manager tainting efforts that are plausibly beneficial to the corporation. Like all takeover defenses, they might be useful in blocking a foolhardy or myopic acquirer, or in buying time to drum up other bids. One might think that some uses of insider tainting are reasonable and proportionate. However, insider tainting is not disclosed to shareholders, who therefore cannot evaluate its appropriateness. It is no great reach to argue that state corporate law should incorporate a per se ban on insider tainting.

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202 Congress did as much in prohibiting spoofing, which entails the placing of trading orders with the intent to cancel them prior to execution. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012). Effective spoofing may therefore involve no purchase or sale. See generally, John I. Sanders, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517, 519 (2016).


204 See In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del.Ch.1949) For discussion of cases both allowing and rejecting state law claims by the issuer against insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 78, § 15.3.


206 The fact that some of the simplest and most important fixes are obtained from corporate law, underscores the importance of trans-substantive analyses. See, e.g., James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116 (2017) (rejecting some distinctions between securities and corporate law, but embracing others).
Bidders do not owe fiduciary duties to the target company shareholders, so state corporate law is not a useful channel by which to restrain them. However, when bidders use insider tainting to deter or discipline other acquirers, this tactical choice is almost certainly appropriate for disclosure under the Williams Act. Anyone buying 5% or more of a stock must timely file with the SEC a detailed disclosure, including discussion of their intentions.\footnote{\textsection 240.13d-1(a).} It should not be controversial for the SEC and courts to deem 13D filings incomplete if they omit discussion of recourse to insider tainting. Similar disclosures are required, and should cover tainting, for the execution of a tender offer.

Yet legal restrictions—whether state or federal, corporate or securities—face information problems. Courts cannot discipline perpetrators without information about their efforts, and perpetrators will go to great lengths to conceal their conduct.

Further surveillance and evidentiary problems arise from the fact that victims of insider tainting will be reluctant to come forward. The victims of insider tainting will often be sophisticated traders and investors whose research practices may well push the boundaries of the law. To report tainting to the SEC, victims would necessarily admit to possessing material, non-public information and invite careful consideration of their practices. Victims’ reluctance to expose themselves to scrutiny by reporting a crime replicates in a white-collar context a phenomenon familiar to scholars of street crime and immigration law: in order to actually enforce the law in marginalized communities, law enforcement officials must assure victims that they are safe to report and cooperate.

This leads naturally to the question of how to assure the victims of insider tainting that they will not be punished for what they report, or the attention that it brings to them. We turn to that question now.

2. Protecting Victims

Prosecutors can attempt to allay the fears of the victims of insider tainting (that they might be prosecuted if they report their involvement with the tipper) by trying not to prosecute victims of insider tainting. But this policy will give little comfort to some tainted individuals; an individual prosecutor may not believe the victim that the tipping was unwanted. Even if all regulators exercised appropriate judgment, private plaintiffs would not. Insider trading gives rise to private actions under 10b-5.\footnote{For discussion of Rule 10b-5 private actions against insider trading defendants, see \textsc{Wang} \& \textsc{Steinberg}, supra note 79, chapter 6.} Entrepreneurial plaintiff’s lawyers are unlikely to restrain themselves if given the chance to pursue disgorgement.

We could institutionalize lenience toward victims of tainting, in order to make lenience credible and predictable.\footnote{We could expand this exemption to cover private suits as well.} Japan did as much, opting a safe harbor for victims of tainting in the tender offer context.
Japan has a law similar to SEC Rule 14e-3, which prohibits trading while in possession of information about a pending tender offer. The law provided that “[u]nder insider trading regulation . . . a recipient of unpublished Tender Offer Facts, in principle, cannot purchase shares of the offeree company until the offeror publishes the ‘Tender Offer Facts.’” A Working Group appointed by the Japanese securities regulator was concerned that these restrictions would inhibit the takeover market.

In June of 2013, the law was amended in a variety of ways to implement the proposals put forth by the Working Group. Among them were provisions added to address the possibility of insider tainting. The amended law gives tainted traders two ways to overcome the taint. First, they may disclose both the content of the tip as well as how they came to learn it.

