ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES

Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic

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ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES

Response to the Periodic Report of the United States to the
United Nations Human Rights Committee

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INTRODUCTION

Only a small fraction of the legal problems experienced by low-
income and poor people living in the United States—less than one in
five—are addressed with the assistance of legal representation.1 Many
who are low-income and poor in the United States cannot afford legal
representation to protect their rights when facing a crisis such as
eviction, foreclosure, domestic violence, workplace discrimination,
and child custody.2 There is no federal constitutional right to counsel in
civil cases,3 and the primary mechanism for providing civil legal
services to people who are poor and low-income is underfunded and
severely restricted. The result is a crisis in unmet civil legal needs that
disproportionately harms racial minorities, women, and non-English
speakers. Concerned with the United States’ human rights record in this
regard, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Human Rights Committee has
asked the United States to provide it with information on steps it has
taken to improve legal representation in civil proceedings, in particular
for litigants belonging to racial, ethnic, and national minorities,4 and to
improve legal representation for women victims of domestic violence.5

Many U.S. states have taken important steps to provide counsel in
certain civil cases for people who are poor and low-income,6 yet the
rights and services established at the state level are patchwork. Owing
to a variety of factors (one of the most substantial being funding
limitations), there is great variability in the availability and delivery
of civil legal assistance services, resulting in uneven dispersal of services
both between and within states, such that access in some states to the
full range of civil assistance depends on geography and luck.7 Also,
programs that look similar on their face may differ in their operation.8

2. See generally Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:
What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORUM FOR
LAW. 1, 67 (2010).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court has found a right to counsel in criminal cases. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring counsel be appointed for indigent defendants in
state court facing imprisonment due to felony charges); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) (requiring counsel for indigent defendants in state court facing imprisonment due to
misdemeanor charges). In fact, the Court has created a presumption against appointing
counsel in any civil case where physical liberty is not in the balance. Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding no categorical right to counsel when termination of
parental rights is at stake). And, it has refused to find a categorical right to counsel even in
some civil cases where lengthy jail sentences are, in fact, imposed. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
 Ct. 2507 (2011) (finding no categorical right to counsel for indigent convicted felons facing
jail time for failing to pay child support, at least where the plaintiff is neither the state nor
represented by counsel).
of the United States of America, Adopted by the Committee at its 107th Session, Mar. 11-28,
5. Id. at ¶ 20.
6. See infra Part III.
Infrastructure Mapping Project, AM. BAR FOUND. 9-11 (Oct. 7, 2011),
_t_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf.
8. Id. at 12.
The result is that significant and increasing numbers of litigants must navigate the court system without a lawyer because they are unable to afford legal representation. A large percentage of people who are represented in fact qualify for federal or state funded legal aid but do not receive it due to the limited resources for legal providers.

Though more research in this area is needed, studies indicate that lack of legal representation dramatically impairs the ability of low-income people to effectively navigate the court system and attain successful outcomes. Represented parties enjoy statistically more favorable results in housing, family law, and small claims cases. Those who are represented by an attorney before administrative agencies governing such vital issues as social security, unemployment, and immigration also have a higher success rate—in some cases up to two or three times higher—than those who are unrepresented in comparable cases.

Lack of access to civil counsel disparately impacts racial minorities, women, and other vulnerable groups. Racial minorities and women are overly represented among people who qualify for civil legal assistance. State-level studies on access to justice indicate that such groups make up a disproportionate number of litigants without representation. In New York City family and housing courts, for example, the vast majority of litigants without representation are racial minorities. Similarly, in Pennsylvania family courts, most low-income litigants, who include a disproportionate number of racial minorities and women, lack representation. Further illustrating the intersection of race and gender, a California study found that about eighty-five percent of litigants appearing in family court without an attorney were women, and the majority of them were women of color. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recognized this problem when it expressed concerns over the disparate impact that lack of counsel in civil cases has on racial and ethnic minorities in the United States.

Lack of representation in civil cases is especially problematic for immigrants in removal proceedings. Although federal law provides that...
defendants in immigration removal proceedings may not be denied the ability to be represented by retained counsel, there is no statute directing the federal government to pay for such counsel in these cases, leaving many who cannot afford it without representation. Federal law also does not provide for counsel for unaccompanied immigrant children and immigrants with serious mental disabilities. A federal district court recently held that federal law requires the government to provide counsel for those with serious psychiatric disorders that render them incompetent to represent themselves in immigration proceedings. Nevertheless, a staggering eighty-four percent of detained noncitizens in proceedings before immigration courts lack counsel. In removal proceedings, representation can have a substantial impact on whether a person is able to remain in the country. For example, one study in New York found that seventy-four percent of non-detained immigrants with counsel prevailed in their cases, compared to only thirteen percent of non-detained immigrants without counsel.

The United States acknowledges the many inequalities that stem from the absence of a civil right to counsel. Yet in its Fourth Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee, the United States nevertheless contends that several federal mechanisms and initiatives, including the federal Legal Services Corporation, the Department of Justice’s Access to Justice Initiative, and federal statutory fee waiver provisions, bring the United States into compliance with its obligations to provide equal access to justice under article fourteen of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). In its response to the committee’s List of Issues, the United States reiterates the importance of the Access to Justice Initiative. These federal mechanisms and initiatives, however, fall far short of addressing the civil justice gap in the United States and ensuring equality before the courts and fair trials, as required by article fourteen.

In order to meet its human rights obligations, the federal government must work toward the establishment of the right to counsel for indigent litigants in civil cases, especially where basic human needs are at stake. Direct steps the federal government should take include: supporting research into the impact of providing counsel in civil cases; fully funding the Legal Services Corporation and lifting restrictions that prevent legal services lawyers from providing necessary services; intensifying the Access to Justice Initiative’s activities with respect to civil legal services and providing it with the necessary leadership and resources; and filing supportive amicus briefs when the right to counsel is litigated in federal and state courts. The federal government should also support and coordinate efforts to establish a civil right to counsel at the state level and introduce and support legislation to create a right to counsel in civil cases where liberty interests or fundamental needs are at stake, including in immigration proceedings.

