Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights, that are also enforceable against third parties outside the contract. Our analysis starts with the following question: which contractual agreements should the law allow parties to enforce as property rights? Our proposed answer to this question is shaped by the overall objective of minimizing due diligence (reading) costs and investment distortions that follow from the inability of third-party lenders to costlessly observe pre-existing rights in a borrower’s property. Borrowers cannot reduce these costs without the law’s help, due to an inability to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution. We find that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties when these rights are i) more costly for third-parties to discover, ii) more likely to redistribute value from third-parties, and iii) less likely to increase efficiency. We find that these qualitative principles are often reflected in observed legal rules, including the enforceability of negative covenants; fraudulent conveyance; corporate veil-piercing; and limits on assignability.

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1 Introduction

What is a property right? What role should the law play in defining and enforcing these rights? Economists and legal scholars conceive of property rights in very different ways, and approach these questions differently as a result. The dominant view among economists, the property rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), defines property rights as residual rights of control. This theory argues that allocations of property rights can be valuable in alleviating holdup problems when contracts are incomplete.

Though not an explicit focus of this literature, the economist’s view of property rights has important implications for the role of the legal system. When all affected parties start around a common bargaining table, as is assumed in the theory, there is no role for law beyond enforcing the contractual agreements reached by the parties. Left to their own devices, all relevant rights are allocated contractually in a way that maximizes total surplus. As a result, the economist’s framework to date has little to offer in the way of a positive analysis that explains features of property law, nor does this framework offer normative prescriptions for the design of these laws, other than the recommendation that voluntary agreements should always be strictly enforced.\(^1\)

The economist’s conception of property rights stands in contrast to the concept of property as defined in recent legal scholarship (Merrill and Smith 2000, 2001a, 2001b, Hansmann and Kraakman 2002). This literature distinguishes property rights from contractual rights by defining property rights as rights \textit{in rem} (rights to assets that are good against third-parties), while contractual rights are rights \textit{in personam} (good only against the contracting parties themselves). In other words, property rights are unique because they bind not only the parties to a contract, but also bind third-parties who lie outside a contracting coalition. As Hansmann and Kraakman (2002) explain the distinction:

“Property rights differ from contract rights in that a property right in an asset, unlike a contract right, can be enforced against subsequent transferees of other

\(^1\)The economists’ viewpoint often presupposes that the law is also necessary to defend an initial allocation of ownership rights to assets (however they may be determined), but this is not entirely obvious. Even if the law is completely silent on this issue and all assets are in the “public domain” at the outset, if all parties are available to bargain over the uses of assets going forward without frictions, efficiency is achievable. This implies that the role of law in the domain of property rights (over and above enforcing contracts) is necessary only when third-parties outside the initial contracting coalition are affected.
rights in the asset.”

This definition of property rights highlights that the law can play a more active role in increasing the efficiency of contractual agreements when third-parties outside a contracting coalition become relevant. Because information about pre-existing rights is costly to acquire, these third-parties may be unknowingly affected by the rights of others. As a result, these authors argue that the law optimally standardizes the property rights that can be created to limit externalities to unrelated parties (Merrill and Smith 2000), and sets limits on the notice required to make property rights enforceable (Hansmann and Kraakman 2002).

The goal of this paper is to offer a first formal model which captures this definition of a property right, and builds on the main insights of this scholarship. A key innovation of our model relative to the economics literature on common agency (Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Segal (1999)) is to introduce reading costs of contracts for third parties and to characterize equilibrium outcomes of a simple common agency game with third-party reading costs. This model helps sharpen the main logic underlying recent legal scholarship on property, and at the same time reveals common forces that influence legal rules regarding property in a variety of settings involving financial contracting.

Our model starts with a firm run by an agent (call the agent A) that requires funding from two lenders, who each provide valuable capital to an investment project, but each lender contracts with the firm at a different point in time. As a result, the lenders may have competing claims to the firm’s cash flows, and knowledge of the rights of pre-existing loan contracts may be imperfect. The financial contracting context is a particularly important environment in which to consider these issues, because of the possibility that insolvency can result in incomplete satisfaction of a lender’s claim. Thus, a mere contractual right to sue

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2We should note that there are alternative definitions of what constitutes a “property right” in legal scholarship. For example, some define a property right as a right that is enforced through a “property rule” such as specific performance, while a contractual right is a right that is enforced through monetary damages. (Calabresi and Melamed 1972; Ayres and Talley 1995; Kaplow and Shavell 1995) This definition gives rise to different legal design problems than the one we consider here, however.

3Our model assumes a sharp difference regarding the information about the contracts of other parties, which is costly to acquire, and the observability of one’s own contract, which is assumed to be costlessly understood by the parties themselves. Thus, our model leaves room for legal intervention into property rights, but not into contractual rights. Nevertheless, the assumption of limited observability has been made in the contractual context; see Katz (1990).
a bankrupt debtor can be substantially less valuable than a property right (such as priority
rights to seize and sell collateral) that also binds past and/or future creditors. When the
law allows for the borrower to give an early lender (call this lender $P_1$) stronger property-
like protections, it can alleviate credit constraints by protecting $P_1$ against borrower moral
hazard and the claims of a later lender (call this lender $P_2$). On the other hand, $P_2$ might act
more conservatively in extending funds when he is uncertain about the pre-existing rights
of $P_1$. He might insist on being compensated for due diligence expenses to verify these
pre-existing rights, and if he can not be sufficiently reassured, might forgo lending entirely.

Our model generates several findings. First, in a world without reading costs, there can
be affirmative reasons for the law to allow $A$ to grant $P_1$ two strong property rights in the
project’s cash flow that are effective against $P_2$. First, $A$ would give $P_1$ a security interest
that makes $P_1$ senior to $P_2$ over the final cash flow. Second, $A$ includes in his loan agreement
with $P_1$ a negative covenant that limits $A$’s ability to borrow from any future $P_2$. Both
rights are valuable because monitoring $A$’s behavior is costly for $P_1$, and $A$ has the incentive
to over-borrow from $P_2$ to continue his project inefficiently at $P_1$’s expense. Intuitively, to
ensure that his claim is sufficiently likely to be repaid, $P_1$ may require not only seniority,
but also that $A$ retain sufficient cash flow rights so that his incentives to make the project
succeed are preserved. To constrain $A$ effectively, however, these contracts must give $P_1$
property rights that are good against $P_2$, rather than a mere contractual right to sue $A$ in
the event that $A$ violates his agreement with $P_1$.

Despite this justification, the law generally enforces negative covenants held by $P_1$ against
$A$ as mere contractual rights against $A$, rather than as property rights that also bind $P_2$. In
addition, some security interests can be invalidated by law when they are particularly harmful
to other creditors. Our model suggests a rationale for these legal restrictions on property
rights when $P_2$ must expend reading costs to observe and understand the pre-existing rights
of $P_1$. If $P_1$ and $A$ anticipate that $P_2$ will not conduct any costly investigation to discover
$P_1$’s rights, this would open the door for $P_1$ to write a redistributive contract with $A$ that
diverts as much value from $P_2$ as the law will enforce. Anticipating this behavior, $P_2$ will
insist that $A$ reimburse enough of $P_2$’s reading costs that $P_1$ and $A$ will not be tempted
to redistribute. In equilibrium, inefficient deadweight reading costs are incurred, and when
these costs are sufficiently large, credit rationing to $A$ may occur. Though these deadweight
losses are borne by $A$ in equilibrium, $A$ cannot eliminate them because he cannot (costlessly)
demonstrate to $P_2$ that he has not written a redistributive contract with $P_1$ without the credible commitment provided by law.\footnote{This logic differs from Merrill and Smith (2000), who argue that legal restrictions on property rights are valuable because they limit externalities across firms (i.e. an $A$-$P_1$-$P_2$ coalition increase due diligence costs for other $A$-$P_1$-$P_2$ coalitions by creating a novel property right). In our model, restrictions can be valuable because they reduce externalities within a firm (i.e. $A$ and $P_1$ impose due diligence costs on $P_2$, which $A$ pays for in equilibrium, but can not reduce without the credible commitment provided by law).}

Though the model focuses on the enforceability of security interests and negative covenants in particular, it generates qualitative principles that can apply in more general settings involving property rights. We find that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing a right (given by $A$ to $P_1$) against a third party ($P_2$) when the right (i) is more costly for $P_2$ to discover; (ii) is more redistributive from an uninformed third-party, and (iii) is less likely to increase the efficiency of contractual relationships. We analyze a series of examples in U.S. debtor-creditor law, and find that these principles are often reflected in legal rules. The principles echo central themes in Hansmann and Kraakman (2002), who argue that an optimally designed law balances the value of a right to its users against the verification costs borne by non-users. Our model finds that when redistributive rights are enforceable, these verification costs are most severe. Hence, an optimal law restricts the enforceability of these rights in particular.\footnote{Our analysis is also related to the large literature on optimal priority and the efficiency of secured credit. Bebchuk and Fried (1996, 1997) argue for mandatory limits on the priority of secured creditors in bankruptcy; unlike our model, their argument relies heavily on the existence of involuntary creditors or small creditors who find it costly to adjust interest rates. Schwartz (1991) argues that current law regarding creditor priorities should be replaced by a pure first-in-time rule, which is similar to the Coasean legal environment we consider here. Schwartz’s model allows for costs of revealing information to creditors, but does not consider the role the law might play in reducing them.}

The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will introduce the general model and Section 3 solves for optimal contracts when all information about pre-existing contracts is costlessly observable by third-parties. Section 4 solves the model in the presence of reading costs by third-parties, which leads to our key results regarding the optimal legal design of property rights and generates comparative statics that can be applied to existing features of the law. Section 5 discusses some of these features and how they relate to the principles in our model, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model

2.1 Technological assumptions

We consider a simple model of a firm with a single project that requires two rounds of financing from two different lenders. At date 1, a wealthless agent \((A)\) is endowed with a valuable idea, and must raise an amount of \(i_1\) from a principal \((P1)\) to start the project. To continue the project at date 2, the agent requires an additional cash input of \(i_2\) from a second principal \((P2)\). To focus on the interface between principal \(P1\)’s and \(P2\)’s claims, we shall make the restrictive assumption that \(P2\) can contribute no more than the required investment outlay \(i_2\) and that \(P1\) can not contribute the entire amount \(i_1 + i_2\)\(^6\). Also, both principals operate in competitive lending markets, all parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, and there is no discounting.