Second, and more interestingly, they may wait six months. After that period, the trader may begin to trade again—though it seems that the tainted trader remains barred from making her own tender offers. The notion is that after six months, any inside information is likely to have lost its value. Consistent with the Japanese approach of listing certain types of information as per se material, we might say that this safe harbor deems certain stale information as per se immaterial. The SEC could adopt such a safe harbor as a partial solution. A trader who received any information—tender offer or otherwise—would be eligible to trade again after an appropriate period of time.

Yet such an approach is both under- and over-inclusive. It is over-inclusive in that it would supply a defense to traders who were not tainted. Dyed-in-the-wool insider traders would calibrate their conduct and litigation defenses to match any available safe harbor, fabricating earlier-in-time origin stories for any information obtained.

It is under-inclusive in that many victims of tainting will find a long delay interminable. Many reasons to buy or sell—an urgent need for liquidity, a sense that the stock is temporarily mispriced, the realization by many firms at the same time that acquiring a given supplier will give the acquirer a strategic edge—must be acted upon soon or not at all. This is particularly true in the case of competitive bidding. A target company is likely to be off the market six months after the auction would have begun.

Another form of systematic protection for victims would be to alter the knowledge or causation standard now used in insider trading law. Recall that one reason that tainting is possible is that victims cannot simply set aside the information tipped. Once tipped, they are aware of the

210 FIEA Article 167.
212 Article 167, Paragraph 5, Item 8 and 9 of the FIEA.
213 Article 167, Paragraph 5, Item 8 and 9 of the FIEA.
214 Supra Part II.A.
proscribed information, they are in knowing possession. Under the SEC’s awareness standard, the proscribed information need not actually cause any change in trading conduct, so information “set-aside” is still sufficient to create liability. Under a “use” standard, traders would not be liable for trading upon receipt of a tip if—as many victims will—they had ample reason to trade and would have done so anyway. Given the amount of debate surrounding this standard, it is natural to ask whether insider tainting offers a reason to reconsider the law’s causation standard.\footnote{Some of the arguments for a use standard include: (1) It gives proper attention to the importance of scienter, whereas a possession standard allows conviction of a defendant with no fraudulent or deceptive intent. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 1998). See also SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that “we do not believe that the SEC’s knowing possession test would always and inevitably be limited to situations involving fraud”). For scholars raising similar criticisms, see Kimberly D. Krawiec & Richard W. Painter, \textit{New SEC Regulations Attempt to Clarify Approach to Insider Trading}, 32 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1593, 1594 (Nov. 20, 2000); Stuart Sinai, \textit{A Challenge to the Validity of Rule 10b5-1}, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 261, 264–67, 271, 282 (2002); Carol B. Swanson, \textit{Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter}, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 196–99, 204 (2003); Kevin E. Warner, \textit{Rethinking Trades “on the Basis of” Inside Information: Some Interpretations of SEC Rule 10b5-1}, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 305–15 (2003). (2) By relieving prosecutors of the question of whether the trade was motivated in part by proscribed information—whether or not the defendant is allowed an affirmative defense—an awareness standard shifts significant burdens of proof onto the defendant, which is unacceptable in a criminal action and undesirable in a civil action. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).}

The most reasonable conclusion may not be a wholesale change of the causation standard, but a targeted change for tainted traders. Where there are credible allegations of insider tainting, the facts will often support some inference that the defendant was going to trade anyway, and this ought to be an effective affirmative defense.\footnote{Under \textit{Adler}, such an affirmative defense is already possible. \textit{Adler} at 1337. Likewise, Rule 10b5-1(c) recognizes its own affirmative defense. However, the formalities for that rule make it unworkable in a variety of tainting contexts. It operates if the trader has already entered into a binding contract to trade, or instructed someone to execute their trade, or adopted a written trading plan. The plan must specify the terms of a series of transactions to come and allow the trader no discretion to vary it. Such an affirmative defense is fine for executives who wish to buy or sell corporate stock at regular intervals, but it is plainly too restrictive for any of the M&A contexts described in this article.}