I. THE UNITED STATES HAS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO ENSURE MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES

In ratifying the ICCPR, the United States obligated itself to ensure meaningful access to justice, including meaningful access to counsel in civil cases where the interests of justice so require.

Article fourteen of the ICCPR guarantees procedural fairness, providing in relevant part that “all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals,” and that “[i]n the determination of . . . his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

Article two of the ICCPR establishes that each state is bound by the treaty to undertake “[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy.” Article twenty-six of the ICCPR reiterates the guarantee of non-discrimination.

As articulated by the Human Rights Committee, these protections include the right to counsel in certain civil cases. General Comment thirty-two clarifies that article fourteen’s guarantee of equality before the law encompasses access to the legal system, including access to counsel in civil cases:

Access to administration of justice must effectively be guaranteed in all such cases to ensure that no individual is deprived, in procedural terms, of his/her right to claim justice . . . . The availability or absence of legal assistance often determines whether or not a person can access the relevant proceedings or participate in them in a meaningful way . . . . States are encouraged to provide free legal aid in [non-criminal cases], for individuals who do not have sufficient means to pay for it. In some cases, they may even be obliged to do so.”

The Human Rights Committee has, on numerous occasions, noted concern over states’ failure to provide counsel in various types of civil cases. For example, in its Concluding Observations regarding the Czech Republic’s compliance with the Covenant, the committee noted with concern that, in order to rectify the problem of discrimination in housing faced by the Roma, the Czech Republic should “provide legal aid for victims of discrimination.”

In commenting on Sweden’s

33. ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 14.
34. Id. at art. 2(3)(a).
35. Id. at art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”).
40. With regard to Switzerland, the committee recommended that “[t]he State party should review its legislation in order to grant free legal assistance to asylum-seekers during all asylum procedures, whether ordinary or extraordinary.” Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations—Switzerland, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SUI/CO/3 (Nov. 3, 2009). With regard to El Salvador, the Committee recommended that the government “ensure that persons subject to deportation proceedings benefit from an effective right to be heard, to have an adequate defence and to request that their case be reviewed by a competent authority.” Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations—El Salvador, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6 (Nov. 10, 2010).
minorities, women, and migrants. As these experts note, meaningful access to civil counsel is a lynchpin to many other rights. As the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty recently commented in the context of people living in poverty,

[lack of legal aid for civil matters can seriously prejudice the rights and interests of persons . . . for example when they are unable to contest tenancy disputes, eviction decisions, immigration or asylum proceedings, eligibility for social security benefits, abusive working conditions, discrimination in the workplace or child custody decisions.

Most recently, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers noted in her March 2013 report to the General Assembly that “[l]egal aid is an essential component of a fair and efficient justice system founded on the rule of law,” and that “[i]t is also a right in itself and an essential precondition for the exercise and enjoyment of a number of human rights,” including the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective remedy, the right to liberty and security of person, the right to equality before the courts and tribunals, and the right to counsel. The special rapporteur emphasized that the right to free

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49. Id. at ¶ 28.

50. Id. at ¶ 27.

51. Id. at ¶ 35.


53. Id.

54. 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, ¶ 26 (1979) ("[The right to fair trial] may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either because legal representation is rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case.")

counsel, stating a goal to “dedicate every effort” to “[a]dequate provision for all persons to have due legal aid in order to secure their rights.”56 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has reinforced this view, noting that states can be obligated to provide free civil legal services to those without means in order to prevent a violation of their right to fair trial and judicial protection.57

II. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FAILS TO MEET ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

In its report to the Human Rights Committee, the United States acknowledges the inequities that exist within the justice system for individuals who are unable to afford civil representation, conceding that “neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal statutes provide a right to government-appointed counsel in civil cases.”58 The report goes on to discuss a number of federal initiatives designed to mitigate the lack of a civil right to legal representation and that close the justice gap for people who are low income and poor. The primary federal initiatives and mechanisms the report mentions for addressing these inequities are the Legal Services Corporation, the Access to Justice Initiative, and the in forma pauperis statute. While the United States report touted these provisions to enhance access to justice, they fail to adequately respond to the justice gap, and particularly its disparate impact on minorities and women.

A. The Legal Services Corporation Is Underfunded and Restricted

In its report to the Human Rights Committee, the United States highlights the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") as a key component in its efforts to improve civil litigants’ abilities to access equal justice.59 LSC was created by Congress in 1974 as an independent nonprofit corporation to promote equal access to justice and provide grants for civil legal assistance to low-income Americans.60 The federal legislation authorizing LSC noted that Congress was acting in response to its finding that “there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation” and that “there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel.”61 Congress also emphasized its desire that LSC be independent, that the lawyers in the program “have full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients,” and that the United States would continue to give “the program the support it needs in order to become a permanent and vital part of the American system of justice.”62 Yet, due to chronic underfunding and a barrage of restrictions, LSC has fallen short of its initial promise.

1. LSC Is Severely Underfunded

Over the past several years, LSC has been hit with massive cuts to its congressional appropriations, ninety percent of which it distributes to 134 independent civil legal aid programs.63 Congressional appropriations for LSC have steadily decreased over the past several years, from $420 million in 2010 to $341 million in 2013.64 While these numbers are stark, they do not accurately illustrate the real scope of the federal government’s decreasing support for LSC. Accounting for inflation and measured in 2012 dollars, the appropriations for LSC in 2013 are approximately forty percent of what they were at the height of LSC funding in 1979.65 These decreases are of particular concern as they come at a time of economic crisis, when more and more Americans are falling below federal poverty guidelines and are in more need of civil legal services than ever before.66 Legal services providers report being flooded with a huge increase in clients seeking legal assistance for