If the project receives two rounds of financing (i.e. it is continued at date 2 rather than liquidated) it produces a random cash flow at date 3. If the project does not receive the required funding at date 2, it is liquidated for a known value \(L > 0\). The final cash flow outcome depends on the realization of the state of nature at date 2, which becomes observable to \(P2\) and \(A\) at date 2 before the continuation decision is made. We allow for two states of nature, \(\mathbf{s} \in \{s_g, s_b\}\). The good state of nature, \(s_g\), occurs with probability \(\pi\) and the bad state, \(s_b\), with probability \(1 - \pi\).

In the bad state of nature, the project yields a cash-flow of \(X\) at date 3 with probability \(p\) and with probability \((1 - p)\) the project yields no cash flow but a liquidation value \(\gamma L\), where \(\gamma < 1\). In the good state of nature, the cash-flow outcome of the project depends on the agent’s effort choice \(e \in \{0, 1\}\) at date 2. If the agent chooses \(e = 1\) then the project yields a final cash flow \(X\) with certainty. If the agent chooses \(e = 0\), the project succeeds with probability \(p\), as in the bad state of nature. The agent’s private cost of choosing high

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\(^6\)There may be several reasons why each principal is only willing to invest a limited amount. For one, the lenders may be wealth constrained, or they may prefer to have a limited exposure in a firm for risk-diversification reasons. Finally, principal \(P1\) may be reluctant to invest more than \(i_1\) for fear that the agent \(A\) simply wastes the surplus funds. It is possible to extend our model to allow for an endogenous determination of each principal’s investment and to show that under some quite intuitive conditions each principal would not want to invest more than the required amount \(i_j\). However, for the sake of simplicity and brevity we omit the discussion of this more general model.
effort \((e = 1)\) is \(c > 0\), and the cost of \(e = 0\) is normalized to zero. We summarize the date 2 timeline and the project’s expected payoffs in Figure 1.

We shall restrict ourselves to a subset of parameter values for which the optimal contract for \(P1\) and \(A\), and for \(P2\) and \(A\), is such that continuation with high effort is optimal in the good state and liquidation at date 2 is optimal in the bad state.

For ease of exposition, we will use the notation \(R_g\) to denote the maximum pledgeable income to \(P1\) in the good state, conditional on continuation with effort:

\[
R_g \equiv X - \frac{c}{1 - p} - i_2
\]  

To see that this is the maximum pledgeable income to \(P1\), note that in order to encourage \(A\) to choose high effort, \(A\) requires a sufficient stake \(w_g\) in the output when the project succeeds. An optimal contract will pay the agent \(w_g\) when the cash flow is \(X\) and 0 if output is 0. Thus, in order to elicit effort from \(A\), the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied:

\[
w_g - c \geq pw_g
\]
which reduces to

$$w_g \geq \frac{c}{1-p}.$$  

Therefore, the maximum pledgeable income to all lenders is \(X - \frac{c}{1-p}\). Since \(P_2\) will not participate unless he receives an expected payment equal to his monetary contribution, \(P_2\) must be repaid \(i_2\). Thus the maximum pledgeable income to \(P_1\) is as in (1).

With this notation, the parameter restrictions we maintain throughout the paper are:

**Assumptions:**

A1)

$$X - c - i_2 > L$$

The first assumption tells us that in the good state, continuation with high effort is economically efficient relative to liquidation.

A2)

$$pX + (1-p)\gamma L - i_2 < L$$

Assumption A2 says that continuation with low effort is inefficient relative to liquidation; hence liquidating the project will be optimal in the bad state at date 2. Assumptions A1 and A2 together imply also that high effort is efficient relative to low effort in the good state.

A3)

$$\pi R_g + (1-\pi)L \geq i_1$$

Assumption A3 implies that the first-best action plan, which involves continuation in the good state with effort and liquidation in the bad state, can generate enough cash flow to repay \(P_1\) for his loan. Since we assume that \(L < i_1\), A3 also implies that \(R_g > L\); i.e. continuation with effort produces more pledgeable income to \(P_1\) than liquidation in the good state.

Finally, we shall also assume that:

A4)

$$X - R_g \geq \frac{i_2}{p}.$$  

As we will show in the next section, assumption A4 implies that \(P_1\) may be at risk of *dilution* of his claim in the bad state if he writes a debt contract that makes him senior to
$P_2$, but does not limit $P_2$’s borrowing. This assumption implies that $P_1$ will require a negative covenant in his loan contract in addition to seniority.

### 2.2 Legal rules: The Coasean environment

Economic models of contracting with multiple principals, similar to the one outlined above, are cast in a world where i) there are no information costs; ii) there is freedom of contracting; iii) property rights are exogenously given; and, iv) contracts are perfectly enforced by courts\(^7\).

The precise form property rights take in these models is typically not spelled out explicitly. Thus, before we introduce the parties’ contracting opportunities, it is important to describe the underlying legal environment in which contracts are enforced.

In this section we attempt to spell out the benchmark that is presupposed in most economic models, which we call the Coasean legal environment. It has, in our view, the following three components:

#### a) Well-defined, fully-alienable, and fully-divisible property rights

In our common agency setup, $A$’s initial endowment is his idea (and his human capital), and the principals $P_1$ and $P_2$ are endowed with their cash stocks. The assumption on property rights is that these individuals begin at date one with full ownership rights to these assets and that these will be perfectly enforced by a court. Full ownership rights are defined as a bundle of property rights similar to the notions of *usu*, *fructus*, and *abusus* under Roman law:

Thus, the full owner of an asset has all of the following property rights:

a) the exclusive right to use the asset (*usu*),
b) the exclusive right to receive income from the asset (*fructus*),
c) the exclusive right to modify or transform the asset (*abusus*).

Importantly, we single out among *abusus* rights,
d) the exclusive right to transfer any subset of these rights by contract (*alienability*).

Thus, in the Coasean legal environment, full ownership is a starting point, and the bundle of property rights that comprise ownership can be freely divided.

#### b) Freedom of Contracting: Courts will enforce all contracts regarding transfers of property rights (based on information they can verify), with no restriction on the space of

\(^7\)See Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986), Segal (1999) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)
allowable contracts, other than that the property right being transferred must be owned by one of the contracting parties. Note that this definition allows for parties to include contractual terms, like negative covenants, that place restraints on alienability. In the present context, for example, if \( A \) has the right to the cash flows from an asset \( X \), she may agree with \( P1 \) that she can spend the cash at date 3, but \( P1 \) can veto any transfer of rights to these cash flows to a third-party before date 3.

c) **First-in-time (FT) rule:** in the Coasean legal environment, when any inconsistency arises between contracts, the first contract written will have priority.

The Coasean legal environment differs from most real-world laws of property and contract, in that it allows for very strong rights that bind third-parties to be enforceable. To give a concrete example that will be relevant to our model, suppose \( A \) writes the following sequence of contracts with \( P1 \) at date 1 and \( P2 \) at date 2:

\[ C_1 : P1 \text{ will lend } 45 \text{ dollars to } A \text{ at date 1 and } A \text{ will repay } P1 \text{ 50 dollars at date 3.} \]

Any agreement with a third-party to transfer the firm’s cash flow made before date 3 is void unless approved by \( P1 \).

\[ C_2 : P2 \text{ will lend } 25 \text{ dollars to } A \text{ at date 1, and } A \text{ will repay } P2 \text{ 30 dollars of the firm’s final cash flow at date 3.} \]

Now suppose that the final cash flow is 100. In the Coasean legal environment, \( P1 \) would receive 50, \( A \) would receive 50, and \( P2 \) would receive zero. In contract \( C_1 \), \( A \) gave a veto right to \( P1 \) over transfers to subsequent lenders. This implies that \( A \) no longer has the legal right to transfer cash flows to \( P2 \) without \( P1 \)’s approval. Since \( P1 \) contracts with \( A \) before \( P2 \), the FT rule would require that \( P2 \)’s claim be voided; he would have no right to recover anything from \( A \), even though \( A \) had knowledge of his inability to pledge cash flow to \( P2 \), and he receives a payout that would allow him to pay \( P2 \) in full.

### 2.3 Contracting assumptions

The agent \( A \) and principal \( P1 \) can write a bilateral long-term debt contract at date 1. Similarly, the agent and principal \( P2 \) can write a bilateral debt contract at date 2. Each bilateral contract specifies the amount the principal agrees to lend \( i_j \) and a repayment \( F_j \) at date 3. The contract between \( P1 \) and \( A \) can specify whether \( P1 \) is senior, junior, or on equal priority with \( P2 \). The contract between \( P1 \) and \( A \) can also include a negative covenant, which states a maximum amount \( \Phi_1 \) that \( A \) is allowed to pay \( P2 \) at date 3. Because we
focus on the implications of the Coasean legal environment, we assume that $P_1$ can contract for seniority in the form of a property right in the cash flow, which we call a *first-priority security interest*. Similarly, we will assume (unless the parties state otherwise in their contract) that the negative covenant functions as a property right that is enforceable against $P_2$. The difference between enforcing these terms as property rights and contractual rights is crucial and will become clear in the next section.