The main rationales in favor of a possession standard include easing the practical burden imposed by a use standard,\footnote{United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1993).} references to statutory
text, conformity with prior decisions, and consistency with the classical theory of insider trading. Most interestingly, Professor Fried argues that a possession standard is a logical fit with a regime that allows insiders to profitably abstain and cannot prevent them from doing so. Insiders are indeed hemmed in by a possession standard, blocked from trades they would otherwise make, but their losses from these trades approximately offset the relative gains they make from “insider abstentions.” That is, insiders can lawfully cancel trades in light of material, non-public information, averting losses. If we accept that insider abstentions are inevitable, but we do not want insiders to make above-market returns based on their knowledge, then a possession rule makes sense.

While accepting Professor Fried’s claims in general, we can say with confidence that it applies with less strength in the context of, and therefore in the shadow of, insider tainting. Fried’s point is that insiders already get a perk by virtue of their role—by learning about information adverse to their current trading plans, insiders can always abstain from trading and avoid the loss befalling the less informed masses. Our law does not seek to stop this behavior, nor could it easily do so. But the tax imposed by way of a knowing possession standard precisely offsets this perk. Traders who intended to trade will be unable to do so because of confirmatory but proscribed information. Fried shows that the expected value of abstention opportunities gained should approximately match the expected cost of trading opportunities lost, since news is just as likely to contradict one’s trading plans as to bolster them.

Such an outcome is not assured when strategic actors disseminate information to suit their own plans. A mogul in the business of buying operating companies for his or her conglomerate is not just as likely to be strategically gifted confirmatory and discouraging information. Strategic tippers will give only confirmatory information, which disables the investor

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218 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1, § 78t-1 (referring to “any person who violates [or has violated] any provision of this title or the rules or regulation thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information ....”), Compare DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION (West Group) (looseleaf) § 3.04, at 3–23. (arguing that this language is “an endorsement of the broader ["possession"] test for insider trading liability.”) with WILLIAM K.S. WANG AND MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1997) for the issue in private civil cases, see WANG & STEINBERG, §§ 4.1 & nn.14–16, 4.4.5, at 182–84 (arguing that “choice of the phrase ‘while in possession of’ could be either an endorsement of the broader standard or a refusal to choose between the two standards”).


222 Id. at 489.

223 Id.
from trading. Hostile buyers will be told of other pending tender offers, not about problems with the company that might slightly lower their valuation.

Likewise, tippers who would taint a blockholder on the verge of selling may not be told of secret value-increasing projects (at least not insofar as the tipper is acting strategically). Rather, the tip will be about pending devaluation, which makes the blockholder’s sale even more attractive and thus illegal. This is one way to interpret the facts of Mark Cuban’s run-in with Mamma.com.224

While recognizing a different causation standard for tainting than the rest of insider trading might appear ad hoc and complex, it is not unimaginable that the different economics of insider tainting warrant a subtly different rule. Professor Donna Nagy has already argued in this context that the standard—possession or use—should turn on the sort of insider trading. Professor Nagy argues that classical insiders, such as the directors of firms, owe broad disclosure duties and may not trade without disclosing all the material information that the shareholders might want to know; thus they are subject to a knowing possession standard.225 Various other actors, such as tippees, do not stand in a fiduciary relationship with their trading partners and so are subject to less stringent disclosure duties. For them, the appropriate standard really is the use rule. Insofar as this insider tainting arises in all insider trading contexts except classical theory trading by classical corporate insiders, it fits nicely with professor Nagy’s analysis. That is, the typical individuals inhibited by insider tainting are outsiders to the firm, such as would-be investors. These individuals do not owe fiduciary duties to other traders that would justify a possession standard. Thus, abusive information tainting can be reduced in a way that is consistent with the underlying logic of the main theories of insider trading.

There is a case to be made for a use standard in this context, but it comes with obvious risks. Intransigent insider traders will gin up stories about intentional tainting in order to avoid liability. It is an open question whether it is worth the effort and cost of vetting those claims to deal with this problem. And even victims of tainting may be making the best of it, by trading even more aggressively in light of their new information. Any safe harbor would have to prevent (or risk) licensing such post-taint insider trading.

