Education:
B.A., McGill University
LL.B., McGill University
B.C.L, McGill University

Working Dissertation Title:
"Accountability of UN Chapter VII Activities"

Professional Experience:
Clerk to Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Supreme Court of Canada (2004-2005)
Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York (2003-2004)

Areas of Interest:
Global governance
United Nations and international organizations
Domestic and global administrative law
Law and development
Law and religion
Religious law

aref.amanat@law.columbia.edu

Israel
J.S.D. / Associate-in-Law
Morris Fellow

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School (James Kent Scholar)
LL.B., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law School (magna cum laude)

Awards and Scholarships:
Fulbright Grant
David E. Fischman Scholarship

Dissertation:
Separating Law-Making from Sausage-Making - A New Model of Judicial Review of the Legislative Process
Faithful, perhaps, to the old adage that "people who like sausages and respect the law should never watch either being made," the US Supreme Court has been reluctant for many years to exercise judicial review of the lawmaking process. My dissertation will challenge this approach and argue that it is time for a comprehensive theoretical and empirical study about judicial review of the legislative process in general, and its applicability to the United States in particular.

My research project has three major goals. The first is to demonstrate the practical need for judicial review of the legislative process and to establish its theoretical basis. The second goal is to examine the different academic and practical models of judicial review of the lawmaking process in the United States and in other countries. This examination will provide theoretic and empirical criteria to appraise the desirability of these models among themselves and in comparison to substantive judicial review and other possible non-judicial means for shaping lawmaking. The third goal is to construct a new model of judicial review of the legislative process. This model will provide an alternative to the traditional model of substantive judicial review, as well as to existing models of judicial review of the legislative process.

Professional Experience:
Columbia Law School, Associate-in-Law, 2007-2009
The Supreme Court of Israel, Permanent Senior Law Clerk to Justice Dorit Beinisch, 2002 -2005
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law School, Research Assistant to Professor Menahem Elon, 2001-2002
The Israel Democracy Institute, Research Assistant to Professor Mordechai Kremnitzer, 2000-2001

ib2147@columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia University School of Law (James Kent Scholar)
LL.B., Hebrew University, Faculty of Law (summa cum laude)
LL.B., Hebrew University, Faculty of Humanities, Humanities Interdisciplinary Program (summa cum laude)

Interpreting Precedents: Developing An Interpretative Methodology For Interpreting Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions are one of the central sources of law in common law legal systems. Like other sources of law that are expressed in the form of an authoritative text, judicial decisions often require interpretation. The need to interpret judicial decisions has significantly increased as court decisions have become longer and more complex and as decisions often include elaborate doctrines and tests. My research has two main aims: first, I intend to examine the methods of interpretation employed by lower courts interpreting higher court decisions. Second, I intend to develop a comprehensive methodology for interpreting judicial decisions comparable to methodologies developed in the fields of statutory and constitutional interpretation.

Fellowships and Appointments:
Columbia University School of Law, Fulbright Scholar, 2005-present
Hebrew University, Faculty of Law, 2001-2003, Teaching Instructor,
Jurisprudence.
Hebrew University, Faculty of Law, 1999-2001, Teaching Assistant, Contract
Law and Jurisprudence.
Hebrew University, Faculty of Law, 1998-2000, Research Assistant, Private
Law and Constitutional Law.

gb2171@columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School
M.A., Ecole Normale Superieure (Philosophy)
B.A., Universite de Paris I, Pantheon Sorbonne (Philosophy)
LL.B., Universite de Paris I, Pantheon Sorbonne

The question I am analyzing is the following: why is it that some institutions have to give reasons for their decisions and others do not have this obligation?  By "institution" I mean the different arms of the government that are entrusted with the task of making public decisions.  They can be political (e.g., Parliaments), administrative (e.g., various specialized agencies) or judicial (essentially courts).  Some of these institutions have an explicit obligation to give reasons for their decisions, others can choose to give reasons or not, and still others enjoy the privilege of never bearing the obligation to give reasons .  Why is this so?  What premises as theories justify these discrepancies?

mc2430@columbia.edu

Education:
M.St., Oxford University (candidate)
LL.M., Columbia University (James Kent Scholar)
J.D., Boston University (G. Joseph Tauro Scholar)
B.A., Drury College (President's Scholar)

My JSD dissertation is tentatively entitled "Self Government and Sovereignty in International Law," and examines the relationship of comparative constitutional ideas of citizen sovereignty and participatory government to the evolution and understanding of state sovereignty in international law as a means to rethink and reinforce arguments for non-state actor participation in international lawmaking.  My broader research agenda relates to law and international development, with a particular focus on natural resource management, property rights, and the process of making decisions about development alternatives.

I'm working on the JSD as part of a transition to full-time teaching.  I served as Director of Tulane Law School's Environmental Law and Policy Institute in New Orleans (2001-05) and as a legal advisor to the US Agency for International Development (1995-2001), and in both positions worked with a number of international agencies, government institutions, and non-governmental organizations on legal reform projects relating to law and natural resource development.  I spent the early part of my career in practice in Boston and Washington, DC.

erd2111@columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School (Walter Gellhorn Prize, James Kent Scholar)
J.D., Boston University School of Law
M.A., Harvard University
B.A., Duke University

I am writing about the intersection of religion and law in a variety of contexts.  My research explores the question of teaching about religion in public schools, the problem of constitutional definitions of religion, and the ongoing debate about the appropriate role of religious belief in forming political judgment.

Prior to enrolling in the J.S.D. program, I was a law clerk for Judge Jerome Farris, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and for Judge William E. Smith, U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island.  I also worked in private practice as an Associate in the litigation department of Sullivan & Worcester, LLP in Boston.  I'm presently working part time as an Assistant District Attorney in the Appellate Division in Middlesex County, Massachusetts.