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58. Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 29, at ¶ 301.
59. Id. at ¶ 302.
62. Id. § 2996(6); see also Special Message from Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, to the Congress Proposing Establishment of a Legal Services Corporation (May 5, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2998.
64. LSC Funding, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/lsc-funding [hereinafter LSC Funding] (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). In September 2012, Congress allocated $350 million to LSC for fiscal year 2013. Id. This was eventually reduced to $341 million due to sequestration in late March 2013. Id.
66. Civil Legal Services: Low-Income Clients Have Nowhere to Turn Amid the Economic Crisis, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 1, http://brennan3cdn.net/ed5d84dfc6f63b02a_exm0b5yv.pdf [hereinafter Civil Legal Services] (last updated June 25, 2010).
more severe legal problems. The recession has also affected LSC grantees' non-federal sources of funding, leaving devastating holes in the budgets of LSC-funded organizations. Interest on Lawyer Trust Account ("IOLTA") programs are the largest national source of civil legal funding after LSC grants, amounting to thirteen percent of funding for LSC-funded organizations in 2008 and serving as an even more critical source for programs that do not receive LSC funds. The economic recession resulted in a massive decline in interest rates and a consequent decrease in revenues that IOLTA uses to fund legal services organizations. From 2007 to 2009, IOLTA revenues decreased seventy-five percent, from $371 million to just $92 million.

These funding decreases leave gaping holes in the budgets for civil legal services that affect the number of cases they pursue and the resources they provide. Due to funding reductions since 2010, LSC has been forced to eliminate more than 1000 staff positions and more than thirty offices.

As a result, LSC and its grantees have been unable to meet current demands for their civil legal services. Programs funded by LSC provide legal assistance to more than 2.3 million people, seventy percent of whom are women. However, nearly one in five Americans meets the federal poverty guidelines that qualify them for civil legal assistance by LSC, a population that now numbers over 60.4 million, which is a 3.6 million increase from 2010 to 2011. This number is expected to increase to 66.6 million in 2013, an increase of 35.1% since 2005. A disproportionately high number of individuals that meet the federal poverty guidelines are racial minorities and women. Further, in 2008, an estimated 25.3 million of those eligible for LSC funding (almost half of those eligible) faced a civil legal problem.

LSC-funded programs have nowhere near the funding and resources necessary to respond to this need. According to the LSC's 2009 report Documenting the Justice Gap in America, "for every client served by an LSC-funded program, one person who seeks help is turned down because of insufficient resources." This means that LSC-funded organizations are forced to reject nearly one million cases because they lack the funding to handle them. According to LSC's report, "state legal needs studies conducted from 2000 to 2009 generally indicate that less than one in five low-income persons get the legal assistance they need."

These numbers may underestimate the problem. Moreover, the last accurate measurement of LSC's ability to address the justice gap was conducted in 2009, before the economic recession pushed an ever-growing number of Americans below the federal poverty line.

2. LSC Grantees Are Unduly Restricted

LSC-funded organizations are also constrained in their ability to meet the legal needs of low-income and poor clients because of restrictive federal rules governing who may receive their legal services and the kinds of legal services they may provide.

LSC bases its eligible population on the federal poverty level threshold as established by the federal poverty guidelines and, thus, serves clients who are at or below 125% of the poverty line, which for a family of four in 2013 amounted to an income of $29,438 a year. While these income thresholds limit the number of individuals qualified

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67. Id.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
72. LSC Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
76. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 58 (2010); Sandefur, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that more recent studies among low income populations in specific states or communities have often found even higher rates of the incidence).
77. Levi Press Release, supra note 73.
78. Documenting the Justice Gap, supra note 1, at 1.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Civil Legal Services, supra note 66, at 1.
to receive legal assistance, federal provisions further restrict the eligible population for LSC-funded organizations. One such restriction prohibits the use of any funds to represent the vast majority of undocumented and other categories of immigrants. There are some narrow exceptions to this prohibition. For instance, LSC-funded organizations may represent immigrants who are lawful permanent residents, who are married to, the parent of, or the unmarried minor child of a U.S. citizen, or who have been granted a certain recognized status. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act also permit organizations to use non-LSC funding to represent undocumented individuals who have been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent, as well as undocumented individuals whose children have been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty. However this representation must be "directly related to the prevention of, or obtaining relief from, the battery or cruelty."

Federal restrictions also prohibit LSC-funded organizations from representing incarcerated individuals in any civil litigation or administrative challenges to the conditions of incarceration. An LSC-funded organization may not be involved in any litigation involving abortion or defend someone in public housing eviction cases if the person threatened with eviction has been charged or convicted with a drug crime related to the sale, distribution, or manufacture of a controlled substance, and the public agency asserts that this drug charge or conviction threatens the health or safety of other tenants or employees.


84. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5; Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 2 (describing eligibility for representation for aliens who have been granted asylum, refugee status, conditional entrant status, withholding of deportation, or status as H-2A non-immigrant temporary agricultural workers).


86. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4(2).

87. See Restrictions on Legal Assistance with Respect to Criminal Proceedings, 45 C.F.R. § 1613; Restrictions on Actions Collaterally Attacking Criminal Convictions, 45 C.F.R. § 1615; Representation of Prisoners, 45 C.F.R. § 1637; see also Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 5.

88. Restriction on Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and Mercy Killing, 45 C.F.R. § 1643; Restriction on Representation in Certain Eviction Proceedings, 45 C.F.R. § 1633; see also Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 5-6.

When civil legal services organizations accept federal funding from LSC, they also face a number of restrictions on the type of legal work and advocacy they may perform. LSC grantees may not engage in the political process through advocacy or representation before legislative bodies on pending or proposed legislation; nor may they represent clients or client interests in front of administrative agencies that direct rulemaking. Federal restrictions forbid conducting or participating in grassroots lobbying and prohibit LSC-funded groups from establishing "training programs to advocate particular public policies or political activities or to train people to engage in restricted activities." LSC-funded organizations "cannot initiate, participate, or engage in class actions." This restriction impedes the efficiency of LSC-funded attorneys: They cannot represent large numbers of people in a single action, but must instead bring many different cases regarding the same wrong.