**B. Learning from Tainting**

This Part broadens the view, asking what insider tainting might teach about the law of insider trading generally and, even more broadly, the regulation of information in markets.

1. **Competing Impulses in American Insider Trading Law**

   If insider trading is possible, and if it is hard to constrain, it serves to highlight the competing natures of U.S. insider trading law. On the one

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224 Supra note 1 and accompanying text.

225 Nagy, supra note __ at 1135.
hand, the law is pro-defendant. Rule 10b-5 applies only to purchases and sales. Our law generally allows insider trading in most assets, and it blocks insider trading in securities only when we can implicate the trader with some kind of fraud and, usually, breach of a duty. This tolerant attitude differs from the approach of other jurisdictions. Japanese and European law have long barred trading in any financial asset, while possessing essentially any informational advantage.

This pro-defendant strain of insider trading law may reflect American solicitude toward white collar criminals, our commitment to robust capital markets, suspicion of lawyer-driven private litigation, or the path dependency of our common law rule making. It also may reflect a legacy of toleration of insider trading. Informed trading has not been morally or legally proscribed until the SEC took up the cause in the early 1960s, and it was only thirty years ago that the words “insider trading” appeared in a statute for the first time.

Yet while the substance of our law has often favored defendants, American insider trading law remains a fearsome creature in terms of its penalties and potential for enforcement. Dozens of traders each year are investigated for trading on the basis of proscribed information, resulting in a multitude of civil enforcement actions. Since 2009, more than 80 traders have been criminally convicted by federal prosecutors in Manhattan alone. The law authorizes double-digit prison terms and multi-million dollar fines. The litigation process is expensive and can impose interim

226 Supra Part II.A.
228 HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING IN THE STOCK MARKET at 1. See also Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where Is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 349 (2013) (“From the SEC’s founding in 1934 to Chairman Cary’s groundbreaking 1961 decision in Cady, Roberts—a span of twenty-seven years—the SEC brought no insider trading cases at all. Over the subsequent twenty years, insider trading continued to be a relatively low prosecution priority in terms of the number of cases at the agency ...”). But see Perino.
229 See supra note 69.
230 Supra note 65.
231 Supra note 66.
232 Id.
233 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Providing for not more than $5 million fines, 20 years imprisonment, or both, for any willful violation of the Exchange Act or any rule thereunder). See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 79, § 7.2.1
harm on a defendant’s reputation and business. In addition, the harshness of penalties and the indirect impact of an enforcement action impose a chilling aura over conduct anywhere near the line of legality.

And it is often unclear where the line is. No statute or rule defines “insider trading,” leaving defendants without the sort of notice normally expected for potentially criminal acts. In most cases where the SEC has offered guidance, it has done so in ways disadvantageous to defendants. For example, it has instituted an awareness standard for the causal inquiry of whether a trade was “on the basis of” material non-public information. Most other jurisdictions have rejected this approach. Likewise, the SEC has defined tender offer insider trading in such a way that traders need not even know all the elements of their alleged offense.

Although critics have decried both American harshness and American lenience, the equilibrium may have proven stable because it struck a palatable balance: much is permitted, but violators are in hot water.

Yet it is this combination of hot and cold that makes insider tainting possible. Numerous accommodations protect those who tip for tainting purposes: the purchaser/seller requirement protects successful tainting efforts, the personal benefit requirement allows much loyal tipping, etc. With so many safe harbors, actual and bluffing tainting efforts are credible. Yet they are also meaningful to the victim. Insider trading law is harsh and expansive, covering even those lacking in bad intent. Without any sort ofgood faith defense, prudent tippees may wisely abstain from planned trades. The features that make the law so effective against genuinely bad actors also make it a dangerous threat to innocent tippees.

America’s securities laws have developed in fits and spurts, emerging from partial congressional action, a patchwork of rules, and the accretion of federal court decisions (and the shadow of them). Even if not ideal, it appears defensibly workable much of the time. However, increasingly sophisticated market participants are likely to continue to test its boundaries and kinks. At some point, we may decide that the time has come for the hard work of agreeing upon a unified, clear, statutory scheme for this domain.