Our assumptions rule out the possibility that contract terms may be contingent on the state of nature $s_l$, $l = g, b$. We justify this restriction on the usual grounds that the state of nature $s_l$, while observable to $A$ and $P_2$ at date 2, is not verifiable in court.\(^8\) We also rule out the possibility for now that $P_1$ is available to monitor the firm, or to renegotiate his contract with $A$ at date 2 after the realization of the state of nature $s_l$. Thus, $P_1$ is a passive lender who can only lend at date 1 and collect at the final date. This assumption is admittedly strong, but is made to demonstrate in the simplest possible fashion the potential conflicts between $P_1$ and $P_2$ when they lend at different points in time.\(^9\)

The four key economic issues in our contracting problem are as follows. First, the agent’s repayment obligations $F_j$ must be low enough that the agent has an incentive to put in high effort ($e = 1$) in state $s_g$. Second, $F_1$ must be sufficiently low to make room for continuation financing by $P_2$ at date 2, whenever continuation is efficient. Third, $P_1$ faces a threat of dilution of the value of his claim $F_1$ in the bad state at date 2, when the agent issues a new claim $F_2$ to $P_2$. As we show below, making $P_1$ senior to $P_2$ is not a sufficient protection against dilution in our setup, so a negative covenant in $P_1$’s contract will be necessary to prevent inefficient dilution. Fourth, and most importantly for our analysis, the very protections provided to $P_1$ against $P_2$, in turn, create a risk of loss for $P_2$ at the hands of $P_1$ in the good state. This latter risk arises from the fact that $P_1$’s contract with $A$ is not fully observable, and the *due diligence* that $P_2$ must expend to discover these covenants in $P_1$’s contract is costly and imperfect. We discuss the formal representation of the due diligence technology in Section 4.

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\(^8\)The non-verifiability of the state is not at all crucial to the results, but it simplifies the set of contracts that can be written.

\(^9\)The assumption that $P_1$ is not available at all at date two implies among other things that $P_1$ cannot accelerate his loan in response to an attempt by $P_2$ to collude with $A$ against $P_1$. While repayment accelerations do sometimes occur in practice, they require that $P_1$ monitor $A$ carefully, which is costly. Moreover a surprise acceleration of a loan might also hurt $P_2$. 

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3 Optimal Contracting with no information costs

3.0.1 First-best outcome

Suppose a benevolent, social welfare-maximizing planner could observe the state of the world and make all investment and effort decisions. Under the assumptions above (A1-A4), the social planner would choose to fund the project, to continue the project in the good state at date 2 while at the same time choosing high effort \((e = 1)\), and to liquidate the project at date 2 in the bad state. This first-best action plan would maximize social welfare, which is given by

\[
\pi(X - c - i_2) + (1 - \pi)L - i_1
\]

3.0.2 Implementation: state-contingent contracts

If the contracting parties can write (bilateral) state-contingent contracts, then this first-best action plan can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the following contracting game.

At date 1, the agent makes the following take-it-or-leave-it offer of a state-contingent debt contract to \(P_1\). Agent \(A\) borrows \(i_1\) from \(P_1\) and in exchange agrees that:

1. in the bad state at date 2, \(P_1\) has the right to liquidate the project and keep the entire liquidation proceeds;

2. in the good state at date 3, \(A\) will repay \(P_1\) a face value of debt

\[
F_1 = \frac{i_1 - (1 - \pi)L}{\pi}
\]

3. \(P_1\) takes a first-priority security interest in the date 3 cash flow, making \(P_1\) senior to any subsequent claims on the project.

Given that this contract covers \(P_1\)’s investment \(i_1\) in expected terms, \(P_1\)’s (weak) best response is to accept this contract.

It is easy to see that the best response to this contract for \(A\) in the good state at date 2 is to offer \(P_2\) the following contract: \(A\) borrows \(i_2\) dollars from \(P_2\) in exchange for a (junior) debt claim with face value \(F_2 = i_2\). Again, as this contract covers \(P_2\)’s investment \(i_2\), \(P_2\)’s (weak) best response is to accept this contract.
Finally, to see that $A$’s contract offer at date 1 is a best response to the respective equilibrium moves of $P1$ at date 1, and $A$ and $P2$ at date 2, observe that under this contract $A$ gets the first-best expected payoff $\pi(X - c - i_2) + (1 - \pi)L - i_1$ which is equal to total social welfare under the first-best action plan. This is the highest expected payoff $A$ could achieve in any equilibrium, since any deviation from the first-best action plan at date 2, induced by another contract offer, would be anticipated by $P1$ and priced into the loan contract through a higher $F_1$ (i.e. a higher interest rate). In other words, $A$’s private objective is perfectly aligned with social welfare in a Coasean legal environment, and therefore $A$’s choice of contract implements the first-best social outcome.

3.0.3 Incomplete contracts: the insufficiency of seniority

While a first-best outcome is straightforward to implement under complete contracting, it is less obvious under incomplete contracting (when courts cannot observe the state of the world). At first glance, one might expect that seniority alone would be sufficient to generate the socially efficient outcome even with non-contingent debt contracts.\(^{10}\)

Indeed, if $P1$ has a senior debt claim one might expect that this would generate the right social incentives for $P2$ to refuse to lend in the bad state, since he bears more of the cost of failure than $P1$.\(^{11}\) Even so, under assumption $A4$, this is not the case. Since under assumption $A4$ we have $X > R_g + \frac{i_2}{p}$, it is still in the joint interest of $P2$ and $A$ to continue the firm inefficiently at the expense of $P1$, and thus to dilute the value of $P1$’s debt claim. Indeed, $P2$ is then willing to lend $i_2$ and take a junior debt claim with face value $F_2 = \frac{i_2}{p}$ and $A$ would then receive an expected payoff from continuation of $p(X - F_1 - F_2) > p(X - R_g - \frac{i_2}{p}) > 0$, which is strictly higher than what $A$ gets in liquidation.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\)The idea that junior debt can be used to dilute senior claims in the presence of moral hazard was originally formalized in Bizer and DeMarzo (1992).

\(^{11}\)Since $P1$’s loan is senior, he will recover the entire cash flow in the low state if the project fails, $\gamma L$ while $P2$ will receive nothing. Thus, the consequences of failure are more severe for $P2$ than for $P1$.

\(^{12}\)It is possible to correct this inefficiency by giving $A$ a payment in the event of liquidation, of say $\phi L$, sufficient to offset the positive gain $A$ would get under continuation. Deviations from absolute priority in bankruptcy could, thus, be rationalized in our model as a way of forestalling inefficient continuation.

In a somewhat richer model, however, one might be concerned that by structuring the agent’s incentives
Thus, under the parameter assumptions in the model, seniority alone is not sufficient to protect $P_1$. Though social welfare is destroyed by the inefficient continuation, the value transferred from $P_1$ to the $P_2/A$ coalition outweighs this loss when $A4$ holds. Thus, the incentives of $P_2$ and $A$ are not aligned with social welfare when a simple senior debt contract is written. Since $A$ bears this efficiency loss in equilibrium, $A$ would prefer to give $P_1$ stronger rights than seniority alone in order to achieve efficiency and maximize his private payoff. Giving an additional property right to $P_1$ to specify a limit $\Phi_1$ of date 3 cash flows $A$ is allowed to pledge to $P_2$ achieves this goal.

### 3.0.4 The value of property rights

In the good state $P_2$ is willing to lend $i_2$ in exchange for debt with face value $F_2 = i_2$, since the project will succeed with certainty. In the bad state, however, the project fails with probability $1 - p$ if it is continued. As we have pointed out above, $P_2$ will then require a face value of debt higher than $i_2$ ($F_2$ must be at least $\frac{i_2}{p}$) in order to be compensated for this added default risk. Thus, the following contract will result in a first-best outcome:

**Proposition 1** Under assumptions $A1$ to $A4$, an optimal contract between $P1$ and $A$ is the following: $A$ receives $i_1$ at date 1, and promises $P1$ a repayment

$$F_1 = \frac{i_1 - (1 - \pi)L}{\pi},$$

in this way one might undermine her incentives to perform at date 1. For example, if efficiency requires that $A$ raise the probability of reaching the good state from $\lambda$ to $\pi > \lambda$ at date 1, by taking action $a = 1$ with private effort-cost $\psi$, rather than the free action $a = 0$, then rewarding the agent in the event of liquidation might be counterproductive.

Indeed, the agent’s incentive constraint at date 1:

$$\pi(X - F_1 - F_2) - \psi \geq \lambda(X - F_1 - F_2)$$

without any payment in liquidation might be satisfied, while the constraint with a payment $\phi L$ in liquidation:

$$\pi(X - F_1 - F_2) + (1 - \pi)\phi L - \psi \geq \lambda(X - F_1 - F_2) + (1 - \lambda)\phi L$$

might not.

$^{13}$By definition of $R_g$, as long as $P1$ is promised no more than this amount, $P2$ can be promised $i_2$ if the good state occurs, and $A$ will prefer high effort. Therefore, the probability of success will be 1 and $P2$ will be repaid with certainty.
at date 3. \( P_1 \) takes a first-priority security interest in the final cash flow, and \( P_1 \) has a right to void any loan to \( A \) made before date 3 whose repayment exceeds \( \Phi_1 = i_2 \).

The best response for \( P_2 \) and \( A \) at date 2 is to sign a new loan contract only in the good state specifying a loan of \( i_2 \) in return for a (riskless) junior claim of \( i_2 \) at date 3.