The LSC appropriations legislation further restricts and limits the activities of LSC grantees by extending the federal restrictions to all the grantees' activities, even those fully financed with non-LSC funding. This provision has been called the "poison pill restriction" due to the impediments it places on the legal tools and activities available to organizations that take a single dollar of LSC funding. For example, in Maryland, where LSC funding accounts for only 16% of total funding, restrictions nonetheless impact 100% of the practice. According to a 2009 report, nationwide, this restriction annually inhibits

89. Restrictions on Lobbying and Certain Other Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 1612; see also Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 3-4 (also describing the one exception where, if approached by a government body with the request, an LSC-funded organization may use non-LSC funds to respond to a written request for information or testimony regarding legislation or rulemaking, and may "participate in a public comment in a rulemaking proceeding").

90. 45 C.F.R. § 1612; see also Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 4.

91. Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 6; see also 45 C.F.R. § 1612.

92. Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 4; see also Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617. It is worth noting that the United States, in its Report to the Human Rights Committee, champions class-actions as a way in which legal representation has been made more affordable for indigent defendants. Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 29, at ¶ 301 ("The Supreme Court has thus recognized a right for groups to 'unite to assert their legal rights as effectively and economically as practicable'.")

93. Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 45 C.F.R. § 1610; see also Houseman & Perle, supra note 83, at 4.


over $490 million of state, local, and private funding, which is fifty-eight percent of the resources of LSC grantees. 96 It also "deters non-federal spending on legal services" by "deny[ing] state, local, and private funders control over how their money is spent." 97 In order to escape these federal restrictions on non-federal funding sources, LSC recipients must set up affiliate or separate entities and transfer the non-LSC funds to these new organizations for use in federally restricted activities. 98 These funding acrobatics to "unrestrict" non-federal money waste scarce resources by requiring the creation of inefficient, duplicative organizations, further limiting the funding available to civil legal services. 99

President Obama and the United States Senate Appropriations Committee have advocated the repeal of restrictions on LSC funding, including the poison pill provision. This effort made some progress in 2010, when the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate voted to remove restrictions on LSC grantees claiming, collecting, and retaining attorney fee awards. 100 However, the President’s and Senate’s efforts to repeal the poison pill restriction in the 2011 appropriations bill failed. Despite President Obama’s recent exhortations to Congress to repeal the poison pill provisions, the broad restrictions on non-LSC funds remain.

These federal restrictions severely limit the independence and flexibility of LSC grantees. They also undermine efforts to effect systemic change through strategies that extend beyond direct legal services to political participation and community outreach and education. Congress’ current, restrictive treatment of LSC-funded organizations thus falls far short of its original vision of a legal services funder that provides rigorous, critical, and independent civil legal support to address the vast justice gap in this country.

B. The Access to Justice Initiative Lacks the Resources and Capacity that Are Necessary to Fulfill Its Mandate Regarding Civil Legal Assistance

The United States’ Fourth Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee champions the new Access to Justice Initiative (“ATJI”) in

96 Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, A Call to End Federal Restrictions on Legal Aid for the Poor, BRENNA THEM COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE I (2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/7e05061ce505311545_75m6ivw3x.pdf.
97 Id.
99 Diller & Savner, supra note 96, at 1.

101 Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 29, at § 318.
104 Access to Justice Initiative Mission, supra note 102.
employment. And LAIR has worked with the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs and the Office of Tribal Justice Support to facilitate the development of Medical-Legal Partnerships, which allow vulnerable individuals to receive medical support and legal assistance at the same time.

In addition, the ATJI has introduced AmeriCorps VISTA, the U.S. federal government’s national service program designed to fight poverty, to legal services organizations and has provided guidance for legal services organizations interested in sponsoring a VISTA project at their site. The ATJI has also collaborated with other organizations and agencies to improve access to legal services and, importantly, is working to create an independent structure to produce research about legal aid, the dimensions and drivers of unmet legal needs, and the relative effectiveness of delivery of legal services.

Nevertheless, the ATJI faces significant constraints. Currently, the ATJI is operating at limited capacity without a permanent senior counselor and with insufficient staffing. At a point when the ATJI had a high profile senior counselor, the initiative appeared to have influence as a “bully pulpit,” as illustrated by Lawrence Tribe’s call for the institution of an Access to Justice Commission in every state in his 2010 speech to the Annual Conference of Chief Justices. The judges present responded with a resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices in support of Access to Justice Commissions. It has been over one year since Mark Childress, Lawrence Tribe’s successor, left the post of Senior Counselor to become Deputy Chief of Staff at the White House. To date, only an acting senior counselor fills the role. The appointment of an accomplished successor to the role of senior counselor would enable the ATJI to enhance its influence. Moreover, the ATJI currently functions with approximately five staff members, and does not possess the capacity to engage in its own research or analysis, to disseminate best practices, or to engage extensively in public education efforts to raise awareness around the importance of civil legal assistance in the

106. Holder Remarks at Shriver Center Awards Dinner, supra note 105, at 5.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 8.

2014]

Access to Justice

United States.

C. The Federal In Forma Pauperis Provision Is Discretionary, Its Requirements Are Hard to Meet, and Appointments Under the Statute Are Extremely Rare

The federal in forma pauperis statute is another mechanism that the United States identifies as closing the justice gap for people in poverty and "ensur[ing] that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts." The in forma pauperis statute provides that a court can request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel. Yet this is simply an option for the court, as it is not required to appoint counsel; whether an individual litigant benefits from this statute is solely up to the discretion of the specific judge presiding over the case. The default rule varies across the country, but a majority of jurisdictions only grant requests for counsel in exceptional cases where the court determines that the indigent litigant has made sufficient efforts to obtain counsel independently and has been unable to do so in a case raising complex factual and legal matters where the indigent litigant lacks the competency to represent himself.

112. Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 29, at ¶ 302 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
114. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which provides that federal courts may “request” an attorney to represent those unable to afford counsel, does not authorize a federal court to make a compulsory appointment of an attorney to represent indigent clients in civil cases).
115. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that to qualify for appointment of counsel, indigent litigant must make reasonable efforts to find counsel whom he or she is unable to secure himself and the court must consider whether given the difficulty of the case, the litigant is competent to try it himself); Willis v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 274 F.3d 531, 532-33 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the discretionary decision of district courts to appoint counsel in forma pauperis is based on whether the litigant is able to represent himself and make logical representations in court, whether the case involves complex legal or factual issues, and whether extensive investigation and discovery is required); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that appointment of counsel for indigent defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) should be made only in exceptional circumstances); Sidles v. Lewis, No. 96-17219, 1998 WL 339667, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 1998) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of civil counsel for indigent litigant who had ability to articulate claims clearly and whose case was of a straightforward nature that did not indicate exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of counsel); Duke v. Hawk, No. 96-1503, 1997 WL 226133, at *2 (10th Cir. May 6, 1997) (emphasizing that there is no right to counsel in civil cases but that the court should consider relevant factors in determining whether or not to appoint counsel, including the merit of the claims, nature of the factual issues raised in those claims, litigant's ability to present the claims, and the complexity of legal issues raised by the claims); Tabor v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that counsel
extremely difficult to reverse a court’s refusal to provide counsel based on a challenge of the exercise of discretion given the high standard of review applied by appellate courts. Appellate courts review lower courts’ denial of requests for appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion and reversal requires a showing of prejudice. This, even if an appeals court finds that a judge abused her discretion by failing to appoint counsel, the appellate court will not reverse the lower court’s decision unless it believes that the result would have been different with the representation of counsel.

Consequently, the primary benefit of in forma pauperis proceedings for civil litigants is its provision that any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Yet even this provision is subject to discretionary application by courts. And, despite its general and seemingly expansive language, U.S. courts have generally read the provision of “costs and fees” narrowly to simply entitle an individual who qualifies for in forma should be appointed in exceptional cases, which can be determined by looking at six factors: the plaintiff’s ability to present his/her own case, the difficulty of the particular legal issues, the degree to which factual investigation is required and the ability of the plaintiffs to pursue that investigation, the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf, the extent to which the case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, and whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses; Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that appointment of counsel for indigent defendants should be made only in exceptional circumstances); Cook v. Bounds, 418 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that appointment of counsel for indigent defendants should be made only in exceptional circumstances).

116. See, e.g., Bracey v. Grendin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2013).
117. See, e.g., Duke, 390 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that appointment of counsel for indigent defendants should be made only in exceptional circumstances).
118. See, e.g., Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659 (finding that “even if a district court’s denial of counsel amounts to an abuse of discretion, [appellate courts] will reverse only upon a showing of prejudice,” and “an erroneous denial of pro bono counsel will be prejudicial if there is a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have made a difference in the outcome of the litigation”).
120. See, e.g., Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (noting court’s “broad discretion”); Williams v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (noting court’s “broad discretion”); Hogan v. Midland City Cmty. Comm’n Court, 680 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting only limit on broad discretion is that court cannot act arbitrarily or dismiss application on erroneous grounds).

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pauperis status to a waiver of court filing fees. Courts operating under the in forma pauperis statute frequently refuse to waive or provide relief for the many other expenses that are inextricable from and essential to typical engagement with the court system.

Ultimately, the in forma pauperis provisions are too discretionary, unfunded, and narrowly applied to meet the obligation of fairness that is required under the ICCPR’s article fourteen.

III. STATE EFFORTS TO FILL THE JUSTICE GAP ARE IMPORTANT BUT INSUFFICIENT

States do a great deal to mitigate the substantial gaps resulting from the federal government’s failure to provide a broad right to counsel in civil cases. For example, all fifty states have statutory provisions that require the state government to provide counsel in some civil commitment hearings. State legislatures have implemented a number of programs to increase access to civil counsel and examine the most cost-effective way of assisting low-income individuals in civil claims. A number of state court decisions have also required states to provide the right to counsel in specific types of civil cases. Finally, a number of state bar initiatives endeavor encourage state-wide efforts to provide counsel in civil cases. Still, states have a fragmented approach to providing meaningful access to counsel in civil cases, making the quantity and quality of services that low-income individuals receive dependent upon the state in which they reside. Moreover, there is no state that has made significant strides in providing a comprehensive right to counsel in cases involving basic human needs, such as shelter, sustenance, and safety.

A. State Statutory and Constitutional Rights to Counsel Are Patchwork

Statutory provisions and court decisions are the most common way in which states provide for meaningful access to counsel in civil cases. All states provide at least a limited right to counsel in some subset of civil cases. However, no state provides a general right to counsel for all civil cases.

122. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Until 2001, Indiana had a statute that stated “[i]f the court is satisfied that a person who makes an application [for in forma pauperis status] ... does not have sufficient means to prosecute or defend the action, the court shall ... assign an attorney to defend or
A comprehensive overview of statutes and cases providing a right to counsel in civil cases divides these statutes primarily into three broad categories: family law matters, involuntary commitment, and medical treatment.\textsuperscript{125} In addition, there are a number of smaller categories in which states provide a right to counsel in civil cases, such as civil arrest or the release of mental health records.\textsuperscript{126}

Collectively, these statutes and decisions fill part of the gap left by the federal government in the civil legal context. However, such protections are absent in many other types of civil cases, including those implicating fundamental human needs like housing, safety, sustenance, and private child custody disputes.\textsuperscript{127} For example, the 2008 foreclosure crisis had a significant impact on low-income homeowners, who were more likely to have subprime mortgages resulting in foreclosure.\textsuperscript{128} Without legal representation, many homeowners are unaware of legal defenses to foreclosure and unable to take advantage of loan modification and refinancing programs (in some cases, programs in which the homeowners were entitled by law to participate) that can help them retain their homes.\textsuperscript{129} While nationwide data on the absence of legal representation is unavailable, data from several counties throughout the United States found that there is a high number of unrepresented defendants in foreclosure actions. For example, in Stark County, Ohio, eighty-six percent of defendants in foreclosure proceedings went without counsel in 2008.\textsuperscript{130} In spite of the clear need for legal representation in foreclosure proceedings, states have not provided a right to counsel in these cases, even in places where the need is particularly high.

prosecute the cause.” Dickson v. D’Angelo, 749 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Ind. CODE ANN. § 34-10-1-2 (West 1999)). As one court put it, the statute as it read at that time “mandate[d] that courts appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants in all situations . . . . The threshold determination of indigency is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . . Once indigency is established, a trial court has no discretion under the statute to determine whether to grant a request for appointed counsel.” Id. (citations omitted). The statute was amended in 2001 to say that a court “may, under exceptional circumstances, assign an attorney to defend or prosecute the cause.” Ind. CODE ANN. § 34-10-1-2(b)(2).
\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 247.
\textsuperscript{127} See Pollock, supra note 123, at 776, 815.
\textsuperscript{128} Melanca Clark & Maggie Barron, Foreclosures: A Crisis in Legal Representation, Brennan CTR. FOR JUSTICE 6-7 (2009), http://brennan3cdn.net/a/bf8a685d088572_8sm6bevks.pdf.
\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 12.
\textsuperscript{130} Id.