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234 Several efforts to define the act were introduced since *Newman* but none received substantial support. S.702 - Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act; H.R. 1173 - Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015; and H.R.1625 - Insider Trading Prohibition Act.


236 *Supra* Part II.

237 *Id.*

238 *Id.*

2. The Nature of Information

Arguably the most important development in economics in recent decades has been a heightened focus on information. Three pioneers of information economics, a field focused on strategic action under conditions of imperfect information, were crowned with the Nobel Prize in 2001.

Much of the literature, particularly as it comes to inform the law, presumes that additional information is a good thing, both for the recipient and for society in general. Scholars have praised the use of information disclosures to protect consumers. Our federal securities regulation regime is principally a regime of mandatory disclosure of information to the public. We hope and expect that, as a result of these disclosures and other market dynamics, securities markets will be largely efficient, with prices reflecting all publicly available information.

And, of course, information plays a central role in shaping the regulation of informed trading—in both securities markets and ordinary contract markets. We wish to encourage individuals to develop knowledge about assets and to contribute that knowledge to the public good. Allowing trading profits is one way to encourage research and dissemination. On the other hand, informed traders increase trading costs and lower liquidity for all other traders, widening spreads and potentially lowering the informativeness of prices. Both our securities law of insider trading and our contract doctrine of mistake are attempts to balance these two competing information paradigms.

Anthony Kronman’s seminal paper provides the simplest formula for how the law should balance the right to informed trading against the...

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240 Speech by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke at the Conference Co-Sponsored by The Center for Economic Policy Studies and The Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 2010 WL 3726649, at *5 (“[O]ne of the most important developments in economics over recent decades has been the flowering of information economics.”). Myriad law & economics papers apply game theoretic models of information asymmetry to predict behavior and propose improved law in light of incentives. See, e.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 88 (2014).


245 Id.

obligation of disclosure. He argued that the law should allow trading based on information that was deliberately acquired (in order to encourage such acquisition) but bar trading based on information that was casually acquired, either by chance or as an inevitable consequence of their career. This theory helps explain, for example, why diligent analysts are permitted to trade on the secrets they discover but corporate executives are not permitted to take their company’s juicy secrets home for evening time trading. It also helps validate the sentiment—not actually reflected in U.S. law—that “a businessman who acquires a valuable piece of information when he accidentally overhears a conversation on a bus” should not be able to trade on that information. The businessman presumably does not need any trade-based incentive to ride the bus to work. A law against trading based on bus-acquired secrets might make the bus a bit less fun for him, “although it would certainly be strange if he stopped riding buses altogether,” and so it is unlikely to greatly warp his incentives.

Kronman’s approach has been very influential, though subsequent scholars have criticized Kronman’s formulation, and problematized the distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information by pointing out the ability of traders to deliberately put themselves into a position to acquire information.

The possibility of insider tainting goes further in problematizing the deliberate/casual distinction by highlighting an underlying linkage between these two paths for obtaining information: casually acquired information is just information that was not deliberately avoided. We can think of it as deliberately acquired information with a negative coefficient.

To return to Kronman’s example of the bus rider, a rule barring trades while in possession of material, non-public information might indeed lead some individuals to avoid the bus, at least on the days when those individuals are about to execute a major trade. And individuals who could

\[\text{Note 248: Id. at 14.}\]
\[\text{Note 249: Id. at 14.}\]
\[\text{Note 250: See, e.g., United States v. Dial, 757, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Kronman in analyzing informed trades by a broker).}\]
\[\text{Note 251: For an example of criticism, see Wang & Steinberg, supra note 79, § 2.2.2 & nn.30–32. Responding to these criticisms (sometimes their own), subsequent scholars have provided more complex versions of Kronman’s core insight. See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1645 (2003) (developing a “multi stranded rule that should govern disclosure in contract law”); Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure Of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20, (1994) (Emphasizing the power of forced disclosure to discourage socially wasteful research).}\]
\[\text{Note 252: See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 330 (noting that investors skill, wealth, and human capital differences results in different abilities to use the information they discover); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443,478 (2001) (pointing out that individuals might opt to become an executive in order to acquire information).}\]
Kronman presumably doubts that buses traffic in enough secrets for either effect to matter, but insider tainting upsets that assumption. Within the set of casually acquired information is information that others endeavored to deliver. If there is an incentive to taint certain traders, tippers may well seek out their bus route (or email address or cell phone number) in order to frustrate their trading plans. This fact gives potential victims a reason to invest in protective efforts, meaning that the possibility of strategic tainting will affect investor behavior.