**Proof.** see appendix ■

In order to implement the first-best, \( P_1 \) requires not only priority over \( P_2 \) (through the security interest), but also that \( A \) make a credible commitment not to borrow more than \( i_2 \). This commitment can be achieved by giving \( P_1 \) a veto right over \( A \)'s ability to transfer the project's cash flows to future lenders over and above \( i_2 \). Since \( P_2 \) understands that \( A \) can legally transfer no more than \( i_2 \), he is not willing to lend in the bad state, and the first-best is achievable.\(^{14}\) We will refer to the optimal contract between \( P_1 \) and \( A \) in Proposition 1 as the *efficient contract*, and denote this contract \( C_{1 fb} \).

It is important to note that achieving the first-best requires giving \( P_1 \) *property rights* in \( A \)'s assets that bind \( P_2 \), instead of mere *contractual rights* that bind only \( A \). Instead of the security interest, which gives \( P_1 \) a property right in the final cash flow, \( A \) could include instead a covenant giving \( P_1 \) the contractual right to sue \( A \) for breach of the contract if \( P_2 \)'s loan is not junior in priority. Similarly, the negative covenant which voids certain loan terms by \( P_2 \) instead could give \( P_1 \) only the right to sue \( A \) if \( P_2 \)'s loan repayment exceeds \( i_2 \).

In either case, the first-best outcome would not obtain.\(^{15}\) If \( P_1 \)'s attempt to establish seniority is only contractual, the best response of \( A \) and \( P_2 \) in the bad state is to give \( P_2 \) a first-priority security interest in the final cash flow, making \( P_2 \) senior to \( P_1 \) up to the face amount of his loan (\( i_2 \)). If \( P_2 \) is senior, he will be willing to lend. Similarly, if \( P_1 \)'s attempt to cap \( P_2 \)'s debt repayment through the negative covenant gives \( P_1 \) only a contractual right, \( A \) can give \( P_2 \) a second-priority security interest in the cash flow sufficient to satisfy \( P_2 \)'s participation constraint (\( F_2 = i_2 \)). In either case, \( P_1 \) will win his breach of contract suit against \( A \) at date 3, but the property available to satisfy the judgment would

\(^{14}\) If \( P_2 \) can take a claim on \( A \)'s personal assets (his dividend from the firm at the end of date three) then he would be equally happy to lend into an inefficient continuation in the bad state. Thus \( P_1 \)'s right to restrict alienability must extend beyond the corporate form and also to \( A \)'s assets more generally in order to effectively shut down \( P_2 \)'s loan.

\(^{15}\) A similar point is made by Schwartz (1996), arguing for property-like protections for unsecured creditors with negative covenants because contractual remedies may be insufficient.
be only the property $A$ has left to transfer, which would be the cash flows from the firm after paying $P_2$.\footnote{We describe $P_1$’s rights as the ability to void the transfer to $P_2$. Alternatively, the law could allow $P_1$ to recover damages for inducing $A$ to breach his contract with $P_1$. Either remedy is equivalent here, as the consequences are the same—either would prevent the loan by $P_2$. Given our working definition, either would be considered a property right, since $P_1$ has a right that is good against a third-party transferee ($P_2$) rather than a right which is good only against $A$.} Anticipating this outcome, $P_2$ will be willing to lend in the bad state, and the inefficient continuation will not be prevented.\footnote{Of course, $P_1$ could take $A$’s remaining cash flow, making him indifferent between continuation and liquidation. Adding a private benefit to continuation for $A$ (avoiding a reputational penalty for liquidating, for example) would make the property right strictly more valuable than the contractual right only.}

## 4 Equilibrium Contracting with Reading Costs

We have shown that in our model there are efficiency gains to be had by allowing for security interests and negative covenants in contracts that bind third-parties. Moreover, in an environment with no transactions costs and perfectly observable contracts, there are only benefits and no costs to these restraints. These rights merely allow the firm to commit to protecting early lenders against the ex-post risk of dilution at the hands of subsequent lenders. Thus, there are affirmative reasons to allow for such divisions of property rights to be enforceable. In this section, we introduce contract reading costs and show that these contractual terms also create costs for third parties. The reading costs third parties face are a form of negative externality that the contracting parties impose on others. What is more, the contracting parties are not well placed, as we shall show, to internalize these externalities.

### 4.1 The contracting game with reading costs

We begin this subsection with a description of the contracting game between $A$, $P_1$, and $P_2$. Before negotiations between $P_2$ and $A$ start, $P_2$ is unable to observe the contract $C_1$ between $P_1$ and $A$ without incurring reading costs. Thus, when negotiations begin, $P_2$ can only form a prior belief over what type of contract $P_1$ and $A$ have signed at date 1. As in standard signaling games, $P_2$ can rationally revise his beliefs about the initial contract between $P_1$ and $A$ when he sees $A$’s contract offer $C_2$ and conducts due diligence.

We assume that the contracting game at date 2 then proceeds as follows:
1. Agent A begins by making a loan contract offer \( C_2 = \{i_2, F_2, \rho \} \) to P2, which contains the terms of the second loan, \( F_2 \) (as well as its priority status and property rights conferred to P2) and a commitment by A to reimburse \( \rho \) dollars of P2’s due diligence costs.\(^{18}\)

2. P2 proceeds with the due diligence specified in A’s contract offer\(^{19}\). Due diligence results in an observed contract \( \Omega(C_1) \).

3. Nature decides whether P2’s due diligence is effective, which occurs with probability \( P(\rho) = \frac{\rho}{\rho + k} \), or ineffective, which occurs with the complementary probability \( (1 - \frac{\rho}{\rho + k}) \). If effective, P2 will observe (and understand) the true contract \( P1 \) and A have written. \( (\Omega(C_1) = C_1) \). If ineffective, P2 observes the efficient contract \( (\Omega(C_1) = C_1^{lb}) \), regardless of the contract \( P1 \) and A have actually written. The second lender P2 knows \( P(\rho) \) but not nature’s decision.

4. Finally, after completing the due diligence P2 decides whether or not to lend given his updated beliefs about \( C_1 \).

This simple setup is intended to capture the possibility that \( P1 \) and A may have written terms into their contract that have the effect of redistributing date 3 cash-flows to them rather than P2. The second lender’s uncertainty can come from two possible sources. First, he may be unsure that he observes the entirety of the pre-existing loan contracts that A has written. For example, he may be wary that A did not disclose a hidden obligation, such as a loan guarantee to a parent company, that would reduce the assets available to P2 in the event of default. Second, even if P2 is confident that he possesses all relevant pre-existing contracts, some of the covenants in these contracts may be overlooked, or have implications for P2’s rights that are misleading. The parameter \( \kappa > 0 \) then represents the difficulty of discovering the meaning or implications of a clause: as \( \kappa \) approaches zero, even low levels of due diligence will discover hidden terms with probability approaching one; as \( \kappa \) grows toward infinity, a given due diligence expenditure discovers hidden terms with probability approaching zero.

\(^{18}\)For simplicity, we assume that due diligence costs can be paid in-kind; that is, A can commit to P1 that these costs will be spent on due diligence (as opposed to being divertable by P2).

\(^{19}\)We assume that when indifferent P2 always conducts the due diligence. Thus, P2 always conducts a level of due diligence that A fully reimburses.
Although \( P_2 \) may not always discover a hidden term, he understands that when \( P_1 \)'s contract appears normal to him, he still “may have missed something”, and makes his lending decision given this risk. Lender \( P_2 \) is aware, however, that the more due diligence that \( P_1 \) and \( A \) willingly reimburse, the less likely is the possibility that \( P_1 \) and \( A \) may have included a redistributive clause in \( C_1 \), since discovery of the clause by \( P_2 \) would preclude further lending and result in an inefficient liquidation. Thus, due diligence gives \( P_2 \) confidence to lend, even if it never results in complete certainty about \( P_1 \)'s contract.

4.2 Equilibrium Contracting and Due Diligence

We begin our analysis by pointing out that there does not exist a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game with reading costs, which implements the first-best outcome without any due diligence by \( P_2 \). To see this point, suppose that \( P_2 \) simply follows the same lending policy as before without reading the details of the contract between \( P_1 \) and \( A \) and hoping that \( P_1 \) and \( A \) would have written the efficient contract. Could the efficient contract between \( P_1 \) and \( A \) still be an equilibrium move when reading costs are positive? If so, then the presence of reading costs for third parties would not be a serious concern for welfare, as agents would simply continue to draft contracts as if they were in a transactions-cost free world and they would not have to worry about imposing negative externalities on others.

However, as the next lemma establishes, when \( P_1 \) and \( A \) expect \( P_2 \) to lend without any investigation, then their best response is to write a contract that involves maximal redistribution from \( P_2 \) to themselves (call this contract \( C_2^* \)). Adding some additional notation, let \( V_x \) denote the joint continuation payoff to \( P_1 \) and \( A \) in the event that they write this maximally redistributive contract and \( P_2 \) lends. Then we have the following lemma:

**Lemma 2** Suppose that \( P_2 \) always accepts the contract \( C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, 0\} \) in the good state without incurring any due diligence costs. Then the best response for \( P_1 \) and \( A \) is to write a maximally redistributive contract \( C_1^* \) that takes the following form:

\[ \text{The maximally redistributive contract } C_1^* \text{ would set } \Phi_1 = 0, \text{ so that } P_1 \text{ and } A \text{ would be able to claim the entire cash-flow net of effort costs: } (X - c). \]

In principle, the law could even allow for negative \( \Phi_1 \), implying that \( P_1 \) could seize \( P_2 \)'s property (over and above \( i_2 \)) if \( P_2 \) makes a loan. In a world with no reading costs, there would be no loss in enforcing these extremely redistributive contracts, because \( P_2 \) would never sign them.
A receives $i_1$ at date 1, and promises $P_1$ a repayment

$$F_1 = \frac{i_1 - (1 - \pi)L}{\pi},$$

at date 3. $P_1$ takes a first-priority security interest in the final cash flow, and $P_1$ has a right to void any loan to $A$ made before date 3 of any amount ($\Phi_1 = 0$). In the Coasean legal environment, $P_1$ and $A$ would receive the maximum possible joint continuation payoff $V_x = X - c$.