Moreover, the patchwork approach to right to counsel means that all individuals in the United States do not receive equal treatment with regard to meaningful access to counsel in civil cases, and residents of neighboring states are subject to substantially different statutory protections. In instances where a statutory provision makes appointment of counsel discretionary with the judge, the variance can even be from court to court or judge to judge. In some states, even where statutes provide for a right to counsel, they require that litigants request counsel.\textsuperscript{131} This is problematic because litigants may not know that they have the right to do so.

Lastly, most state statutes providing for the right to counsel either explicitly or implicitly require that the person seeking state-provided counsel provide proof of indigence. While this ensures that limited resources can be allocated to those who need assistance the most, it could also limit people from seeking counsel if proving indigence is burdensome or if they do not meet the criteria set by the state, in spite of their having limited resources. Indeed, there is widespread recognition that official federal poverty guidelines are out of date, and thus may not capture the full extent of indigent need.\textsuperscript{132} The current administration recently seemed to acknowledge as much by creating a “supplemental poverty measure” (“SPM”), based on the recommendations of a National Academy of Sciences working group in 1992.\textsuperscript{133} The SPM accounts for a number of important issues which the official guidelines neglect, including regional variations in cost-of-living and changes in the make-up of the average American.\textsuperscript{134} However, eligibility for government assistance, like appointment of counsel, is often still determined with reference to official poverty guidelines, leaving many low-income Americans without meaningful access to justice in civil

\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 3-5.
implementation strategies for the civil right to counsel, which includes providing legal representation through a mixed delivery model that uses nonprofit legal service providers and borrowing from the model of the Office of the Public Defender. Recently, the state went a step further. The Maryland General Assembly passed a bill, in its 2013 session, creating a Task Force to Study Implementing a Civil Right to Counsel. The Maryland task force will be staffed by the Access to Justice Commission and will produce a report and make recommendations by October 2014 concerning providing a right to counsel, at public expense, in basic human needs cases. The Texas Access to Justice Commission has also taken steps to support “right to civil counsel” pilot programs, creating in 2009 a new category of grant for precisely that purpose. It is not just the access to justice

135. O’Brien & Pedulla, supra note 132, at 32.
138. Closing the Loop, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Implementing a Civil Right to Counsel in Maryland, MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N 4-5 (2011), http://www.courts.state.md.us/mdatjc/pdfs/implementingacivilrighttocounselinnand2011.pdf [hereinafter Implementing a Civil Right to Counsel in Maryland].
143. Id. §§ 1(4), (g). The task force is charged to (1) study the current resources available to assist in providing counsel to low-income Marylanders compared to the depth of the unmet need, including the resulting burden on the court system and the stress on other public resources; (2) study whether low-income Marylanders should have the right to counsel at public expense in basic human needs cases, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody, including review and analysis of the Maryland Access to Justice Commission’s “Implementing a Civil Right to Counsel in Maryland” report and each other previous report by a task force, commission, or workgroup on this issue; (3) study alternatives regarding the currently underserved citizenry of the State and the operation of the court system; (4) study how the right to counsel might be implemented in Maryland; (5) study the costs to provide meaningful access to counsel and the savings to the court system and other public resources; (6) study the possible revenue sources; and (7) make recommendations regarding the matters described in this subsection.
commissions that have been involved. The Boston Bar Association’s Civil Right to Counsel Task Force, for example, conducted pilots in two different housing courts\textsuperscript{145} and recently received money from the Massachusetts Attorney General to conduct a second round of eviction pilots.\textsuperscript{146} Pilot projects are also underway in Iowa (domestic violence)\textsuperscript{147} and New York City (immigration)\textsuperscript{148}.

C. National and State Bar Initiatives Are Important but Incapable of Closing the Gap on Their Own

Bar associations also work to increase access to civil legal representation by encouraging members to provide pro bono services and advocating for funding and statutory changes. While these associations are private entities, they often work closely with government to develop and implement legal reform. State bar associations’ work has expanded in recent years, largely in response to the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) national efforts to increase access to civil legal representation and to encourage the private bar to fill the gaps left by the states and the federal government. State bar associations also work in tandem with state officials to facilitate access to civil legal representation.

In 2006, in response to the civil justice gap, the ABA unanimously approved a resolution urging

federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{149}

This resolution marked the first time that the ABA recognized the government’s obligation to provide counsel to low-income individuals

\textsuperscript{145} See The Importance of Representation, supra note 13, at 1.


\textsuperscript{149} Howard H. Dana, Report to the ABA House of Delegates: Resolution 112A, 1 (2006) [hereinafter Resolution 112A], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_schid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf (identifying the basic needs “most critical for low income persons and families”).


151. Thirteen state and local bar associations co-sponsored the ABA resolution. Resolution 112A, supra note 149. The Alaska Bar Association adopted a resolution that mirrored the ABA resolution, and the Conference of California Bar Associations recommended that the state constitution be amended to include language providing for a right to counsel. Resolution 105, supra note 150.

152. Resolution 105, supra note 150.


154. Id.
substantive changes to state statutes; initiatives that call for cost-effective research encouraging state governments (and the federal government) to increase funding for current state-provided civil legal assistance; and initiatives that focus on civil society-level engagement encouraging individuals to provide more pro bono services to low-income individuals requiring assistance. These initiatives are not mutually exclusive and often work best when they are incorporated into a campaign to increase the right to counsel in civil cases.