Publications:
"Recoiling From Religion," 43 San Diego Law Review (forthcoming 2006)
"The New Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist Commitments," 59 Arkansas Law Review 1 (2006) "Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal Judges," 10 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 111 (2005)

md2377@columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School (James Kent Scholar)
Graduate Studies in Philosophy, Tel Aviv University
LL.B. (magna cum laude), Tel Aviv University
B.A., Philosophy (magna cum laude), Tel Aviv University

Dissertation:
"The non-identity problem: The possibility of historic injustice, the rights of future people and the value of non-existence".
The dissertation takes a critical stance on what is known in ethics as the "non-identity problem".  We can affect the identity of future people, and many of our acts and choices have this effect. This fact gives rise to the non-identity problem, according to which acts that determine the identity of those born in the future cannot harm or wrong those individuals since, had the choice not been made, the individual at stake would not have existed. Future people are better off existing as they are than not existing at all.

This argument poses a problem to practical reasoning, since many times we think the past can harm or wrong members of subsequent generations, born after the original act took place.  For example: often events and acts such as slavery, crimes against aboriginal people, cases of wrongful life or cases of environmental degradation are intuitively taken to harm or wrong some of those born later in time.

The dissertation tackles three main questions in light of the non-identity problem:

1. Can historic wrongs harm members of subsequent generations? 
2. Do future people ever have rights in relation to past acts that determined their existence?
3. Can value be attributed to non-existent people?

I currently believe that the answer to the first two questions is "yes" and the answer to the third question is "no". In the dissertation I go into these issues in a bit more detail.

Fields of Research and Interest:
Legal theory
Political philosophy
Moral philosophy
Theories of harm 
Value theory 
Historic justice

Legal and Teaching Experience:
Columbia Law School, Associate in Law, 2005/7
Tel Aviv University Philosophy Department, Instructor, 2002/3
Tel Aviv University Law School, Teaching Assistant, 2002/3 
District Court of Tel Aviv, Israel, Law Clerk to the Honorable Judge Dr. Drora Pilpel, 2001/2  

Fellowships, Scholarships and Honors:
Columbia Law School, Finkelstein Fellow, 2004/6 
Tel Aviv University, Philosophy Department, grant awarded for excellence in M.A. studies, 2003 
Dean's list, Tel Aviv University Law School, 1998

Research Experience:
Research Assistant to: 
Professor Joseph Raz, Columbia Law School, 2004/5
Professor Nili cohen, Tel Aviv University, 2003
Professor Leora Bilsky, Tel Aviv University, 2000
Professor Jose Brunner, Tel Aviv University, 1999

oherst1@law.columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School
M.A., Tel Aviv School of History
LL.B., Tel Aviv Law School

My dissertation consists of three articles.  The first article, entitled "Disposable Mothers," focuses on paid in-home caretakers and explores the intricate interactions between changes in the structures of the American family, the shifting demands of US labor market and global trends of worker migration.

Fields of Research:
Family Law
Law and Society
Citizenship Law

Additional Research Interests:
Feminist Legal Theory
Immigration Law

Recent Appointments & Awards:
ISERP Graduate Fellow, Columbia University, 2006-2007
Harlan Fiske Scholar, Columbia Law School, 2005
Columbia Law School, Research Assistant to Prof. Cynthia Estlund, 2005
Academic Distinction Scholarship, Tel Aviv School of History, 2003
Kurt Lion Foundation Fellowship, University of Constance, Germany, 2002-2003 Publications

Publications:
"Look Back at Anger: The Politics of Emotions in the Middle Ages," 87 Zmanim 22 (in Hebrew).

ts2195@columbia.edu

Education:
LL.M., Columbia Law School
M.A., Rutgers University (Criminal Justice)
LL.B., College of Management, Rishon Lezion, Israel

J.S.D. Research Topic:
"The Case for Defendants' Rights in International Law"

Education:
Utrecht University, Anthropology 2004
Master Thesis: Puzzle of Violence. A discourse analysis after the legitimization of violence in the Mapuche conflict in Chile
Utrecht University, Law 2004
Master Thesis: The Challenge of the Monopoly of Force

Fields of Research:
Legal and Political Philosophy
Conflict Studies
Criminal Justice System

Additional Research Interests:
Legitimization of Violence
Discourse Analysis
Critical Criminology

The working title of my research is: Prosecution on the Edge of Escalation: "Which Story Do You Tell Mr. Prosecutor?" That is the question I will ask in several situations of violent political conflict with regards to the prosecutors engaged in criminal proceedings against rebels, activists or ‘terrorists.' An actual risk of prosecution of crime in conflict might be that it does indeed stop the criminal acts in the short run, but radicalizes the conflict in the long run. My starting point is that the escalation process depends not so much on whether there is a criminal intervention, but more on the manner in which the prosecution is performed. Contrary to regular criminal prosecutions, in a situation of violent political conflict the legitimacy of the government and its monopoly of force are threatened. The criminal intervention in that case also serves to regain legitimacy.

Since my childhood I have been fascinated by violence and the most effective ways to deal with it. This research combines my specialization in conflict studies at the Center for Conflict Studies in Utrecht, Netherlands and my choice to focus on criminal law and criminology at the Utrecht Law School. 
 
After graduation I taught at the Center for Conflict Studies and the International School for Humanities and Social Sciences. In addition I founded "Stichting StadsSpelen", a civil society association organizing Urban Olympic Games in Amsterdam. Furthermore I worked as an intern in a criminal law firm and at the International Criminal Court.

ct2273@columbia.edu