This lemma implies that in a Coasean legal environment in which third parties incur contract reading costs, it will be impossible to avoid these costs completely, because this would increase the likelihood of opportunism by $P_1$ and $A$.

We now proceed to describe what we will term the least-cost separating equilibrium of the contracting game. This will be the equilibrium with the lowest feasible (deadweight) due diligence costs that supports lending by $P_1$ and $P_2$ in equilibrium. As is well known, the set of possible Bayes-Nash equilibrium outcomes in a signaling game is typically large and our game is no exception. This multiplicity is driven by the general form the conditional belief function can take and the weak restrictions imposed by the equilibrium consistency-of-beliefs requirement in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. However, in our game as in other signaling games a particular belief function appears to be particularly reasonable intuitively.

We assume that the belief function is such that $P_2$ will attach positive probability weight to at most two contracts: the efficient contract $C_1^{fb}$, and the maximally redistributive contract $C_1^r$. Let $\nu(C_1) \in [0, 1]$ denote $P_2$’s belief that $C_1^{fb}$ was written. As in standard signaling games, $P_2$ can rationally revise his beliefs about $C_1$ to $\nu_2(C_1 \mid C_2, \Omega(C_1))$ when he sees $A$’s contract offer $C_2$ and the observed contract $\Omega(C_1)$ that results from his investigation. We assume this belief function takes the general form that any contract offer $C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}$ – where $\rho$ is below a cutoff value $\rho^*$ – is interpreted by $P_2$ as signaling the redistributive contract $C_1^r$. In that case $P_2$’s updated beliefs are $\nu_2(C_1 \mid C_2, \Omega(C_1)) = 0$ and $P_2$’s best response is to reject such a contract. On the other hand, all contract offers $C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}$, with $\rho \geq \rho^*$ provide sufficient reassurance to $P_2$ that he is willing to investigate, and he will lend as long as $\Omega(C_1) = C_1^{fb}$.

We now characterize the cutoff $\rho^*$ that implements the least-cost separating equilibrium. Consider some $\rho \geq \rho^*$, so that $P_2$ will lend after observing $C_1^{fb}$. Intuitively, $P_1$ and $A$ will find one of two possible strategies optimal given $P_2$’s beliefs.
One strategy is to write contract $C_1^{fb}$, which is optimal for $P_1$ and $A$ given a fully-informed $P_2$. If $P_1$ and $A$ were to agree on this contract, followed by the same contract offer $C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}$, their joint continuation payoff in the good state would be

$$X - i_2 - c$$

The other strategy is to write the maximally redistributive contract $C_1^x$, hoping that $P_2$ will not discover it. This contract would return the highest possible joint payoff $V_x = X - c$ to the parties if the investigation is ineffective, but will result in liquidation if $P_2$’s due diligence is effective. The expected joint continuation payoff of $P_1$ and $A$ in the good state from writing $C_1^x$ is

$$\left(\frac{\rho}{\rho + \kappa}\right) L + \left(1 - \frac{\rho}{\rho + \kappa}\right) V_x$$

With these expressions in hand, the following inequality tells us for what level of due diligence costs $P_1$ and $A$ will prefer to write the efficient contract, given $P_2$’s beliefs:

$$X - i_2 - c \geq \left(\frac{\rho}{\rho + \kappa}\right) L + \left(1 - \frac{\rho}{\rho + \kappa}\right) V_x \quad (2)$$

Since equilibrium requires that $P_2$’s beliefs must be consistent with the behavior of $P_1$ and $A$ along the equilibrium path, the lowest feasible cut-off $\rho^*$ is given by the solution $\rho$ for which (2) holds as an equality:

$$\rho^* = \frac{\kappa \{V_x - (X - i_2 - c)\}}{X - i_2 - c - L} \quad (3)$$

In the Coasean legal environment (in which the law allows fully-flexible design of property rights), this expression reduces to:

$$\rho^* = \frac{\kappa i_2}{X - i_2 - c - L} \quad (4)$$

In the least-cost separating equilibrium, $P_1$ and $A$ must set aside $\rho^*$ up-front to compensate $P_2$ for his due diligence: if they offer less, $P_2$ will rationally believe that the contract is redistributive and refuse to lend.

The final step in implementing this equilibrium is to verify that, inclusive of these due diligence costs, $P_1$ and $A$ prefer to implement an equilibrium that involves $P_1$ lending at date 1, and continuing with effort in the good state by borrowing from $P_2$. This requires a slightly modified assumption to reflect the presence of positive reading costs:
A3b: \( \pi(R_g - \rho^*) + (1 - \pi)L \geq i_1 \)

Under this assumption the project can feasibly repay P1 inclusive of P2’s due diligence costs, which are paid only in the good state.

With these assumptions in hand, we summarize this subsection by describing fully the least-cost separating equilibrium in the following proposition:

**Proposition 3** Under the assumptions above (A1, A2, A3b, A4), the least cost separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the lending game with reading costs is as follows. At date 1, P1 and A agree on contract \( C_1^{fb} \) taking the following form:

1. P1 lends \( i_1 + \rho^* \) to A. In turn, A invests \( i_1 \) in the project and holds \( \rho^* \) until date 2;
2. A promises a repayment to P1 of \( F_1 = \frac{i_1 + \rho^* - (1 - \pi)(L + \rho^*)}{\pi} \). P1 takes a first-priority security interest in the final cash flow, and the right to void any loan made to A before date 3 whose repayment exceeds \( \Phi_1 = i_2 \).

At date 2, in the good state:

1. A offers contract \( C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho^*\} \) to P2,
2. P2 conducts due diligence, accepts the contract after observing \( \Omega(C_1) = C_1^{fb} \), and invests \( i_2 \) in the firm;
3. A chooses high effort (\( e = 1 \)) and the project yields \( X \) at date 3.

At date 2 in the bad state: P2 refuses to lend and the project is liquidated, paying \( L + \rho^* \) to P1.

**Proof.** See the appendix. ■

In this equilibrium, since we have assumed (by assumption A3b) that \( \rho^* \) is not too large, the only inefficiency caused by the presence of reading costs for P2 are the deadweight costs of due-diligence \( \rho^* \).

It is important to note, however, that the direct costs of due diligence are not the only economically relevant costs to imperfect observability. When assumption A3b is relaxed, so that

\[
\pi(R_g - \rho^*) + (1 - \pi)L < i_1 \leq \pi R_g + (1 - \pi)L,
\]
then $P_1$ does not expect to be repaid his initial contribution, and refuses to lend. As a result, due diligence costs cause credit-rationing: firms that would otherwise receive funding under costless observability can not obtain an initial loan from $P_1$.

Whether the deadweight costs are the reading costs actually expended, or the indirect costs of underinvestment in valuable projects, it is clear that these losses will be higher when $\rho^*$ is higher. A casual examination of (3), then, gives the following comparative statics:

**Corollary 4** Relative to the Coasean environment with no reading costs, the social welfare loss with positive reading costs is greater when:

1. Due diligence expenditures are less effective (higher $\kappa$);
2. The net gains from redistribution to $P_1$ and $A$ ($V_x - (X - i_2 - c)$) are larger;
3. The net present value of $P_2$’s loan ($X - i_2 - c - L$) is smaller.

**Proof.** These follow immediately from the definition of $\rho^*$. ■

These comparative statics are intuitive. The less effective is due diligence in finding a hidden term, the more cost must be expended to eliminate the redistribution threat. When the net gains from redistribution ($V_x - (X - i_2 - c)$) are large relative to the cost of being caught ($X - i_2 - c - L$), $P_2$ must be able to catch a redistributive covenant with greater probability for $P_1$ and $A$ to prefer to write an efficient contract rather than a maximally redistributive one.

### 4.2.1 Optimal Property Rights with Omniscient Courts

Up to this point, we have assumed a legal environment (which we termed the Coasean legal environment), in which the law allows contracting parties maximum flexibility in designing property rights that the law will enforce. In the setting with costless observability, the first-best action plan is possible in the Coasean environment, implying that no alternative legal rule can be preferred.

With positive reading costs, however, the Coasean legal environment is not a welfare-maximizing legal rule. To see this, suppose a social planner can observe and condition legal rules on the same set of variables that the parties can contract upon. Then an optimal legal rule would limit the rights that $A$ could grant to $P_1$, to eliminate the risk of expropriation. With this risk eliminated, $P_2$ will be free to lend without requiring due diligence.
Lemma 5 If courts are omniscient, an optimal legal rule modifies the Coasean legal environment by adding the following limitations on the space of enforceable property rights:

1. A limit on senior security interests: $A$ can promise $P_1$ a repayment of no more than

$$F_1 = \frac{i_1 - (1 - \pi)L}{\pi}.$$ 

to be secured by a first-priority interest in the final cash flow.

2. A limitation on negative covenants that bind third-parties: $A$ and $P_1$ can set $\Phi_1$ no less than $i_2$.

In this modified legal environment, the first-best action plan can be implemented by the sequence of contracts in Proposition 1 with no reading costs expended by $P_2$.

Proof. Omitted.

The lemma demonstrates, at least in principle, that legal rules limiting the set of enforceable property rights can increase social welfare. In the lemma, the law simply mandates that $P_1$’s rights be no stronger than what is necessary to achieve the first-best outcome.