A number of state bar associations have placed pressure on state governments to increase the right to counsel in civil cases. For example, the State Bar of California was integral in putting pressure on state lawmakers to enact the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act and create a pilot program for expanding the right to counsel for civil claims.155 Several state bar associations, including those in twenty-eight states, are members of Access to Justice Commissions, which bring together various members of the legal community, including lawmakers, to address the need for civil legal representation for indigent individuals.156 Many state bar associations, such as the Arizona State Bar and the State Bar of Michigan, mobilize lawyers to provide pro bono services and fundraise for organizations providing civil legal representation for indigent individuals.157 Other state bar associations, such as the Alabama State Bar, use short-term awareness campaigns to spotlight civil legal representation issues.158 However, many of these state bar initiatives, especially those calling on lawyers and law students to do more pro bono, fall short of advocating for or creating a right to counsel in civil cases. While these initiatives may help to narrow the justice gap, they are insufficient to close it.

IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT SEVERAL REFORMS

To fulfill its obligations under the ICCPR, the federal government should take steps to ensure meaningful access to counsel in civil cases, including and especially in instances where basic human needs are at stake. These steps include both adopting federal reforms and supporting state efforts. Specifically, the U.S. government should (1) support research into the efficacy of providing counsel in certain categories of civil cases; (2) fully fund LSC and eliminate the restrictions on LSC grantee organizations; (3) intensify and fully resource the ATJII; (4) file supportive amicus briefs for right-to-counsel litigation in federal and state court; (5) support, coordinate, and encourage efforts on the state level to establish a civil right to counsel; and (6) establish a right to counsel in federal civil cases where basic needs are at stake and in immigration removal proceedings.

A. The United States Should Undertake and Fund Research to Ascertain the Impact of Counsel in Certain Civil Cases

The government should lead and support empirical research on the impact of providing counsel in civil cases, particularly where basic human needs are at stake. Indeed, a number of studies examining a specific category of civil cases demonstrate that having legal representation is a key determinant of a successful outcome, improves court efficiency, and can lead to substantial cost savings for governments.159 One study, for example, concluded that being represented by counsel greatly increased a litigant’s chances of gaining an order of protection in the domestic violence context,160 while another observed that legal representation had a major effect on eviction rates in housing cases.161 A meta-study examined a number of studies that have shown how legal services programs save municipalities money by lowering arrest rates, preventing domestic violence incidents, and avoiding wrongful evictions that increase homelessness.162 Further study is required to examine the effect of counsel in civil cases.

155.决议105，supra note 148.
162. See Abel & Vignola, supra note 14, at 146-50.
involving other important interests and different categories of potential clients, including racial minorities and women. Moreover, there is a dearth of more systemic, national-level studies on civil access-to-justice issues.  

In order to meet these research needs, the government should reform the existing infrastructure for directing civil justice research. Current research efforts are coordinated by a diffuse network of institutions, including state and local bar associations, various legal services programs, LSC, the American Bar Foundation, not-for-profit organizations, the Department of Justice’s ATJI, and numerous law schools. Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition among practitioners and academics that “efforts to understand the distribution of legal services and unmet needs [in civil cases] have suffered from the absence of any centralized organization responsible for collecting such data.” Additional research is also needed to determine the impact of civil legal aid on individuals and their communities, and how civil legal aid can best be delivered. As originally constituted, LSC had such a centralized body, but it was subsequently abolished, an event which significantly hampered the national collection and coordination of civil legal aid research. The Department of Justice has recently acknowledged this problem, hosting a series of meetings exploring the possibility of establishing “an independent structure to produce research about [civil] legal aid, the dimensions and drivers of unmet needs, and the relative effectiveness of different delivery models.” A new independent research unit could be housed in the Justice Department itself or reconstituted under LSC.

Short of establishing such a body, the government should help fund and coordinate research initiatives focused on civil legal aid generally and the right to counsel in civil cases implicating basic human needs specifically.

B. The United States Should Fund the Legal Services Corporation Adequately and Ease Restrictions on LSC Grantees

The U.S. government has identified LSC as the lynchpin in its efforts to promote access to civil legal aid. However, unless funding is dramatically increased and restrictions on grantees are eased, LSC will continue to fall far short of meeting the civil legal needs of those living in the United States. Since 2010, Congress has cut almost $80 million from LSC’s budget. These reductions come at a time when the number of people qualifying for LSC assistance is at an all-time high. LSC has estimated that it requires a Congressional appropriation of $486 million to meet the needs of those seeking civil legal assistance in 2014.

To enhance the impact of LSC programs, the federal government should also remove the restrictions it places on LSC grantees, including restrictions on the categories of clients who grantee organizations may serve, types of activities in which they may engage, and kinds of cases they may take. Short of this, the government should abandon the requirement that LSC-grantees confine their work to federal funding limits, even when activities are independently financed. Doing so will provide grantee organizations with needed flexibility and eliminate the need to create duplicative infrastructure in order to create partner programs not funded by LSC and thus not subject to LSC-funding restrictions. Scarce resources could then be reallocated to directly serve the civil legal needs of low-income Americans.

C. The Federal Government Should Dedicate the Necessary Resources to the Access to Justice Initiative

The ATJI has made significant strides since it was established. The ATJI has worked with public defenders and other advocates to increase access to indigent legal defense, address due process concerns with the juvenile justice system, and collaborate with federal agencies and other stakeholders to improve the provision of civil legal services. Yet, the ATJI lacks the leadership and resources necessary to meet its ambitious mandate.

For example, the ATJI has, over the past couple of years, worked with other advocates and stakeholders to partake in conversations

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164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Houseman, supra note 11, at 15.
167. Holder Remarks at Shriver Center Awards Dinner, supra note 105, at 5.
169. See LSC Fact Book 2012, supra note 65, at 3; LSC Funding, supra note 64. In September 2012, Congress allocated $350 million to the Legal Services Corporation for FY 2013. LSC Funding, supra note 64. This was eventually reduced to $341 million due to sequestration in late March 2013. Id.
171. Id. at 1.
around effective research and analysis models. With additional resources, the ATJI could conduct its own research and evaluation, facilitate wide dissemination of best practices of state and federal efforts to improve meaningful access to legal representation in civil cases, and raise awareness about the importance of civil legal aid.