The possibility of insider tainting does indeed alter incentives for potential victims. Just as individuals can deliberately situate themselves to casually acquire information, they can deliberately situate themselves to avoid casual acquisition. Tainting parties are most likely to wish to taint traders with independent reasons to trade, typically with the victim’s own private information justifying the trade. Insider tainting will therefore tend to occur where individuals have invested in information, and it will act to reduce the value of that information ex post. From an ex ante perspective, potential victims will invest less in information development if they know that the law may later force them to sit on the sidelines.

And as a trader’s preferred moment of execution occurs, the trader gains an incentive to plug their ears. She may opt to avoid taking calls or emails, at least from anonymous sources, lest a pre-planned trade become invalid by virtue of new, casually acquired information. Yet these self-protective efforts further limit the flow of information. An activist hedge fund might instruct its employees not to take calls or open email from employees of the issuer firm. This would help to protect the firm from tainting, but it would limit the research and engagement that makes activist investment useful to begin with. Tuning out market information before a trade is hardly the optimal behavior for the market’s best informed traders.

In the presence of insider trading law, casually acquired information can harm diligently informed traders. This effect is not random. It grows as the trader spends more resources on research, because of the strategic element of insider tainting. In light of insider tainting, insider trading law acts as a tax on diligently acquired information. This complicates the tradeoffs involved in the regulation of information in markets, rendering our tradeoffs far more dynamic than previously assumed. In light of the importance of information to law and scholarship these days, substantial attention is therefore warranted.

**CONCLUSION**

Many would-be traders are grateful to receive material, non-public information; many tippers share information to help the tippee or to earn their gratitude. If there were no laws banning insider trading, almost all tipping would involve mutually consensual transfers. Indeed, our insider
trading laws are predicated on the notion that enthusiastic tipping dyads would ignore the public interest.

Nevertheless, insider trading law may sometimes lead to more tipping precisely because of the way that the law is structured. Rather than simply removing informational advantages, American insider trading law pushes informed traders to abstain altogether. That may leave the recipients worse off than they started. Thus, informational disclosure becomes a method for constructing legal barriers to the tippee’s action.

Tainting with inside information is a viable strategy because of the many ways that tippers can elude responsibility for their disclosures, and because tippees are unable to protect themselves from tainting. They cannot simply abstain from fraud or refuse to pay bribes for tips. Insider trading law is invoked if the tippee is told the magic words that someone else breached a duty to get this tip to them. And having heard those words, the trader cannot just disregard the information, because they will remain aware of it. Tainting casts a cloud even in the many cases where a clear-sighted judge would actually acquit the trader based on the facts, simply because the facts and law are not always clear. Traders may fear that prosecutors, plaintiffs, or judges may see things differently than they are.

There are a number of fact patterns in which tippers may find insider tainting attractive. Executives working at an issuer company might use tainting as a strategy for deterring undesirable acquirers—whether for the company’s benefit or for their own. Competing traders or investors might use tainting to temporarily eliminate their competitors in an acquisition or at a trading desk. Cooperative traders might likewise use insider trading law to buttress their planned collective investment strategy.

It is difficult to craft solutions to insider tainting that do not open the door wide enough for many ordinary insider trading defendants to fit through. Without stronger evidence on the extent of insider tainting, it may not be appropriate to take those steps. Still, insider tainting serves as a useful vehicle to think about what our insider trading regime costs and how it works. It is not just that insider trading law is vague or punishes selfish but not obviously destructive conduct; it also serves as a weapon for strategic actors to wield against one another.