It is worth noting that the law may need to limit $A$’s senior indebtedness to $P_1$ ($F_1$) as well as the negative covenant ($\Phi_1$) in order for $P_2$ to lend without any investigation. If the law limited $\Phi_1$ but did not limit $F_1$, then $P_1$ and $A$ may find it optimal to set $F_1 = X$ (thus giving $P_1$ a senior claim on the entire date 3 cash flow). If $P_2$ chose to lend in the good state without investigation, he would receive zero at date 3. Though $A$ will choose low effort in the good state under this contract, the value redistributed from $P_2$ (his entire loan $i_2$) may outweigh the efficiency loss from continuation with low effort $((1 - p)(X - \gamma L) - c)$. Under U.S. law, this type of redistributive contract by $P_1$ and $A$ could in fact be invalidated by $P_2$ if a court considers it a fraudulent conveyance; we discuss the conditions under which this can occur in Section 5.

Of course, the obvious critique of the above intervention is that it would require an unrealistic level of knowledge by courts to implement successfully in practice. Given that firms vary along many dimensions that are unobservable, the optimal cap on $F_1$ and $\Phi_1$ will be firm-specific and difficult to identify precisely on a case-by-case basis. As a result, $21$ $A$ would receive nothing at date 3 as well, but $A$ would require an up-front cash payment from $P_1$ at date 1, so that $P_1$’s participation constraint binds and $A$ receives the expected rents.
legal rules that limit the space of enforceable property rights in practice will be subject to a trade-off: stricter restrictions may reduce due diligence and credit rationing costs, but due to their imperfect design, tighter restrictions will impose costs on parties who would write these contracts even in a world of perfect observability.

4.2.2 Optimal Property Rights under Imperfect Legal Enforcement

To see this trade-off in our formal model, consider the following imperfect legal rule: at date 2, A may promise $P_2$ up to $i_2$ dollars that is senior to $P_1$. If $A$ writes this contract with $P_2$, it will be enforced notwithstanding the terms of the contract between $A$ and $P_1$. This modified legal environment is similar in spirit to some legal rules that give later lenders non-waivable priority over earlier lenders, such as the priority given to debtor-in-possession lenders in bankruptcy.\(^{22}\)

To compare welfare (which is also $A$’s expected payoff) under these two legal environments, note that total expected welfare in the least-cost separating equilibrium in the Coasean legal environment (assuming that $P_1$’s participation constraint is satisfied) is given by

$$\pi(X - c - \rho^*) + (1 - \pi)L - i_1 - i_2$$

While investment efficiency is guaranteed in the Coasean legal environment (continuation with effort in the good state, and liquidation in the bad state), the deadweight due diligence costs $\rho^*$ are incurred in equilibrium. Social welfare under the modified legal environment that “rules in” the new loan is the following:

$$\pi(X - c) + (1 - \pi)(pX + (1 - p)\gamma L) - i_1 - i_2$$

If $P_2$ knows for sure that he will recover at least the value of his loan, he would be willing to lend at fair terms to $A$ at date 2 without the need for any due diligence. But as we have seen, the cost of providing $P_2$ with a certain return is that $P_2$ and $A$ have the incentive to invest and continue in the bad state of the world. Comparing social welfare in (5) and (6), we observe that as long as

$$\pi \rho^* > (1 - \pi)(L - pX - (1 - p)\gamma L)$$

\(^{22}\)See Bisin and Rampini (2006), who argue that a reorienting of creditor priorities in bankruptcy can be valuable for moral hazard reasons in a world where exclusivity is not enforceable. See Triantis (1993) for a discussion of debtor-in-possession financing in bankruptcy.
the “rule-in” legal environment will be social welfare-improving relative to the Coasean environment.

The comparative statics underlying the inequality are intuitive. When $\rho^*$ increases (which will be higher when $\kappa$ and $V_x$ are higher all else equal), the more restrictive legal environment improves welfare relative to the Coasean environment. On the other hand, $L - pX - (1-p)\gamma L$ represents the forgone efficiency gains when the bad state occurs. As these efficiency gains rise, the Coasean environment is more likely to be preferred. Finally, the probability $(1-\pi)$ can be thought of as a measure of the likelihood that the potentially unenforceable right would be used in equilibrium. When the states of the world in which the right is valuable are sufficiently unlikely, the more restrictive environment is more likely to be preferred.

It is worth emphasizing that this result is driven by the inability of $P1$ and $A$ to commit to protecting $P2$ in a Coasean legal environment, where all contracts are strictly enforced as written and all property rights are transferable. If the inequality above holds, $P1$ and $A$ would like to commit to offering $P2$ a senior claim, because of the due diligence cost savings, even though this would result in an inefficient continuation in the bad state. But although they prefer this outcome, they can not achieve it in the Coasean environment. Any attempt to offer this “guaranteed seniority” to $P2$ would not be credible unless accompanied by an offer to reimburse $\rho^*$ in due diligence costs. Lender $P2$ is aware that, due to the first-in-time rule in the Coasean world, $P1$’s contract could contain a term setting $\Phi_1 = 0$, which would essentially nullify $P2$’s contract. Thus, $P2$ will react with suspicion to any proposal that does not include reimbursement of due diligence, and refuse to participate.

Given that legal design and courts are imperfect, there is a difficult trade-off to resolve in the design of property laws in a financial contracting setting. While we can not resolve these trade-offs quantitatively, the analysis in this section suggests three general principles that are relevant for resolving this trade-off:

**Principle 1** The law should be less likely to enforce a right if it is *more costly for third-parties to discover* (higher $\kappa$)

**Principle 2** The law should be less likely to enforce a right if it is more *redistributive* from third parties ($V_x$)

**Principle 3** The law should be more likely to enforce a right if the *expected efficiency gains* are larger ($(1 - \pi)(L - pX - (1 - p)\gamma L)$)
5 Legal Rules and Optimal Property Rights

With these principles in mind, we now discuss some examples of legal rules regarding property rights. Our goal is to demonstrate that in a variety of situations, the general principles in our model regarding optimal legal design are often reflected in the way property rights are enforced in practice.

5.0.3 Principle 1: Discovery costs

Perfected and unperfected security interests Our model predicts that the law will employ a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties, all else equal, when these rights are more costly for a third party to discover. U.S. law regarding secured credit provides an illustration of this principle. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a secured creditor can acquire important rights that bind third-parties, but only if the security interest is perfected. For example, a perfected security interest will follow the collateral if the debtor sells it to a third-party under most circumstances. Also, if the debtor pledges the same collateral to a subsequent lender, the first creditor will have priority over the second.

Under the UCC, obtaining perfection requires that the creditor give the world notice of the security interest, usually by recording it in a filing system that third-parties can check. If the secured creditor fails to record, the security interest is said to have attached but not perfected. In this scenario, the law allows the secured lender to enforce contractual rights that are good against the borrower, such as the ability to declare default and accelerate the loan, but the law will not enforce property rights that bind third-party buyers or lenders against the asset who act without notice of the security interest.

Note here that our definition of a property right is different from the definition that is sometimes used in this context. For example, a lender whose security interest has attached but not perfected is often said to have a property right, though the secured creditor has rights only against the debtor, not against third-parties.

There are exceptions to this general rule. In some circumstances, giving notice (by filing, or by taking possession of the collateral) is not required. Under revised Article 9, sales of “payment intangibles” are automatically perfected and thus do not require notice filing. Schwarcz (2006) argues that this poses a problem for securitization of such assets, as potential buyers of these intangibles can not be certain about their priority status with respect to potential competing interests.
The notice-filing system guarantees that a security interest (or the absence thereof) can be verified easily, which reduces the required investigation costs of third-parties.\(^{25}\) Without such a system, the later lender \((P_2)\) must rely on the cooperation of the debtor \((A)\) to make knowledge of the early lender’s \((P_1)\) prior interests available at low cost. For the reasons we have discussed in the model, the debtor may have the incentive to make this information costly to discover. Hence, the law applies a restrictive approach to enforcing property rights when the interest is not recorded.

**Perfected security interests and negative covenants** The legal restriction on the property rights of an unperfected secured creditor also applies to creditors with negative covenants in their contracts that prevent or limit future borrowing. These existence of these covenants in bond indentures, which are mostly unsecured, are well-documented (Smith and Warner 1979; Billett, King and Mauer 2007), but they are also common in bank loan agreements, most of which are secured (Nini, Smith and Sufi 2008). This suggests that negative covenants provide protection to creditors over and above the benefit of security, as is the case in our model.

Though the model demonstrates that enforcement of these covenants as property rights can be valuable in preventing overinvestment, the law often refuses to enforce them as property rights in practice.\(^{26,27}\) The exceptions to this general rule have occurred when the court verifies that the subsequent lender had *actual knowledge* of the negative covenant and violated it willingly. In such situations, courts have created remedies for the negative covenant holders that bind the subsequent lender.\(^{28}\)

The usual rationale given for the difference between the perfected security interest and the negative covenant is the absence of a registration system for covenants that reduce verification costs (Bjerre 1999). Like an unrecorded security interest, discovery of a negative covenant

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\(^{25}\) In addition to mere recording, the standardization of the security interest also likely reduces investigation costs. We discuss standardization in an earlier version of this paper (Ayotte and Bolton 2007).

\(^{26}\) The oldest known case on this subject is Knott v. Shepherdstown Manufacturing, 5 S.E. 266 (W. Va. 1888) in which the court found that the breach of the negative covenant gave rise only to a claim for damages against the borrower.

\(^{27}\) Similarly, an unsecured creditor can not subordinate future unsecured creditors unless they explicitly agree to the subordination (Schwartz 1989).