The ATJI would also benefit from the appointment of senior leadership. As of now, the ATJI website lists only an "Acting Senior Counselor" under "Leadership," which gives the Initiative an uncertain status. With a more permanent Senior Counselor who can help to define a clear strategy and operational mission, the ATJI could function more deliberately and transparently as it works to meet its objectives.

Finally, the ATJI should be institutionalized within the DOJ, with an explicit mandate to increase access to counsel in civil cases. This will help to ensure the program’s longevity and establish a clear trajectory for its work.

D. The Federal Government Should Provide Support and Guidance for State and Local Efforts

In an understanding attached to its ratification of ICCPR, the U.S. federal government committed itself to ensuring that state and local authorities adhere to the covenant. In fulfilling its obligation to provide meaningful access to legal representation in civil cases, the federal government should thus support and encourage state and local governments to do so as well. The government has two primary means for achieving this. First, it can direct federal funding so as to influence state and local activity and, second, it can exercise its considerable persuasive authority to guide compliance efforts.

Federal funding should support research and encourage implementation of state efforts to provide meaningful access to counsel in civil cases where basic needs are at stake. For example, federal funds can be used to encourage the creation of pilot programs, like the one instituted by California’s Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, which is designed to examine the cost effectiveness of civil counsel. Similarly, federal funding might support programs examining the provision of counsel in foreclosure proceedings, which is especially important in the wake of the housing crisis. Few such pilot programs exist, though there is great need for more research into who is affected by a lack of meaningful representation in civil cases, especially in minority or vulnerable communities. Additionally, federal funding can be tied to whether a state provides counsel in civil cases for vulnerable communities or in cases implicating basic human needs. For example, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act requires states accepting federal funds for child abuse programs to appoint a "guardian ad litem" for the child in all dependency cases. A similar mechanism could be implemented with respect to the appointment of legal representation in other instances related to federal funding.

The federal government should also exercise its persuasive authority to promote the establishment of the civil right to counsel on the state level. Specifically, it should use programs like the ATJI to engage states in a dialogue about the issue of civil counsel, with the ultimate goal of encouraging states to adopt statutory language in keeping with the ABA’s Model Access Act as well as its Principles for a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings. Likewise, the government should develop and disseminate best practices regarding the establishment of a right to counsel in civil cases at the state level. The Department of Justice, by way of the ATJI, already does this in the specific context of child support proceedings, and thus can develop and circulate “best practices” on a broader basis. Finally, the government can exert influence by filing supportive amicus briefs in right to counsel cases before the U.S. Supreme Court or state courts or, at the very least, by not opposing the right to counsel (as unfortunately the government did in Turner v. Rogers).

By leveraging its budgetary power and persuasive authority, the federal government can help tip the balance in favor of states complying with their obligation to ensure meaningful access to counsel in civil cases, particularly those implicating basic human needs.

176. Holder Remarks at Shriver Center Awards Dinner, supra note 105, at 4.
E. The United States Should Introduce and Support Legislation Providing a Right to Counsel in Certain Federal Cases

The federal government should move beyond the discretion-based *in forma pauperis* statute and introduce legislation creating a comprehensive right to counsel in federal civil cases where basic human needs are at stake. Already a number of federal statutes provide for the appointment of counsel in certain narrow contexts.178 The United States should broaden the range of civil cases where the right to counsel applies. In accordance with the basic contours of the ABA’s resolution on civil counsel in 2006, federal legislation should establish the right to counsel in federal cases that implicate basic human needs including shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody, provided certain financial and merit-based eligibility requirements are met.179 Such legislation should, moreover, adhere to minimum standards for the implementation and provision of the right to counsel, as set forth in the ABA’s “Basic Principles for a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings.”180 Immigration proceedings similarly involve fundamental concerns, and thus counsel should be provided as a matter of right in such cases.

Enshrining the right to counsel in federal civil cases where basic human needs are at stake and in immigration proceedings would begin to close the justice gap while demonstrating the government’s commitment to its international human rights obligations under the ICCPR.

CONCLUSION

By ratifying the ICCPR, the United States committed itself to ensuring meaningful access to justice for all its citizens. As part of this commitment, the United States must ensure meaningful access to
counsel in civil cases, especially where core human needs are at stake and particularly where lack of counsel has a disparate impact on vulnerable communities. Current efforts at both the federal and state level are inadequate to fulfill this commitment. To meet its obligations under the ICCPR, the federal government should support research that examines the impact of counsel in civil cases and support efforts by state and local governments, and others at the state and local level, to improve meaningful access to counsel in civil cases. In addition, the United States must ease restrictions and increase financial and logistical support for LSC and the ATJF, thereby enabling these efforts to reach their full potential. The United States should also file supportive amicus briefs for right-to-counsel litigation, and support and coordinate efforts on the state level to establish a civil right to counsel. Finally, the United States should establish a right to counsel in cases implicating basic human needs, including in immigration proceedings. By implementing these recommendations, the United States can begin to bridge the justice gap and uphold the dignity of all Americans.

178. Outside of the in *forma pauperis* statute, there are a handful of federal statutes that provide for the appointment of counsel in civil cases. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2006) (discretionary appointment of counsel in federal civil forfeiture proceedings and right to counsel where disputed property used as primary residence); id. § 3006A(a)(2) (right to counsel for sexually dangerous persons proceedings in federal court); id. § 4247(d) (right to counsel for federal civil commitment proceedings); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2006) (right to counsel for Indian parents in foster care or termination of parental rights proceedings); id. § 1875(d)(1) (right to counsel for jurors fired for jury service, if judge finds merit in claim); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b) (2006) (discretionary appointment in housing discrimination cases); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 521(b)(2), 522(d)(2) (2006) (no entry of judgment against defendant in military service unless counsel appointed, and if stay refused, counsel must also be appointed).

179. RESOLUTION 112A, supra note 149.

180. See generally RESOLUTION 105, supra note 150.