\(^{28}\) In the case First Wyoming Bank v. Mudge (748 P.2d 713 Wyo. 1988) a negative pledge holder was able to recover damages from a later secured lender who knowingly violated the negative pledge clause.
requires the cooperation of the borrower, which is less reliable than a recording system. Enforcing the negative covenant (or the unperfected security interest) against $P_2$ when he has actual knowledge is also consistent with our model. If the court can verify that $P_2$ was aware and understood the negative covenant, then there is no cost to enforcing $P_1$’s rights exactly as he intends. Importantly, however, the law generally does not place the burden on $P_2$ to discover and fully understand negative covenants, which helps limit $P_2$’s required verification costs.\footnote{This does not fully resolve the issue from a normative standpoint, of course. Bjerre (1999) argues that Article 9 should be expanded to allow registration of negative pledge clauses (prohibitions on future secured debt), thus allowing them to bind third-parties. Pursuing this logic further, the law could allow \textit{any} negative covenant to be publicized, including stronger covenants (such as the ones we model here through the $\Phi$ parameter) that void any subsequent debt, secured or otherwise. In a prior version of this paper (Ayotte and Bolton 2007) we discuss this issue in more detail.}

One interesting recent example of the law’s treatment of negative covenants is the case Hechinger Liquidation Trust v. BankBoston Retail Fin., Inc. In that case, unsecured bondholders ($P_1$) argued that Hechinger ($A$) violated the terms of a negative pledge covenant when it issued secured debt to Chase ($P_2$), who provided financing for Hechinger’s acquisition of Builders Square. The negative pledge contained an exception that allowed Hechinger to issue new secured debt to purchase new assets, as long as the new assets exceeded the value of the secured debt.\footnote{This description of the facts is somewhat oversimplified, in that the interpretation of the negative pledge clause itself was disputed, not only the valuation of the target.} The two sides offered competing valuations of Builders Square to show that the negative pledge was, or was not, violated.

Instead of making the decision based on the accuracy of the competing valuations, the judge ruled that the bondholders were not entitled to an \textit{equitable lien}, a property right which would have elevated their priority in Hechinger’s bankruptcy. The judge argued that, irrespective of the actual value of Builder’s Square, the secured creditor did not have \textit{actual knowledge} that they were violating the negative pledge when they made the loan. This finding relied on the fact that Chase conducted due diligence in good faith, and relied on outsiders’ opinions that the negative pledge was not violated by the secured loan:

\begin{quote}
It is uncontroverted that the 1997 Transactions [which included Chase’s loan] were negotiated in good faith, at arms-length and with reliance upon professional advice and opinions with respect to compliance with the terms of the Negative
\end{quote}
Pledge...Even if the court were to adopt plaintiff’s expert’s testimony with respect to the value of Builders Square, the court finds no evidence that Chase Bank or defendants [BankBoston, who acquired the loan from Chase] had actual knowledge of that valuation, that they were under no legal duty to know that valuation and, therefore, there is no basis in law or equity to impose a lien based on that valuation.31

In addition to demonstrating the law’s willingness to limit property rights to negative covenant holders, this case also illustrates the real-world nature of investigation costs. Not only must contractual terms be discovered (as the negative pledge was discovered by Chase), but they must also be interpreted and understood by third-parties, and this understanding may be costly to achieve. The court’s ruling in this case serves to limit the required investigation by third-parties into the meaning of terms in pre-existing contracts that are subjective or ambiguous.

5.0.4 Principle 2: Redistributive rights

Fraudulent conveyance Our model suggests that the law adds value by refusing to enforce a division of rights that is particularly redistributive from third-parties. The law of fraudulent conveyance is intended to invalidate exactly these redistributive transfers of rights. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), an unsecured creditor can invalidate a transaction if it satisfies the conditions for actual fraud or constructive fraud. Actual fraud requires demonstrating fraudulent intent on the part of the parties to the transaction (in this context, A and P1) to redistribute from P2. The tests for constructive fraud require the creditor to demonstrate that the transaction left the firm in poor financial condition, so that it is insufficiently capitalized, or unlikely to be able to pay future debts when they come due.32 It is exactly these transactions that are likely to be redistributive from P2.

Fraudulent conveyance attacks have arisen in leveraged buyouts that subsequently fail. To make the example concrete, consider a redistributive transaction between P1 and A, similar to the transaction we discuss following Lemma 5. Concretely, suppose P1 and A

32 Constructive fraud can be established if the creditor can show that the debtor firm a) received less than reasonably equivalent value for the transfer, and b) that the debtor was in a precarious financial situation at the time of the transfer (Blum, 2004).
engage in a leveraged recapitalization at date 1, whereby $P_1$ lends money to a corporation controlled by $A$ in exchange for a large debt claim secured by $A$’s assets. The corporation pays $A$ the proceeds from the debt issue as a dividend at date 1, leaving $A$’s firm highly levered. If the corporation later borrows from $P_2$, and then files for bankruptcy, $P_2$ may be able to attack the recapitalization as a fraudulent conveyance, and unwind the security interest given to $P_1$.

Notably, consistent with Principle 1, some courts have taken the cost of discovery into account, refusing to apply fraudulent conveyance law to protect future creditors in situations where the cost of becoming informed about past transactions is sufficiently low. In the case *Kupetz v. Wolf*, the court refused to protect creditors who invested after a well-publicized leveraged buyout:

> “Because fraudulent conveyance statutes were designed to protect creditors from secret transactions by debtors, the same rules should not apply when the transaction is made public. *Future creditors may not complain when they knew or could easily have found out about the transaction.* This certainly appears to be the case in this particular LBO. The transaction was well-publicized and the Trustee has not claimed or presented evidence that any of the future creditors were not aware of Wolf & Vine’s financial dealings.” [emphasis added]

The proper role for fraudulent conveyance law is a topic that has received attention in existing legal scholarship. Baird and Jackson (1985) argue that creditors can use protective covenants to prevent fraudulent conveyances (such as a leveraged buyout that dilutes earlier unsecured creditors) voluntarily if they so choose, but firms can not “contract out” of fraudulent conveyance protection if courts apply it erroneously. Our model is consistent with this argument, as it does not justify any mandatory restrictions on $P_1$’s ability to weaken *his own* rights against $P_2$ that are provided by default in the law.34

Nevertheless, our model can be used to explain why the law might refuse to enforce a contract between $A$ and $P_1$ that weakens $P_2$’s rights, by preventing $P_2$ from using the fraudulent conveyance remedy, as this would require $P_2$’s investigation to discover a right

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33 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988)

34 Moreover, in such a context, $A$ would have every incentive to reveal this contractual term to $P_2$, as it would result in more generous lending terms from $P_2$. This is not true in the opposite case (where $A$ and $P_1$ restrict $P_2$’s rights), as $A$ has the incentive to disguise this information.
that may be harmful to him. In this context, our model implies that there is a valid trade-off between the benefits of reducing due diligence expenditures and credit-rationing, and the costs of ineffective or incorrect enforcement of this standard by courts.

**Piercing the corporate veil** Though our discussion focuses on security interests and negative covenants as a means of protecting $P_1$’s claims against dilution by $P_2$, another means of giving $P_1$ priority over $P_2$ is through the creation of separate legal entities. For example, $A$ might create a parent company and a wholly-owned subsidiary, and allow $P_1$ to lend at the parent level, while $P_2$ lends at the subsidiary level. This would imply that $P_2$ would be senior to $P_1$ with respect to assets held at the subsidiary level, but $P_2$ would have no ability to reach the assets at the parent level if the subsidiary’s assets are not sufficient to repay $P_2$.

When such multi-tiered organizational structures exist, $P_2$’s information about which entity owns which assets, and the nature of the relationship between the two entities, is obviously important. As we have seen, $A$ might have an incentive to disguise the fact that $P_2$ is lending to an under-capitalized subsidiary rather than a well-capitalized parent company. When such misrepresentation is possible due to vague boundaries between entities, creditors can attempt to pierce the veil of the subsidiary and pursue the parent’s assets to satisfy their claims. While the application of veil-piercing by courts is difficult to generalize, Thompson (1991) finds that the most common reasoning includes undercapitalization of the subsidiary and the misrepresentation of entity boundaries by the firm. The first rationale is consistent with Principle 2: the more thinly-capitalized the subsidiary, the lower the recovery for the later lender if veil-piercing is not allowed.\(^{35}\) The second rationale is consistent with Principle 1, that in misrepresenting the boundary of the entity, the firm increased the costs of discovery to third-parties.

**5.0.5 Principle 3: Efficiency**

**Limitations on anti-assignment clauses** Our model suggests a trade-off in legal design between limiting verification costs, and allowing for divisions of rights that enhance efficiency.

\(^{35}\)Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) argues, in the same spirit as our model, that allowing for veil-piercing in these contexts can be understood as a means of providing incentives for firms to disclose their undercapitalization to creditors when a full investigation of the firm’s finances is prohibitively costly.
One example of balancing these competing forces can be found in the treatment of contractual anti-assignment clauses. For instance, a firm operating as a franchisee (A) may desire to grant a security interest in his franchisee rights to a lender (P2) as a means of obtaining cheaper credit, but the franchisor (P1) may value the right to restrict who can become a franchisee. In a different context, a bank (A) might wish to sell its rights to payment on a loan to an investor (P2), but the borrower (P1) may be concerned about who his creditors are in the future.

These applications are a slight departure from the model in that the principals are not both lenders, but the underlying trade-off is similar. If the law allows complete contractual freedom between P1 and A to limit A’s ability to assign his rights to P2, this could result in redistribution from an uninformed P2 who attempts to acquire A’s rights, and later finds himself empty-handed. The possibility of this outcome would increase the required due diligence of potential P2’s before agreeing with A, and potentially limit the liquidity of these financial contracts in secondary markets if P2 attempts to resell them.36 On the other hand, limiting the scope of P1 and A to create such restraints might hinder efficient contracting. For example, after making a loan to a borrower, a relationship bank might be tempted to assign a loan to a lender who would be unwilling to forgive minor covenant violations, simply because this “tough” lender is willing to buy the loan at a high price.37

Allowing these restraints on assignment to be enforceable helps the bank commit to the relationship with the borrower.

Article 9 of the UCC resolves this tension in a way that balances the key trade-offs of efficiency gains against verification costs. In contexts such as the examples above, the UCC invalidates agreements between A and P1 that attempt to restrict assignability to P2.38

This restriction allows potential third-parties to lend against or purchase these assets without

36 Some anecdotal evidence from Canada supports this feature of our model. In Quebec and Ontario, anti-assignment provisions are not part of the commercial code. As a result, Fingerhut (2006), in an article targeted at practicing lawyers, warns that “additional due diligence is called for when the collateral includes Quebec or Ontario receivables.”

37 Consistent with this logic, Guner (2007) finds that borrowers extract concessions from banks that are likely to sell loans through lower interest rates.

38 The discussion applies to collateral covered by UCC §9-408 which includes, among other things, “general intangibles” such as franchise and licensing agreements, and sales of “payment intangibles” such as commercial loans. For a thorough discussion of these issues, see Morse (2001), Plank (2001) and Schwarcz (1999).
taking the steps to verify that these anti-assignment clauses are not present. To protect
P1, however, the law allows a contractual anti-assignment provision to limit P2’s rights to
enforce the security interest against P1. Thus, a borrower in a commercial lending context
can ensure that he will not be subject to the aggressive collection tactics of an unknown loan
buyer if he contracts for this protection, yet the loan buyer can be certain that in purchasing
rights to payment, his potential losses from failing to discover an anti-assignment clause are
limited.\textsuperscript{39}

\section{Conclusion}

In this paper, we adopt a definition of property rights that departs from most of the eco-
nomics literature on the subject and follows a definition of property rights in recent legal
scholarship. Because this definition emphasizes that property rights are rights that bind
third-parties, a key concern is that third-parties may be imperfectly informed about the
pre-existing rights that affect them. In a financial contracting context, these concepts are
particularly important because borrowers may become insolvent. As a result, lenders are
particularly worried about the presence of rights that bind other lenders with competing
claims.

We develop a formal theoretical model in which lenders and borrowers are rational, in
that they anticipate the strategic behavior of other players, and can write sophisticated
contracts that attempt to mitigate inefficient, opportunistic behavior. If information is
costless to acquire, a legal environment that allows parties maximum flexibility to create
and enforce any allocation of divided property rights is optimal. When observability is
costly, however, there can be a role for the legal system to limit the space of property rights
that are enforceable.

If the law permits full enforceability, third-parties will not participate without conducting
sufficient due diligence to reassure themselves that redistribution at their expense has not
occurred. In equilibrium, these deadweight costs of due diligence are borne by the borrowing

\textsuperscript{39}The reader might wonder what the value of a security interest in the intangible to P2 would be in the
presence of an anti-assignment clause if P2 can not enforce his rights against P1. If P2 were a secured
lender to A against the intangible, the protection P2 would obtain in this case is, among other things, the
right to adequate protection payments if A files for bankruptcy. For an example, see Plank (2001), p. 331.
firms. Importantly, though, this does not rule out a role for optimal design of property laws. In our model, there is no way for firms to reduce these costs, due to an inability to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution. The law can add value by providing firms with a credible mechanism to make this commitment. If the cost of discovering a right is large enough, and the right is potentially redistributive, then the law will optimally refuse to enforce such a right. The law in our model can be seen as mandatory, in that the law will mandate a relationship between the enforceability of a right and the cost of discovering that right by third-parties which cannot be adjusted by contract. On the other hand, if contracting parties can demonstrate to a court that they made third-parties aware of their pre-existing rights, then our model suggests the rights should be enforced.

In our investigation into existing law, we find several examples that broadly confirm the qualitative trade-offs in the model. Laws that govern financial contracting in which third-parties are affected often limit the ability of early lenders to create enforceable property rights that can be redistributive. The law is less likely to enforce a property right when it is unlikely that the right has an efficiency rationale, and is more likely to enforce the right when knowledge about the right is relatively inexpensive for a third-party to acquire.

While our formal model is intended to add an additional element of realism to the study of legal design in a financial contracting setting, there are other important factors our analysis does not address that are important. For instance, many of the mandatory standards in the law that are intended to protect third-parties also entail substantial ex-post litigation costs. If accessing courts is costly, and judges make errors, later lenders could threaten to use the legal protections we document above in an opportunistic way as a means of extracting value from earlier lenders. This could lead to deadweight costs and inefficient allocations as a result, tipping the scales toward a more permissive legal environment. On the other hand, the ability of the early lender to protect himself by monitoring the firm’s contracting with the later lender is not present in the current model. Adding the possibility of costly monitoring would imply that $P_1$ has other means of protecting himself from dilution by $P_2$, reducing the cost of less-permissive legal rules.
References


7 Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1:

Proof. Note first that under the contract written between $P_1$ and $A$, $P_2$ is not willing to lend to $A$ at date 2 in the bad state. By lending $i_2$ principal $P_2$ gets an expected repayment
which is less than the loan $i_2$. Indeed, the most $P2$ can hope to get is

$$pi_2 + (1 - p) \max\{0, \gamma L - F_1\} = pi_2$$

since

$$\gamma L - F_1 = \gamma L - \frac{i_1 - (1 - \pi)L}{\pi} = \frac{\pi\gamma L + (1 - \pi)L - i_1}{\pi} < \frac{L - i_1}{\pi} < 0.$$ 

Next, $P2$ is willing to lend to $A$ at date 2 in the good state under the contract written between $P1$ and $A$, since $X - (i_2 + F_1) > \frac{c}{1 - p}$, or

$$\pi(X - \frac{c}{1 - p} - i_2) - (1 - \pi)L \geq i_1$$

by assumption A3. And when $X - (i_2 + F_1) > \frac{c}{1 - p}$, $A$’s best response is to choose high effort ($e = 1$), since then:

$$X - (i_2 + F_1) - c > p(X - (i_2 + F_1))$$

(7)

as

$$F_1 \leq R_g \equiv X - \frac{c}{1 - p} - i_2$$

by assumption A3, and by definition of $R_g$,

$$X - R_g \geq \frac{c}{1 - p}.$$ 

The RHS of (7) is $A$’s expected payoff under the low effort choice ($e = 0$), since when the project fails and only yields a liquidation value $\gamma L$ the firm’s total liabilities $(i_2 + F_1)$ exceed its assets $\gamma L$, so that $A$ gets zero. When $A$ chooses high effort the firm gets a cash flow of $X$ for sure at date 3. The firm’s debt is therefore safe, so that $P1$ is willing to lend $i_1$ in return for a debt repayment of the same amount at date 3. ■

7.0.6 The Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Proposition 3

An equilibrium of our game is taken to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where:

1. All agents play a best response given their beliefs, and

2. All players’ updated beliefs are consistent with all agents’ best responses.
More concretely,

a) $P_1$ and $A$ choose $C_1$ at date 1 given $P_2$’s expected equilibrium best response,

b) $A$ chooses the contract offer $C_2$ optimally at date 2 given the past choice of $C_1$ at date 1 and given $P_2$’s beliefs $\nu_2(C_1 \mid C_2, \Omega(C_1))$,

c) $P_2$ best responds by deciding whether or not to lend when $\Omega(C_1)$ is observed. (We assume that $P_2$ conducts any due diligence that is reimbursed by $A$ irrespective of his beliefs).

d) $P_2$’s beliefs $\nu_2(C_1 \mid C_2, \Omega(C_1))$ are consistent with the equilibrium choices, $C_1$ and $C_2$.

Under these assumptions, and under the belief-function $\nu_2(C_1^{fb} \mid C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}, \Omega(C_1) = C_1^{fb}) = 1$ for $\rho \geq \rho^*$ and $\nu_2(C_1^{fb} \mid C_2, \Omega(C_1)) = 0$ otherwise, the least-cost separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the full contracting game is stated in Proposition 3.

The proof of Proposition 3 is as follows:

**Proof.** Given that under due diligence $\rho^*$ we have

$$X - i_2 - c = \left(\frac{\rho^*}{\rho^* + \kappa}\right) L + \left(1 - \frac{\rho^*}{\rho^* + \kappa}\right) (X - c),$$

it is a (weak) best response for $P_1$ and $A$ to agree to contract $C_1^{fb}$. Given the choice of $C_1^{fb}$, $P_2$’s investigation will produce $\Omega(C_1) = C_1^{fb}$. Thus, $P_2$’s equilibrium beliefs $\nu_2(C_1^{fb} \mid C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}, \Omega(C_1) = C_1^{fb}) = 1$ are consistent with $P_1$ and $A$’s equilibrium play. It is a (weak) best response for $A$ to offer contract $C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho^*\}$ at date 2, and a (weak) best response for $P_2$ to accept $C_2$ in the good state, but to reject it in the bad state. In particular, $A$ cannot obtain a higher payoff by offering any other contract $C_2 = \{i_2, i_2, \rho\}$, with $\rho \neq \rho^*$ at date 2. Indeed, any contract with $\rho > \rho^*$ would involve unnecessarily high due diligence expenditures, and any contract such that $\rho < \rho^*$ would be rejected by $P_2$ given his updated beliefs, yielding a payoff of $L + \rho^*$ to $P_1$ and $A$. To show this is less than $X - i_2 - c$, note that by A3b, $\pi(R_g - \rho^*) + (1 - \pi)L \geq i_1$. Combining this assumption with $L < i_1$, and the definition of $R_g$, it follows that $X - i_2 - c > R_g > L + \rho^*$. ■

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